Friday, March 1, 2013

Is Sound Prediction a "Free-Standing Doctrine"?

Teva Canada Ltd v Novartis AG / imatinib 2013 FC 141, Snider J
            GLEEVEC / imatinib mesylate / 2,093,203

[164] Sound prediction is not a free-standing statutory requirement. Rather, it is a way of showing that an invention is useful when the invention has not been directly demonstrated to work. Its introduction into Canadian law was not, as I understand it, to give a crushing hammer to those who challenge patents.

This is technically and historically correct, but it does not mean that patentees have no cause for complaint. Sound prediction originated as an aid to patentees, but some developments have been very problematic. These stem from a pregnant passage in Wellcome / AZT 2002 SCC 77 [70], that said that to support sound prediction, in addition to a factual basis and a sound line of reasoning:

there must be proper disclosure. . . . In this sort of case, however, the sound prediction is to some extent the quid pro quo the applicant offers in exchange for the patent monopoly. Precise disclosure requirements in this regard do not arise for decision in this case because both the underlying facts (the test data) and the line of reasoning (the chain terminator effect) were in fact disclosed, and disclosure in this respect did not become an issue between the parties. I therefore say no more about it.

While these remarks are expressly obiter, they suggest that when utility is based on sound prediction, there may be a requirement that the facts and line of reasoning be disclosed in the patent itself. This suggestion was taken up by Hughes J in Lilly / raloxifene 2008 FC 142 [164] and affirmed by the FCA 2009 FCA 97 [15], holding that the factual basis for sound disclosure be provided in the patent itself: see my article “Must the Factual Basis for Sound Prediction Be Disclosed in the Patent?” (2012) 28 CIPR 39, draft version here. Furthermore, in its Latanoprost decision, 2011 FCA 236, the FCA strongly implied that the line of reasoning must also be disclosed in the patent.

In her imatinib decision, Snider J held that the utility of some use claims and some genus claims was established based on sound prediction. Consequently her decisions navigates the shoals of these heightened disclosure requirements.

Miscellaneous Issues in Imatinib

Teva Canada Ltd v Novartis AG / imatinib 2013 FC 141, Snider J
            GLEEVEC / imatinib mesylate / 2,093,203


As well as the promise of the patent, discussed yesterday, Snider J’s imatinib decision is the first application of the SCC  Sildenafil disclosure requirement, and it also raises interesting issues related to sound prediction. I am still working on posts on those topics. In the meantime, this post discusses some miscellaneous emerging from the decision.

  • Differentiated promise of utility
  • What is a scintilla?
  • Burden of proof
  • POSITA may be an expert

Thursday, February 28, 2013

Imatinib – Promise of the Patent

Teva Canada Ltd v Novartis AG / imatinib 2013 FC 141, Snider J
            GLEEVEC / imatinib mesylate / 2,093,203

Imatinib has proven to be a revolutionary treatment for chronic myeloid leukemia: “What once was a death sentence has now become a manageable chronic illness with overall survival rates equal to the general population” [71]. The ‘203 patent includes a compound claim to imatinib (Claim 29) and a claim to the use of imatinib for the treatment of tumours (Claim 46, read together with Claim 29) [184]. These were the key claims at issue, and both were held to be valid. (Other important claims included Claim 1, the broadest genus claim, which was held to be invalid, and Claim 5, a sub-genus claim encompassing imatinib, which was held to be valid. A number of other claims to individual compounds were also held to be valid.)

As is now standard with respect to pharmaceutical patents, the main attack on the patent was based on lack of utility [8], and a key argument turned on the promise of the patent. In the end, Snider J construed the promise modestly, in favour of the patentee, but her decision illustrates once again that under the false promise doctrine, validity of a pharmaceutical patent may turn on an extraordinarily fine parsing of the description. Whatever the result, this is problematic, as the description is intended to disclose the invention, not to define it; the false promise doctrine means that the same meticulous care that must be given to every word of the claims, should also be given to every word of the description when drafting a Canadian patent application.

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Imatinib Procedural Posture

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc v Apotex Inc / imatinib (NOC) 2013 FC 142, Snider J
Teva Canada Ltd v Novartis AG / imatinib 2013 FC 141, Snider J
            GLEEVEC / imatinib mesylate / 2,093,203

There is a lot of meat in Snider J’s decision relating to relating to Novartis’ GLEEVEC (imatinib mesylate). I started writing a general overview, and realized that even that was too much for one post, so I will start by dealing with the NOC proceeding and the somewhat unusual procedural posture.

Apotex and Teva both wished to sell a generic version of GLEEVEC, but in their initial ANDS, submitted in 2007 and 2010, respectively, they indicated that they would wait until the expiry of the ‘203 patent, which is listed against GLEEVEC on the Patent Register. In 2011 both changed their minds and submitted revised Form Vs purporting to amend their election to allege invalidity. At about the same time, each brought an action against Novartis seeking a declaration under s 60(1) that the ‘203 patent was invalid. All four proceedings were eventually consolidated, though Snider J gave separate reasons for judgment in respect of the declaratory action (2013 FC 141) and the NOC proceeding (2013 FC 142).

In lengthy reasons in 2013 FC 141, Snider J dismissed the declaratory action, holding the key claims not to be invalid. That conclusion was also determinative in the NOC proceedings, because “it follows that the allegations of invalidity contained in the NOAs cannot be justified,” [NOC 7]. A separate question in the NOC proceedings was whether the NOC Regulations permit the amendment of a Form V to change an election [NOC 28], as Apotex and Teva had done in 2011. I would infer that it was because Apotex and Teva had doubts as to whether they would prevail on this point in an NOC proceeding that they chose to adopt the unusual course of seeking a declaration of invalidity in addition to serving an NOA (though there is nothing in Snider J's decisions that states this, even implicitly). In the end, Snider J declined to answer that question, on the basis that it is not determinative in light of her conclusion the substantive question, and because it is a question of law on which she would be owed no deference on appeal “[b]y wading into this legal question – which has become purely academic – I would not be assisting either the parties before me or the Court of Appeal” [31]. Her NOC decision was therefore primarily devoted to setting out the factual background of the proceedings. 

Friday, February 22, 2013

Thalidomide Is Not an "Innovative Drug"

Celgene Inc. v. Canada (Health) / THALOMID 2013 FCA 43 Gauthier J, Sharlow J concurring: Nadon JA dissenting, rev’g 2012 FC 154 de Montigny J (blogged here)

Text, context and purpose are all important in statutory interpretation, and in hard cases, where these considerations do not all align, the result may depend on which element is emphasized. TheTHALOMID litigation over the interpretation of the term “innovative drug” under the Data Protection Regulations, shows three different judges weighing these factors differently. In the FC, de Montigny J focused almost entirely on what he saw as the purpose of the Regulations. In the FCA, Gauthier J, for the majority, adopted an approach centered primarily on the text, while Nadon J, dissenting, had a relatively balanced approach, and relied on text, context and purpose. The result on the facts is that the FCA reversed de Montigny J decision that thalidomide should be listed. The more general consequence is a negative one. de Montigny J’s interpretation would have had very wide ramifications for the interpretation of “innovative drug.” The FCA approach turns more on the particular and very unusual facts of this case. This is true in respect of both the reasons of Gauthier J for the majority, and Nadon J in dissent.

Friday, February 15, 2013

A Serious Matter

To wrap up your week, we have the decision of Phelan J in San Miguel Brewing Int'l Ltd v Molson Canada 2005 2013 FC 156. The question was whether the trade-mark RED HORSE for beer is confusing with the trade-mark BLACK HORSE. Phelan J began by noting that “The potential for the use of phrases such as ‘this is a horse of a different colour’ or equine and beer jokes jump out at one. The Court will refrain from such frivolities for this is a case about beer and a case of beer is a serious matter.”

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

Cryptic Obvious to Try Analysis

Pfizer Canada Inc v Pharmascience Inc / pregabalin (NOC) 2013 FC 120 Hughes J
            2,255,652 – LYRICA

The ‘652 patent claims the use of pregabalin for the treatment of pain. As discussed in a previous post, Hughes J found it to be invalid for lack of utility / overbreadth. However, he also held it was not obvious.

While the discussion of obviousness was brief, it appears the attack was based on an obvious-to-try argument, as Hughes J began his analysis at [186] by quoting the relevant passages from Sanofi 2008 SCC 61 and Pfizer / sildenafil (NOC) 2009 FCA 8. Pregabalin was a compound known to be useful as an anticonvulsant, and the evidence indicated that at the relevant time “physicians would try or expect that anticonvulsants would be useful in treating some forms of pain,” [193], though at the same time a skilled person “would not have an expectation that pregabalin would be useful to treat pain without making and testing it” [194].

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

Dicta on Disclosure of Utility

Pfizer Canada Inc v Pharmascience Inc / pregabalin (NOC) 2013 FC 120 Hughes J
            2,255,652 – LYRICA

As noted in yesterday’s post, Hughes J’s pregabalin decision provides an extended, 33 page discussion of the law of sound prediction and, particularly, disclosure of utility. As discussed yesterday, the entire discussion is obiter dicta. This is significant, as some of Hughes J’s analysis appears to go beyond established law.

So, without citing authority, Hughes J says at [103] (and see similarly [159] first bullet):

The law is clear that where a new compound, such as a pharmaceutical, is the invention, the specification must state the utility of that compound so as to satisfy the definition of “invention” in section 2 of the Patent Act.

This is at odds with the statement by the SCC in Consolboard [1981] 1 SCR 504, 526 that the inventor is not obliged “in his disclosure or claims to describe in what respect the invention is new or in what way it is useful. He must say what it is he claims to have invented. He is not obliged to extol the effect or advantage of his discovery, if he describes his invention so as to produce it.” The Consolboard position that the inventor is not required to state the utility at all is problematic, and I have argued in my Factual Basis article 28 CIPR 39, section 5, that ultimately the better view is that the utility must be disclosed in the specification, if it would not otherwise be obvious to a person skilled in the art. That is the law according to the US Federal Circuit, the EPO, the PCT Reg 5.1(vi), and the EPC Rule 42(1)(f). That is also how the Canadian Patent Office understands the requirement to disclose utility: Re Immunex CD 1302, 89 CPR(4th) 34 at 74. Consolboard is also consistent with this position on its facts, as the utility was obvious without an explicit statement. (The invention was a type of wooden board, which was obviously useful for construction.) But in Canada, in light of Consolboard, it cannot yet be said that it is clear law that utility must be disclosed even when it would not be obvious; and to say utility of a new compound must be stated in the disclosure, even if it would be obvious in any event, is very difficult to reconcile with existing law. It may well be that as a practical matter, the utility of a new compound will rarely be obvious, so a statement of utility will normally be necessary, and perhaps this is what Hughes J had in mind.

Hughes J also states that it is “established” that “where utility of a pharmaceutical has been established before the application for a patent was filed in Canada, it was sufficient to reference a study in the patent description” [153] first bullet. Even more strongly, he states at [159], third bullet, that:

there is a requirement in the jurisprudence that that [sic] the specification disclose information from which the utility can be confirmed or be said to be soundly predicted.

That studies supporting demonstrated utility must be disclosed in the patent is a novel proposition which would be very controversial if accepted. The only authority cited by Hughes J is a remark from Pfizer / sildenafil [Viagra] 2010 FCA 242 (rev’d on other grounds 2012 SCC 60) that “[s]o long as the disclosure makes reference to a study demonstrating utility, there do not appear to be any other requirements to fulfill section 2" [90]. But that remark was itself obiter, as the main point of the discussion by the FCA was that the argument that the patentee “was required to include evidence of demonstrated utility in the patent disclosure is without merit. The requirements for demonstrated utility can be provided in evidence during invalidity proceedings as opposed to in the patent itself” [90]. This passage in this FCA decision is essentially an affirmation of the holding of Kelen J at first instance 2009 FC 638 [82] that:

The Court finds that there is no requirement in patent law that evidence of the demonstrated utility of the patent must be included in the patent. It is sufficient that the patent states that the invention has been demonstrated to be useful, as the '446 Patent does by making reference to the clinical testing of the compound (Study 350), and that the patent-holder is able to show evidence of demonstrated utility if the validity of the patent is challenged.

In this passage, the reference to the study in the patent was simply the way in which this particular patent has made the necessary statement that the invention is useful. (As noted above, even such a statement is probably not generally required, though it was certainly necessary on the facts as the patent at issue was a use patent.) Therefore, Kelen J’s statement does not support the conclusion drawn by Hughes J, and the FCA statement really goes no further. Thus, the case law cited by Hughes J simply does not support his assertion that “there is a requirement in the jurisprudence that that [sic] the specification disclose information from which the utility can be confirmed or be said to be soundly predicted” [159].

Finally, I note that Hughes J also remarks confusingly that in the Viagra decision the SCC “said that there was no heightened requirement for disclosure in cases where utility is based on sound prediction,” [154] though in the next paragraph, he quotes the SCC as saying the point “does not arise in this case and need not be addressed,” [155], and he then emphasizes that “the comments as to sound prediction are strictly obiter” [156].

It remains to be seen whether Hughes J will give effect to the controversial statements of law set out in this discussion when they arise on the facts in a case before him. For now, we may note that this statements are obiter, and are by no means uncontroversial.

Sunday, February 10, 2013

Be Sure to Claim the Commercial Compound

Pfizer Canada Inc v Pharmascience Inc / pregabalin (NOC) 2013 FC 120 Hughes J
            2,255,652 – LYRICA

Hughes J’s pregabalin decision is noteworthy for a curiously lengthy discussion of the law related to disclosure of utility. The discussion spanned 63 paragraphs [96 -159] and 33 pages of the 86 page decision. What is curious about the discussion is that it was entirely irrelevant to the case at hand! Hughes J remarked at the outset that “The manner in which our Courts have dealt with the matter of sound prediction has appeared to cause some to raise concerns, in Canada and elsewhere, as to how the subject is treated” [96], and he has apparently decided to take this judgment as an opportunity to set out his views. My next post will discuss those views. This post focuses on the issues raised in the case. The bottom line is straightforward: make sure to claim the commercial compound for the primary use.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Removing Inventors Post-Grant

Segatoys Co., Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General) 2013 FC 98 O’Keefe J
            2,547,539 T-1472-12, Date: January 30, 2013

Somehow the Segatoys decision escaped my notice last week, even though I had been staring straight at it when looking at FC website. (Alan Macek’s useful daily IP update brought it to my attention.)

Segatoys was an uncontested application by Segatoys for an order to replace the named inventors on a granted patent by removing the two listed inventors, who had worked on the appearance of the final product without contributing to the inventive concept, and adding the two real inventors. It was uncontested that the error was inadvertent.

In Micromass 2006 FC 117 Layden-Stevenson J held that inventorship of a patent cannot be changed under s 8, which allows the Commissioner to make changes, as that relates only to clerical errors. Prior to grant, the change can be made under s 31(3), (4), which allow the Commissioner to remove or join an applicant to a pending application, but after grant, such a chance can only be made under s 52, which gives the Federal Court broad powers to rectify matters relating to title. Subsequently, in Plasti-Fab 2010 FC 172, O'Keefe J followed Micromass, and held further that when considering an application under s 52 to add an inventor to a granted patent, the Court will engage the test set out under s 31(4) that would be applied by the Commissioner in adding an applicant prior to grant. In Segatoys, O’Keefe J, in a straightforward extension of Plasti-Fab, held that when considering an application under s 52 to remove an inventor, the Court will engage the test set out under s 31(3) that would be applied by the Commissioner in removing an applicant prior to grant.

Apart from this, the decision suggests that the Court will try not to place unnecessary burdens on the applicant in this type of uncontested motion, where, as O’Keefe J noted “nothing suggests that third party rights will be affected” [26]. In particular, the facts were established by notarized declaration rather than affidavit, as specified in s 31(3) of the Act, but O’Keefe J held that this was adequate, as “the declarations thus fulfill the same function as an affidavit and it would be overly formalistic to reject them on the basis of their labelling” [18]

Friday, February 1, 2013

Motion for Default Judgment Must Be Supported by Affidavit Evidence

The only decision patent decision released this week by the Federal Courts was Monsanto Canada Inc v Verdegem 2013 FC 50. I had not intended to blog on it, as it is procedural, and so brief that it would be as fast to read the decision as to read this blog post. But since nothing else of interest was released, I will simply note that Verdegem was a motion for default judgment, which, under Rule 210(3) “shall be supported by affidavit evidence.” The plaintiffs did not provide any affidavit evidence directed to the substance of the claim. However, they had served a Request to Admit under Rule 255, which had not been answered. The plaintiffs argued that the unanswered Request to Admit sufficiently supported the allegations in the Statement of Claim even in the absence of an affidavit. Hughes J disagreed. He held that “such a Request cannot be a substitute for affidavit evidence required on a motion for default judgment.” Accordingly, he dismissed the motion for default judgment “without prejudice to a further motion based on proper affidavit evidence.”

Friday, January 25, 2013

“Obvious to Try” Not Appropriate on the Facts in Wenzel

Wenzel Downhole Tools Ltd v National-Oilwell Canada Ltd 2012 FCA 333 Gauthier JA: Nadon JA; Mainville JA concurring in a separate opinion aff’g 2011 FC 1323 Snider J

As described in my post on the anticipation aspect of the FCA decision, this litigation involved a bearing assembly for use in downhole drilling motors in oil and gas wells. Snider J held that the invention was obvious, invoking an “obvious to try” analysis. I suggested in my post on that aspect of her decision that it was not clear why Snider J felt an obvious to try analysis was warranted, and despite her reference to that doctrine, it did not seem to make any difference to her reasoning. The FCA has taken the same view of this aspect of her decision. While noting that the “obvious to try” approach might in principle be applicable in a mechanical field, depending on the facts of the case [95], the Court, unanimously on this point [108], held that “it was not appropriate to refer to the obvious to try approach in this case” [100]. The FCA noted that the mere fact that the bearing assemblies were tested before use did not mean the field was one in which advances are won by experimentation [99]. Nonetheless, “despite her reference to the ‘obvious to try’ approach, the Judge undertook a careful and objective analysis of the relevant factors referred to in Sanofi,” [106] in coming to her conclusion, which was supported by the evidence [103]. Consequently the FCA affirmed Snider J’s holding that the invention was obvious.

Thursday, January 24, 2013

Withdrawal of an NOA Normally Renders Application Moot

Eli Lilly Canada Inc v Teva Canada Ltd / pemetrexed (NOC) 2013 FC 28 Barnes J
            injectable pemetrexed disodium – Altima – 1,340,794

Lilly sought an order of prohibition in response to Teva’s NOA related to injectable pemetrexed disodium. Teva failed to file evidence in support of its allegation of invalidity, and subsequently withdrew its NOA. The question was whether an order of prohibition should be granted (Lilly’s position), or whether the application should be dismissed as moot (Teva’s position).

Barnes J held that the application should be dismissed for mootness. He acknowledged that it would be an abuse of process for Teva to withdraw its application solely to overcome its failure to file evidence, but he noted that there was no clear evidence as to what motivated Teva’s withdrawal in this case [10], and while “this Court could issue an Order of prohibition in circumstances similar to these. . . it is [generally] preferable to deal with abuse of process concerns as and when they arise” [13]. He noted that “[t]he withdrawal of a NOA renders the second person’s submission to the Minister for a NOC non-compliant,” so there is no risk that the Minister would issue the NOC despite the withdrawal if an order of prohibition were not granted. In response to Lilly’s concern about potential exposure to s 8 damages if a subsequent NOA were successfully filed, avoiding abuse of process concerns, he noted that the Court would be mindful of its obligations under subsection 8(4) and 8(5) [11]. Subsection 8(5) in particular provides that the Court may take account of all relevant matters, “including any conduct of the first or second person which contributed to delay the disposition of the application.” This implies that if the circumstances warranted, any s 8 damages would be assessed from the time of the filing of the second NOA.

Split FCA Affirms That Enantiomers Are Per Se Ineligible for Data Protection

Takeda Canada Inc. v. Canada (Health) / DEXILANT 2013 FCA 13 Dawson JA: Pelletier JA; Stratas JA dissenting, aff’g 2011 FC 1444 Near J (blogged here)
            dexlansoprazole – DEXILANT

It is now trite law that legislation is to be interpreted “as a harmonious whole,” in light of its text, context and purpose: Canada Trustco 2005 SCC 54 [10]. But as Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, points out (5th ed at 3):

In an easy case textual meaning, legislative intent and relevant norms all support a single interpretation. In hard cases, however, these dimensions are vague or obscure and point in different directions. In the hardest cases, the textual meaning seems plain, but cogent evidence of legislative intent (actual or presumed) makes the plain meaning unacceptable.

Takeda / DEXILANT presents a “hard case” in Sullivan’s sense, if perhaps not “the hardest case,” and the panel has split on the interpretation of the definition of “innovative drug” in the Data Protection Regulations. The majority held that enantiomers, along with salts, esters, solvates and polymorphs, are per se ineligible for protection under the Regulations, regardless of the effort necessary to originate the regulatory approval data.

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

No Vested Right to an NOC When Health and Safety is in Issue

Apotex Inc v Canada / omeprazole 2012 FCA 322 Dawson JA: Sharlow, Trudel JJA aff’g 2011 FC 1308 Barnes J (blogged here)
            omeprazole magnesium tablets

In March 2003 the Therapeutic Products Directorate advised Apotex that the examination of Apo-Omeprazole had been completed but Apotex’s application for a NOC was on patent hold. In the fall of 2009, while the application was still on patent hold, the TPD revoked the approval status on the basis that the bioequivalence study filed by Apotex with its ANDS had not been appropriately conducted. The TPD refused to reconsider this decision (for a review of the facts see 2010 FC 1310, [3], a motion to strike on this application). Apotex challenged the TPD’s decisions by way of an application. Barnes J dismissed the application as untimely under the Federal Courts Act s 18.1(2), and he held that time should not be extended. On the only substantive point that was discussed, Barnes J held that there can be no vested right to an NOC. The FCA has now affirmed the decision of Barnes J. Again, the important substantive point was whether Apotex had a vested right to an NOC. The issue was fully argued [21], and therefore, like Barnes J, the FCA gave full consideration to the point, notwithstanding its conclusion that the motion should be dismissed as being out of time.

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

The SCC Did Not Hold the Viagra Patent to Be Void in Rem

Apotex v Pfizer / sildenafil 2012 FC 1339 Zinn J
             2,163,446 / VIAGRA


In this decision in an impeachment action brought by Apotex, Zinn J granted a motion for summary judgment that the ‘446 patent is invalid, on the basis that the SCC had declared the ‘446 patent to be invalid with in rem effect in its Pfizer / sildenafil 2012 SCC 60 decision. (This decision was released in late November and posted by Alan Macek on IP Practice. I missed it as I was away on vacation at the time. It is still not posted on the FC website.) It seems to have been accepted by Pfizer that the SCC did hold the ‘446 patent invalid with in rem effect when it held at [91] that “Patent 2,163,446 is void.” So in this motion, Pfizer argued that the SCC exceeded its jurisdiction, and has filed a motion seeking amendment of the judgment, or for a rehearing on the issue of remedy [10]. Pfizer also argued that “as a consequence of the Judgment of the Supreme Court declaring the ‘446 Patent void,” the impeachment action is moot [15]. Pfzier also argued that the questions at issue were questions of mixed fact and law, and so were not binding [32]. All of these arguments take it for granted that the SCC held that patent void with in rem effect. I do not agree. The question is, what did the SCC mean when it said the patent is “void”? Did it mean “void in rem,” or “void inter partes”? In my view, it is very clear that the SCC intended the latter.

Friday, January 18, 2013

Disgorgement of Profits in NOC S 8 Claim Not Available in Ontario

Apotex Inc v Abbott Laboratories Ltd / lansoprazole 2013 ONSC 356 Quigley J

The FCA has held definitively that disgorgement of the patentee’s profits is not available as a remedy in a claim under s 8 of the NOC Regulations: Apotex Inc v Eli Lilly Canada Inc 2011 FCA 358 blogged here.  Apotex hoped to have better luck by bringing an action in the Ontario courts. That hope was kept alive when the Ontario courts dismissed a motion to strike Apotex’s claim is this case: Apotex v Abbott Labs / lansoprazole 2010 ONSC 6909, Whitaker J blogged here aff’d 2011 ONSC 3988 (Div. Ct.). Swinton J. But that hope has been now dashed by Quigley J’s long and thorough summary judgment decision on the merits, dismissing Apotex’s claim for disgorgement of Abbott and Takeda’s profits from the sale of lansoprazole [2], [212].

"Available" to the Public

Wenzel Downhole Tools Ltd v National-Oilwell Canada Ltd 2012 FCA 333 Gauthier JA: Nadon JA; Mainville JA concurring aff’g 2011 FC 1323 Snider J (blogged here)

The decision of the FCA in Wenzel Downhole Tools illustrates the difficulty of determining when a prior use of an invention make that invention “available" to the public so as to be anticipatory prior art.

The ‘630 patent was for a bearing assembly for use in downhole drilling motors in oil and gas wells. The prior art was the so-called 3103 bearing assembly. It was found as a fact at trial, and accepted on appeal, that the 3103 bearing embodied all the essential elements of the ‘630 patent, so that it would have infringed if it had been used after the ‘630 patent had issued [FC 102]. Prior to the filing date of the ‘630 patent, three 3103 bearings had been rented by their developer to a drilling company and used on a drilling job in Texas. The bearing assembly was enclosed in a metal casing giving no hint of what was inside. Had the user opened the casing and inspected the assembly, it would have been able to discern the essential elements of the invention [60]. However, it would not have been usual or easy for the user to open the casing and on the facts the user made no effort to do so [154]. The question was whether this was enabling disclosure, or, as the Act puts it, whether this made the invention “available to the public,” so as to anticipate the ‘630 patent. It was undisputed that the user “was free at law and in equity to use whatever information was available from the product it rented” [59], so that the user qualified as “the public.” The question therefore was whether the invention had been “made available.” Snider J at trial thought it had, and Gauthier JA, for herself and Nadon JA agreed. Mainville JA, however, penned a strong dissent on this point. (Mainville JA concurred in the result on the ground that the invention was obvious; the Court unanimously agreed with Snider J that issue.)

Friday, January 11, 2013

No New Cases for Weeks of 23 December, 6 January

No new patent / NOC / data protection cases were posted on the Federal Courts' websites for the weeks of 30 December, 2012, or 6 January, 2013.

Wednesday, January 2, 2013

Easterbrook J on Issue Estoppel Based on Foreign Proceedings

In Apotex v AstraZeneca / omeprazole 2012 FCA 68 Stratas JA: Dawson, Trudel JJA aff’g 2011 FC 598 Mosley J, aff’g 95 CPR(4th) 414 Lafrenière Pr (blogged here), the FCA refused to strike a pleading raising issue estoppel based on foreign litigation. In catching up on my law review reading, I came across the decision of Easterbrook J (sitting by designation) in Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar 745 F Supp 517 (ND Ill 1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, 935 F 2d 1555 (Fed Cir 1991), which actually applied issue estoppel based on the Canadian decision by Strayer J in Mahurkar v Vas-Cath of Canada Ltd(1988), 18 CPR(3d) 417 as determinative of some issues in the US litigation between the same parties involving the corresponding patent. In light of the recent FCA decision, I thought Easterbrook J’s decision was worth raising, as I do not believe it has been cited in the previous Canadian cases on this point.

In deciding to apply issue estoppel (or issue preclusion, the US terminology), Easterbrook J remarked

I do not read the Federal Circuit's cases as compelling courts of the United States to ignore informed decisions rendered abroad; the judges of that distinguished court are not xenophobes. Decisions from the Federal Circuit instead reflect the legitimate concern that, when considering what the first case settled, courts not disregard differences in law. If a foreign court renders judgment on a question of fact with significance in each system of law, there is no reason not to take over that decision. Despite Judge Weinstein's omens, I propose to do just that: to examine the Canadian judgments, to learn what has been decided, and to apply those decisions to this litigation to the extent-and only to the extent-they are legally relevant, and the findings are free of the influence of legal differences.
            . . .
I do not think it important that Canada does not afford parties the same discovery rights as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Preclusion survives substantial differences in the rules of procedure (provided the differences are not so great that the original judgment was obtained without due process of law, as we understand that phrase). Even within the United States, some states are more stingy with discovery than are federal courts, yet their judgments are honored. Vas-Cath does not contend that the system of litigation in Canada is uncivilized or unlikely to produce sound judgments. Most nations of the world view our system of discovery as uncivilized. No case I could find declined to give force to a Canadian judgment on the ground that Canadian procedural rules differ from ours. Vas-Cath has not pointed to any fact that it wanted to bring to the Canadian court's attention but could not because of procedural rules. Even after extensive discovery in this case, Vas-Cath has not identified any fact that could have made a difference, if only it had been found in time for presentation to the Canadian court.

Easterbrook J’s analysis seems to be consistent with the approach adopted in prior Canadian cases refusing to strike pleading based on foreign issue estoppel, such as those reviewed by Layden-Stevenson J inJohnson & Johnson Inc v Boston Scientific Ltd, 2008 FC 552 at [260]-[268] (and see also my post here discussing a variant of this issue.) The difference is that Easterbrook J went so far as to actually apply the doctrine.

I came across Easterbrook J’s decision in Kyle Grimshaw, International Upheaval: Patent Independence Protections and the Hague Conference, 2001 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 20. Grimshaw argues that Easterbrook J was wrong, and issue estoppel based on foreign decisions should not be allowed, on the basis that foreign substantive and procedural rules may be different. While that is true, both of these concerns were acknowledged by Easterbrook J, who held, in effect, that this would not preclude the application of issue estoppel if these differences were not significant in the context of the case at hand.

Monday, December 31, 2012

No New Cases for Week of 23 December

No new patent / NOC / data protection cases were posted on the Federal Courts' website for the week of 23 December.

Thursday, December 20, 2012

Damages Calculations Are a “Broad Axe” Not a “Rapier Point”

Apotex Inc v Merck Canada Inc / alendronate (NOC) 2012 FC 1418 Hughes J, further reasons in respect of 2012 FC 1235
            2,294,595 – alendronate

These supplementary reasons by Hughes J resolve a narrow question regarding the calculation of damages, but they also illustrate the more general point that calculation of damages is not an exact science.

The decision concerned the calculation of Apotex’s damages under s 8 of the NOC Regulations for having been wrongly excluded from the market for alendronate. The applicable general principles were set out by Hughes J in his first damages decision, blogged here. One specific question concerned the calculation of rebates. As Hughes J explained in his first decision at [92]-[93], rebates are often paid by the seller, such as Apotex, to the purchaser, such as a pharmacy. The amount of the rebate varies considerably, depending on the relative bargaining power of the parties [94]. The rebate, which is usually calculated as a percentage of the sale price, will be smaller when the first generic in the market is the sole generic supplier, and so has more market power, and it will be larger after entry by multiple generics, when there is more competition. In his first decision, Hughes J held that one amount YY% (the actual number was redacted) should apply during the period when Apotex would have been the exclusive generic supplier, and another, larger, number XX%, should be applied in the subsequent period after entry by other generics, which, on the facts, would have been Novopharm [101].

The parties were unable to agree on how these numbers should be applied, and this second damages decision by Hughes J was to resolve this disagreement. The calculations by Merck’s expert simply applied a rebate of YY% up until the date when Novopharm entered the market, and XX% thereafter [5]. Apotex’s expert, in contrast, argued that in reality the rebate would not have suddenly have jumped from YY% to XX%, but would have adjusted gradually. This would have meant greater hypothetical profits for Apotex, and thus larger damages.

Hughes J preferred Merck’s approach, for two reasons. First, the approach advocated by Apotex’s expert had not been advanced at trial, where it was accepted that two figures would be applied, representing pre- and post-entry rebates [7].

Of more general interest, Hughes J also pointed out that Apotex’s approach involved a false sophistication. Even if it was true that in reality the rebate would have adjusted gradually, the fact is that the whole calculation was fraught with uncertainty. To adjust the XX figure to reflect a gradual entry was not likely to be more accurate than a simple two stage calculation, given that the XX percentage itself was a best guess, rather than a truly correct figure:

[8] As I expressed in my October Reasons, the whole area of rebates is a murky one. There is no one correct or absolute figure that can be established. At best, one can approximate what “would have” happened. It is not an area where exactitude or sophisticated calculations have a place. As some judges have said, the approach is more of a “broad axe” approach than that of a “rapier point”.

This is a reference to Lord Shaw’s remark in Watson Laidlaw (1914), 31 RPC 104 at 117-18 (H.L.) that “[t]he restoration by way of compensation is therefore accomplished to a large extent by the exercise of a sound imagination and the practice of the broad axe.”

That damages calculations are uncertain is important for two reasons. Most directly, as this case illustrates, there comes a point at which attempts to overly refine the damages calculation will add expense without adding accuracy. Secondly, it is important in the context of the irreparable harm requirement for obtaining an interlocutory injunctions. As I have argued in my article, Interlocutory Injunctions and Irreparable Harm in the Federal Courts, (2010) 88 Can Bar Rev 517, the fact that damages calculations are inherently unreliable implies that in most cases a party who is wrongly denied an interlocutory injunction will suffer irreparable harm, in the sense that damages will not provide full compensation for the loss.

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

Statute of Monopolies Redux?

Apotex Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Company LLC / quinapril 2012 FCA 323 Nadon JA: Sharlow, Dawson JJA rev’g 2012 FC 202 Lemieux J
            1,331,615

Is the Statute of Monopolies alive and well and hiding in Ontario? In 2009 Apotex brought an impeachment action seeking a declaration that two patents, including the ‘615 patent, are invalid. The ‘615 patent expired in August 2011, and the patentee, Parke Davis, moved to have the action dismissed in respect of it on the grounds of mootness. Apotex responded that the issue was not moot because the question was whether the ‘615 patent was ever valid, and the answer would affect its entitlement to a remedy under both the Statute of Monopolies of Ontario RSO 1897, c 323, and under s 8 of the NOC Regulations.

In the decision under appeal (blogged here), Lemieux J granted the motion on the basis that it was well established that subsequent success in an infringement or impeachment action could not affect a generic’s entitlement to s 8 damages, which are conditioned on success in the NOC proceedings themselves. However, Lemieux J did not address the Statute of Monopolies argument at all. 

In this decision, the FCA has held that Lemieux J erred in failing to address the Statute of Monopolies argument. The FCA then went on to allow the appeal on the basis that it was not clear that Apotex’s action based on the Statute of Monopolies could not possibly succeed. The Statute of Monopolies of Ontario, “reproduces in somewhat altered form, the original Statute of Monopolies enacted in 1624, 21 James I, Chap. 3,” originally appeared as Ch. 1 of the Statutes of Upper Canada, 1792, and is one of the unrepealed statutes remaining in force in Ontario: Gilbert v Horner (1960), 34 C.P.R. 17 (OCA). In holding that it might possibly form the basis for a remedy in favour of Apotex, the FCA relied on Gilbert v Horner, in which the OCA held that the interpretation of the statute was difficult, and there was almost no relevant case law, so that it could not be said that there was no prospect of success. As this was sufficient to allow the appeal, the FCA did not address the NOC arguments.

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Named Co-inventor Has No Right to Be Heard Before Being Removed from Application

Baksh v Probiohealth LLC 2012 FC 1388, O’Reilly J
            Application 2,503,510

It seems that a named co-inventor has no right to be heard before being removed from an application. In 1999 Mr Bing Baksh was involved in helping Probiohealth develop a probiotic nutritional supplement involving bacteria suspended in oil and packaged in a particular encapsulation system. Mr Baksh had been primarily responsible for the encapsulation system, while a Dr Naidu was primarily responsible for developing the oil suspension [3]. In 2002 Priobiohealth filed a patent application, that became the ‘510 application, in which Mr Baksh and Dr Naidu were named as co-inventors [4]. In 2006 Dr Naidu assigned his rights to Probiohealth, but Mr Baksh refused to do so [5]. Probiohealth filed a voluntary amendment cancelling the claims related to the encapsulation system [6]. Probiohealth then filed a request under 31(3) of the Act to remove Mr Baksh as a co-inventor on the application [9], supporting this with an affidavit from Dr Naidu swearing that he was the sole inventor of the remaining claims. The Commissioner granted the request, and sent Mr Baksh a letter confirming that he had been removed as a co-inventor [11]. Mr Baksh appealed that decision and also sought judicial review. Both the appeal and the application for judicial review were addressed in O’Reilly J’s reasons.

Monday, December 17, 2012

The Inventive Concept Must Be Construed with Reference to the Disclosure

Apotex Inc v Allergan Inc / COMBIGAN (NOC) 2012 FCA 308 Noël JA: Stratas, Webb JJA aff’g for different reasons 2012 FC 767 Hughes J
            2,440,764 – COMBIGAN – brimonidine / timolol

The decision of the FCA in Apotex / COMBIGAN provides an important clarification of the second step of the Windsurfing/ Pozzoli approach to obviousness by establishing that it is necessary to have reference to the entire specification in order to construe the inventive concept. Implicitly, the statement by Jacob LJ that if any difficulty arises in determining the inventive concept, it can simply be ignored in favour of a focus on the claim as construed, is not the law in Canada.

The second step of the Windsurfing/ Pozzoli approach to obviousness, as approved by the Supreme Court in Sanofi 2008 SCC 61, [67] is to “[i]dentify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be done, construe it.” This raises two questions. How is the inventive concept to be determined? As Hughes J put it in the decision under appeal, “The question is whether the “inventive concept” is something different from the claim at issue, even when that claim has been construed by the Court. Is the Court to embark on two separate missions; one to construe the claim, the other to define the inventive concept?” [135] Secondly, why bother construing the inventive concept at all? Jacob LJ remarked in Pozzoli [2007] EWCA Civ 588 [19] that identification of the inventive concept “can develop into an unnecessary satellite debate” and in such cases “the sensible way to proceed is to forget it and simply to work on the features of the claim,” as “[i]n the end what matters is/are the difference(s) between what is claimed and the prior art.” In Actavis UK Ltd v Novartis AG [2010] EWCA Civ 82 [20] he remarked similarly that “[t]he "inventive concept" can be a distraction or helpful. It is a distraction almost as soon as there is an argument as to what it is. It is helpful when the parties are agreed as to what it is.”

Friday, December 14, 2012

Comity Cannot Solve the Problem of Inconsistent NOC Decisions

Apotex Inc v Allergan Inc / COMBIGAN (NOC) 2012 FCA 308 Noël JA: Stratas, Webb JJA aff’g for different reasons 2012 FC 767 Hughes J
            2,440,764 – COMBIGAN – brimonidine / timolol

While the FCA has affirmed Hughes J’s decision (blogged here) granting an order of prohibition preventing Apotex from launching a generic version of COMBIGAN, the FCA decision is a thoroughgoing repudiation of Hughes J’s reasoning, in respect of both the main issues, comity and obviousness. The FCA decision is important on both these points. Today’s post will deal with comity and related issues, while my next post will focus on obviousness. 

The ‘764 patent covers a composition of two active ingredients, brimonidine and timolol, for the treatment of glaucoma. Such a composition is sold by Allergan as COMBIGAN. The ‘ 764 patent had previously been the subject of another NOC proceeding between Allergan and Sandoz, in which Crampton J had granted the order of prohibition sought by Allergan: Allergan v Sandoz / COMBIGAN (NOC) 2011 FC 1316. As discussed in my posts here and here, the sole issue respecting the ‘764 patent in the Sandoz / COMBIGAN litigation was whether it was invalid for obviousness. Crampton J held it was not. In the decision under appeal in Apotex / COMBIGAN (NOC), Hughes J found that the ‘764 patent was invalid for obviousness [FC 189], expressly disagreeing with Crampton J. This raised the question of the extent to which a FC judge should be influenced by a prior inconsistent decision. Hughes J therefore went on to review the case law and proposed a five-part approach for a court to adopt when faced with an earlier NOC decision involving failed invalidity allegations [FC 82]. Despite his conclusion that the claimed invention was obvious, Hughes J then went on to issue the prohibition order sought by Allergan, though it does not appear that Hughes J actually applied the five-part test which he had developed; rather he granted the order on the basis that the law regarding comity, and hence the precedential effect of Crampton J’s conclusion, required clarification by the FCA, and “[t]he only practical way to get the matter before the Court of Appeal is for me to grant the Order for prohibition in the likely expectation that Apotex will appeal” [FC 194].

Monday, November 19, 2012

Vacation

I will be on vacation (in New Zealand) for a few weeks. I expect to start posting again on December 13, starting with the cases I missed while away.

Thursday, November 15, 2012

Sound Prediction and False Promise in Pfizer / sildenafil

Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc, 2012 SCC 60 LeBel J for a unanimous court,* rev’g 2010 FCA 242 Nadon JA: Blais CJ, Trudel JA rev’g 2009 FC 638 Kelen J
            2,163,446 VIAGRA

While the SCC decided Pfizer / sildenafil on the basis that disclosure of the invention was insufficient under s 27(3), the issue of whether the factual basis for sound prediction must be disclosed in the specification was also raised. The SCC declined to decide this question, but what it did say on the point is nonetheless of some interest.

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

What Is the “Invention”?

Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc, 2012 SCC 60 LeBel J for a unanimous court,* rev’g 2010 FCA 242 Nadon JA: Blais CJ, Trudel JA rev’g 2009 FC 638 Kelen J
            2,163,446 VIAGRA

As I noted in yesterday’s post, the Pfizer / sildenafil decision was fundamentally about the patentee’s duty to disclose the invention. But what is “the invention”? Sildenafil had not been explicitly identified in the description as compound which had been tested and found to work, but it had been separately claimed in Claim 7. The ultimate question was whether the identify of sildenafil as the tested compound was sufficiently disclosed. The doctrinal argument turned on whether each claim is to be considered a separate invention [53ff]. At trial, Kelen J had felt bound by the prior case law to hold that each claim defines a separate invention [FC 44, 148], and this was affirmed by the FCA [FCA 65].** This conclusion effectively determined the outcome. As the FCA explained at [71]:

The appellant argues that the Judge was not entitled to find that the patent was clear because Claim 7 was clear. However, the Judge was never actually required to find that the '446 Patent itself was clear. Rather, he was required to find that the '446 Patent clearly revealed the invention disclosed by Claim 7.

That is, once we have decided that the invention is sildenafil (more precisely, the use of sildenafil to treat ED), it follows that the invention was sufficiently identified, since the claim itself explicitly identifies sildenafil. The SCC reversed on the basis that in this case, the specification as a whole must be considered [64], and “there is only one invention: the use of the compound or compounds that are effective in treating ED” [68]. That being the case, it does not follow directly that the invention was sufficiently identified, because the question is whether Claim 7 (which is part of the specification), in conjunction with the disclosure, sufficiently identifies the tested compound. This will depend on the particular patent.