Showing posts with label Double-Patenting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Double-Patenting. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 2, 2024

Double Patenting and Divisionals

NCS Multistage Inc v Kobold Corporation 2023 FC 1486 McVeigh J

2,693,676 / 2,820,652 / 2,738,907 / 2,766,026 / 2,820,704 (NCS) / 3,027,571 (Kobold)

My first post on this case provided an overview of this decision and addressed some miscellaneous issues, while my second post addressed the overbreadth argument. This post addresses the issue of double patenting and the Consolboard [1981] 1 SCR 504, 536–37 safe harbour for so-called ‘forced’ divisionals. Specifically, the question is whether the safe habour for forced divisionals is triggered by an examiner requisition raising a unity of invention objection, or only by a Final Action, or by something in between.

This is the most important legal aspect of the decision. It is unfortunate that NCS’s ‘throw mud at the wall’ litigation strategy meant it was crammed in with dozens of other issues. The entire discussion of divisionals was 40 paragraphs in a 1684 paragraph decision dealing with myriad other matters. As a result, McVeigh J’s analysis left several loose ends unresolved. This post, which is twice as long as McVeigh J’s discussion, tracks down these loose ends in some detail. It might seem unreasonable of me to do so, given that there is now clearly a split in the case law. No doubt future cases will provide more guidance, so it might be said that we need only let the law unfold.

But that is a litigation perspective and this is a patent prosecution problem. There are many legal issues that make no difference in prosecution. A question as to the threshold for obviousness might make it more or less likely that the patent will ultimately be found invalid for obviousness in litigation, but there is nothing a patent agent can do to affect whether the invention is obvious; that means that any change in the rule will not affect how patent agents prosecute current applications. It is not unreasonable to allow the law to unfold slowly on such issues. But the law relating to divisionals affects hundreds of applications every week. Patent agents need to know what steps to take today, to protect the patents they are prosecuting now from double patenting attacks ten years from now, when the issued patents are finally tested in litigation. The patent agent has a more difficult job than the litigator in that respect; the litigator needs to know what the law is today, the agent needs to know what it will be ten years from now.

An inventor cannot have two patents for the same invention: Comm'r of Patents v Hoechst [1964] SCR 49. The rule applies when the claims are “identical or conterminous,” referred to as “same invention” double patenting, and also when the claims of the second patent are not “patentably distinct” from those of the earlier patent, called “obviousness” double patenting: Whirlpool 2000 SCC 67 [63]–[67]; Sanofi 2008 SCC 61 [108]–[115].

The rule applies also to divisional patents, with the caveat that in Consolboard [1981] 1 SCR 504, 536–37, the SCC carved out an exception for what is sometimes call a ‘forced’ divisional, as a opposed to a voluntary divisional:

As I noted earlier, the appellant originally filed a single patent application for letters patent, but was required by the Commissioner of Patents to divide his application into two parts. It may be open to question whether the Commissioner of Patents should have split off the wafers and treated them as the subject of a separate patent but in my view a patentee is not to be prejudiced by enforced divisional applications. If patents are granted on divisional applications directed by the Patent Office, none of them should be deemed invalid, or open to attack, by reason only of the grant of the original patent.

A question then arises as to what constitutes an “enforced” or ‘forced’ divisional, which permits the patentee to take advantage of this safe harbour [226]–[245], as opposed to a so-called ‘voluntary’ divisional, which is not.

The SCC’s Consolboard statement does not provide any guidance on this issue. The SCC was speaking loosely, because a divisional is never “enforced” or “directed” by the Patent Office. If an examiner raises a unity objection, refusing to grant the patent with the full set of filed claims, and the applicant deletes some of the claims in response, the patentee may choose to file a divisional in respect of those claims, but the Patent Office will never require the applicant to file the divisional. In that sense, all divisionals are voluntary. In another sense, all divisionals are forced, because the applicant obviously wanted a patent with the full set of original claims, or it would have filed two entirely different applications in the first place. The SCC must have meant that a divisional is to be considered forced if the Patent Office would have refused to grant the parent application with the full set of claims, so that the only way to get a patent with the claims found in the divisional would have been to file the divisional. The forced / voluntary terminology seems established, so I will continue to use it, but the real question is what it means for the Patent Office to refuse the parent application.

With that terminology in mind, the substantive question is which divisionals can take advantage of the Consolboard safe harbour (‘forced’) and which cannot (‘voluntary’). Is a divisional considered forced if it is a response to a unity of invention objection by the examiner, or it is considered forced only if it is a response to a Final Action? The question arose on the facts on the issue of whether the 652 and 2,749,636 patents were voluntary divisionals of the 676 patent. (The 636 patent was not asserted but McVeigh J found it necessary to address it nonetheless [1229].)

In her review of the limited caselaw, McVeigh J [234], noted that in Abbott FC 2009 FC 648 [193], Heneghan J indicated that it was enough that the division was a response to an examiner’s unity of invention objection, saying:

[193] I am satisfied that the [2,358,395] Patent should not be found invalid for double patenting over the [2,285,266] Patent. The Applicants provided evidence to show that claims respecting the improved taste profile were divided out of the ‘266 Patent at the request of the Commissioner of Patents. That was an administrative action lying within the mandate of the Commissioner of Patents. In my opinion, it would be unfair and inequitable to find that the ‘395 Patent should be invalidated, only because the Applicants had followed the directions of the Commissioner.

In Abbott FC [27], Heneghan J noted that “during the prosecution of the ‘266 Patent, the Commissioner of Patents required Abbott to divide out any claim relating to improved taste profile into a separate application,” which led to the 395 patent. This evidently refers to the examiner’s requisition of 28 March 2000 (02285266-2000-03-28-PRO). This was the extent of the objection; in particular, there was no Final Action in the file. This means that for Heneghan J, for the applicant to be able to take advantage of the safe harbour it is enough that the divisional was filed after a requisition by the examiner making a unity objection. For convenience, I’ll call this a ‘requisition only’ approach to the safe harbour. (Note that it is the examiner, not the Commissioner, who issues a requisition, but I take it that Heneghan J is using “the Commissioner” is a synecdoche for the Patent Office as a whole.)

On the other hand, McVeigh J [236] noted that in Biogen FC 2020 FC 621 [106], [197], relating to the 2,562,277 patent, Manson J suggested that a divisional is not considered forced if it is merely a response to a requisition:

[106] Throughout the trial, Biogen characterized the divisional application as “forced.” This is an overstatement, as the August 26, 2011 Office Action was an objection, rather than a rejection by way of a “final action.” At this point in the prosecution process, Acorda’s election to proceed with the use claims and file a divisional for the method claims was voluntary. If Acorda felt that the unity of invention objection was not merited, it could have advocated that the responder method was indeed part of the claimed use invention.

The thrust of Manson J’s remark was that a divisional filed as a response to an examiner’s unity objection is not considered voluntary. The examiner requisitions at issue in Abbott FC and Biogen FC were in substantially similar terms, so it is clear that the two decisions are indeed at odds on this point. Manson J’s statement also suggests that a divisional should be considered forced only if it is in response to a Final Action. I’ll call this a ‘Final Action’ approach.

I should note that strictly a unity objection is never resolved by a Final Action. In response to a unity objection, and prior to a Final Action, the Examiner may refer the application to the Commissioner of Patents for review by a Unity Review Board: see MOPOP 21.07 and 21.07.06. (This is an administrative procedure not specifically contemplated in the Rules.) If the applicant is unsuccessful before the URB, the matter is referred to the Commissioner who may issue a Notice of Direction to the applicant under authority of 36(2.1): “the applicant shall, on the direction of the Commissioner, limit the claims to one invention only.” While 36(2.1) uses mandatory “shall” language, what is mandatory is limiting the claims in the application to a single invention. There is no positive obligation to then pursue a divisional: 36(2.1) provides that any other invention disclosed “may” be made the subject of a divisional application. In any event, notwithstanding the mandatory language, even after a Notice of Direction has been sent to the applicant, this does not in itself terminate prosecution. The applicant can then respond to the Notice of Direction, presumably normally by deleting the objectionable claims. But if the applicant chooses instead to continue the fight, the application will be forwarded to the Patent Appeal Board in a process that “resembles the review of a Final Action”: MOPOP 21.07.06. After the referral to the PAB, an unsuccessful applicant has the option of pursuing the matter through the courts. So, under the current procedure a unity objection is never resolved by a Final Action as such. With that said, this entire scenario was not before Manson J, and presumably his reference to a “final action” can be taken to mean the functionally equivalent referral to the PAB under the unity procedure. With that said, Manson J made no reference to the URB, and it is likely that he did not have the procedural context in mind, given that the divisional at issue was a response to a requisition. It is therefore entirely possible that he would consider a divisional responding to a Notice of Direction to also be forced, even though it precedes the equivalent of a Final Action. It also seems clear enough that he would not require the applicant to go so far as to appeal to the PAB.

With all that out of the way, back to the case at hand. After reviewing Abbott FC and Biogen FC, McVeigh J was of the view that:

[245] The preferred approach is an informed middle ground. Where an inventor can trace the origin of the divisional back to a direction of the Commissioner, it will be immune from double patenting attacks.

It’s not clear from this passage alone what kind of “middle ground” McVeigh J is endorsing. McVeigh J’s language referring to “a direction of the Commissioner” echoes Heneghan J’s reference to “the directions of the Commissioner.” This suggests McVeigh J contemplated a variation on Heneghan J’s approach.

Seemingly confirming this, on the facts McVeigh J did review the prosecution history to see if the 636 divisional was forced or voluntary, even though there was no referral to the URB or PAB [1228]–[1236]. This in itself implies that she would not require a referral to the URB or PAB as a prerequisite to considering a divisional to be forced. NCS relied on two Examiner Requisitions in the 676 file dated October 19, 2010 (02693676-2010-10-19-PRO) and June 16, 2011 (02693676-2011-06-16-PRO) [1234], both of which were requisitions which contained unity objections in fairly standard terms. McVeigh J found these requisitions insufficient to establish that the divisional was forced. This means that, contrary to the ‘requisition only’ approach, for McVeigh J a unity objection by an examiner is not in itself enough to establish that division was forced.

Specifically, McVeigh J noted that while the examiner had made two requisitions, “[a] review of the file history leaves it unclear whether NCS divided the 676 Patent [to form the 636 Patent] due to these objections from the Patent Office” [1235]. So, for McVeigh J, while a referral to the URB is not required, a requisition based on a unity objection alone is not enough either. It appears that she would require some evidence connecting the divisional to the objection. This might be called a ‘requisition plus’ approach. It is not enough that a unity objection was made; there must be something more that establishes a causal connection between that objection and the filing of the divisional.

What kind of evidence could establish the necessary connection? Here is the text of the June 16, 2011 requisition that NCS relied on. (The first was in similar terms.)

The application does not comply with subsection 36(1) of the Patent Act. The claims are directed to a plurality of alleged inventions as follows:

[. . . ]

According to subsection 36(2) of the Patent Act, after limiting the claims of the present application to one invention only, the applicant may make any other invention disclosed the subject of a divisional application.

This in itself was not enough to persuade McVeigh J of the necessary connection. So, it would seem that for McVeigh J, a divisional that is simply a response to this language in a requisition does not constitute a forced divisional, and so cannot take advantage of the safe harbour. This is fairly standard language for a unity objection. The language in the 28 March 2000 requisition (02285266-2000-03-28-PRO ) in Abbott FC was in very similar terms:

The claims are directed to a plurality of alleged inventions as follows:

[. . . ]

The claims must be limited to one invention only as set out in Section 36 of the Patent Act.

From this we see that McVeigh J sets a higher bar than Heneghan J in that she came to a different conclusion on essentially the same facts. I don’t think that anything can be made of the difference of the wording between these requisitions, or whether a divisional is forced or not would turn on vagaries of the examiner’s drafting style. But her “middle ground” remark implies she would not go so far as to require a Final Action.

The foregoing tells us what evidence McVeigh J considers is not adequate to establish the necessary connection between the requisition and the divisional, but it does not tell us what kind of evidence is adequate.

The next paragraph offers a hint. In coming to the conclusion that “there is nothing in the record to indicate the 636 Patent is a forced divisional” [1236], McVeigh J stated:

I acknowledge that there are two Examiner Requisitions on October 19, 2010 and June 16, 2011. However, there is no indication as there was above, in the case of the 652 Patent that NCS created a new patent application based on these objections or even in response to these objections.

The reference to the “above” case of the 652 patent is evidently a reference to [1233], where McVeigh J screenshotted the following from the 652 file history correspondence (02820652-2013-07-11-PRO):

 

 

 

 

 

 

So, it appears that McVeigh J took this to be an indication that the 652 Patent was created as a response to the examiner objections. I must say that it is not clear to me what it is about this document that warrants that inference. I am given to understand that a “voluntary amendment” (VA) of this type is not unusual, but neither is it entirely standard. A divisional is typically filed with the intended claims. In some cases, however, perhaps if the applicant has not decided which claims to pursue in the divisional, the applicant may file the divisional with placeholder claims, perhaps the original claims from the parent or claims to the unelected subject matter that was cancelled after the unity objection in the parent. The applicant may then amend the claims after filing by a VA. The VA is usually filed after the initial filing of the divisional, though in this case it was filed at the same time as the divisional application itself was filed. It not clear why that was done; filing a VA adds some expense and an additional step that could have been avoided by simply filing the intended claims as part of the application itself. In any event, the VA is an amendment to the claims that were filed as part of the divisional application, which is considered an entirely separate application (s 36(4)). I can’t see how an amendment to the claims of the divisional establishes a connection to the examiner’s requisition relating to the parent.

In any event, this at least implies that something in the correspondence with the Patent Office during the prosecution of the divisional indicating that the divisional is being filed in response to the objection is the extra step that McVeigh J would require to show that the divisional was filed as a result of that objection. Second, it implies that the above language is sufficient to establish that inference, even though it is not entirely clear why that language is sufficient.

There is a problem, however. As quoted above, McVeigh J held that in contrast to the 652 patent, the file history of the 636 patent left it unclear as to whether the 636 application was also was a response to the examiner requisition. However, the 636 file history (02749636-2011-11-30-PRO) has a very similar VA:


 I don’t see any substantive distinction between these. There is a difference in that the 652 VA was filed at the same time as the divisional itself was filed, whereas the 636 VA was filed about ten weeks after the divisional application was itself filed (as is more usual). I don’t know why this would make any difference in McVeigh J’s analysis, but I also don’t see any other difference that might be relevant.

The bottom line from the analysis so far is that that McVeigh J would require something more than a unity objection to establish that the divisional was forced; there must be something in the file history of the divisional to indicate it was filed in response to the requisition. However, it is not clear what it is about the VA that allowed McVeigh J to draw that inference. The confusion about the role of the VA is compounded by the apparent inconsistency between the treatment of the 652 and 636 divisionals. Consequently, it is not clear what evidence is needed to establish the connection that McVeigh J would require.

The foregoing relates to McVeigh J’s discussion of whether the 636 divisional was forced. She then turned to the question of whether the 652 divisional was forced [1236]. In that context, her analysis turned on what appears to be an entirely separate point:

[1244] As can be seen, Parliament created two avenues for the Patent Office when objecting to a multiplicity of invention. Subsection 36(2) allows the inventor to voluntarily divide, whereas subsection 36(2.1) enforces a division.

[1245] NCS adopts the position that both voluntary and forced divisional applications are possible under subsections 36(2) and 36(2.1) of the Patent Act.

[1246] However, I am of the view that subsection 36(2.1) is comparable to the Supreme Court’s wording of “enforced divisional application” in Consolboard at paras 536-537. This further supports adopting the approach in Biogen FC.

This seems to be saying that only a divisional issued pursuant to 36(2.1) would be considered forced. As noted above, 36(2.1) is used by the Commissioner after a review by the URB. This means that only a divisional that went to the URB is to be considered forced. As McVeigh J notes [1246], this is similar to the Biogen FC approach of requiring a Final Action, with the caveat that a referral to the URB is not strictly a Final Action, though it follows a similar procedure. While neither McVeigh J nor Manson J mentioned the URB, I expect they would both consider it sufficient if the divisional were filed as a consequence of a Notice of Direction pursuant to 36(2.1) without requiring the applicant to continue resisting so as to provoke a true Final Action.

It is not clear to me how to reconcile McVeigh J’s analysis of the 636 and 652 divisionals. The “middle ground” language [245], and the discussion at of the 636 patent at [1233]–[1236], implies a ‘requisition plus’ approach, while the discussion of the 652 patent at [1244]–[1246] implies a ‘final action’ approach. These seem to be two entirely different tests. McVeigh J held the 636 patent to be a ‘voluntary’ divisional on the basis of the first test [1236], and she held the 636 patent to be a ‘voluntary’ divisional on the basis of the second test [1247], thus confirming that these two lines of reasoning are indeed distinct grounds for holding that the division is voluntary. One way to reconcile the tests would be to say that both tests must be satisfied to take advantage of the safe harbour, but this seems strained — if McVeigh J had intended a two-pronged test, one would have expected her to say so explicitly.

To this point I have been trying to unpack McVeigh J’s decision. Now we can turn to policy considerations. There are a few points at which the divisional might be considered forced: (1) if made as a response to an examiner’s requisition; (2) after a referral to the URB and a subsequent Notice of Direction by the Commissioner pursuant to 36(2.1); (3) after the subsequent Final Action by the examiner; (4) after an adverse PAB decision; (5) after an adverse court decision. All of these might additionally be combined with McVeigh J’s suggestion that there must be something extra in the divisional file to establish a connection between the requisition and the divisional.

Regardless of the point where we draw the line in the prosecution of the parent, it is difficult to see any policy justification for requiring something extra in the file to establish a causal connection with the divisional. First, I must say that I have difficulty understanding why the standard sequence of events is not sufficient to establish a causal connection. Typically, a unity objection is made to the parent patent, identifying two groups of claims, and instructing the applicant to elect Group A or Group B; the applicant does indeed delete Group B; the applicant subsequently files a divisional claiming Group B (or substantively similar claims); the divisional application explicitly indicates that it is a divisional of the parent, as is required to claim divisional status and the benefit of the same filing date. What else is really needed to establish that the division was caused by the requisition?

Further, if a ‘requisition plus’ rule is established, patent agents will simply add the necessary wording, once they find out what it is. That will be pure formalism, and it is difficult to see what is gained. If the special words are already standard boilerplate, then it won’t make any difference. If new words need to be used – for example, if it is necessary to file placeholder claims and a VA simultaneously — there will be a period of potentially prolonged uncertainty before we find out what the special words are. And there is also the question of existing divisional patents. If agents need to add new words that are not now normally included, this would effectively mean that all past divisionals are deemed to be voluntary. This is effectively a retroactive change in the law with the injustice that entails, for no apparent benefit. The broader point here is that specific words in the divisional file will never be a reliable indication of a causal connection (assuming some evidence is necessary beyond the requisition), because the patent agent will use whatever words are necessary to invoke the safe harbour. For simplicity, in the remainder of this policy discussion I will assume there is no such requirement, though we cannot rule it out as a legal requirement.

Now we can return to the question of where to draw the line. We can rule out options (4) and (5). No one so far has suggested going so far as to requiring the applicant to go to the PAB or beyond. The outcome of a PAB decision may be an outright rejection of the application: see MOPOP 26.08. It unreasonable to require the applicant to risk rejection of the application as a prerequisite to taking advantage of the safe harbour. Moreover, requiring a PAB decision would appear to be contrary to Consolboard, as there was no mention of a PAB decision requiring the division, though it is conceivable that there was one and it was not mentioned. I included options (4) and (5) nonetheless for completeness, and to point out that there is no reason in principle to draw the line at a Final Action rather than a PAB rejection; whether the applicant decides to withdraw claims from the parent and file a divisional after any of these steps, the reason is always that the cost and inconvenience of filing a divisional is outweighed by the cost of fighting the objection.

The real question, then, is whether the safe harbour should be triggered by a requisition only, or whether the applicant needs a URB referral or a Final Action. Since a URB referral and a Final Action are closely linked, we can treat them together. These are very onerous requirements. Final Actions, or a trips to the URB, are rare. This is because a Final Action is intended as a last resort when a true impasse is reached. Indeed, an applicant is required to respond “in good faith” to a requisition: Rule 86(3). A refusal to divide in response to a unity objection solely to provoke a referral to the URB so as to protect the safe harbour, would arguably not be made in good faith. Moreover, I am given to understand that in practice unity objections tend to be raised early in proceedings and the examination does not take place until any perceived lack of unity issue is resolved. That means that a trip to the URB and possibly a Final Action would be provoked at the very outset of examination, before any of the substantive objection have been raised. That is clearly not the function of a Final Action. Further, while unity objections are routinely made very early in prosecution on the basis of the application submitted by the applicant, it also happens that a unity objection is made later in prosecution, based on new prior art discovered by the examiner or submitted by a third party pursuant to 34.1(1). In such a case, the applicant may agree with the examiner that the unity objection is appropriate. It seems wrong to require the applicant to disagree with the examiner in order to provoke a Final Action so as to take advantage of the safe harbour. It might be said that if the examiner and the applicant agree the parent claims two patentably distinct inventions, then there is no need for the safe harbour. But it is one thing for the examiner and the applicant to agree, and it is another for the applicant to be confident that a court ten years from now will agree. And just because the applicant agrees that division is appropriate, it does not necessarily mean that the applicant believes that the parent contains two distinct inventions. It is enough that the applicant is of the view that there are arguably grounds for believing the application contains two inventions; that is enough to warrant examining the two putative inventions separately. This is not to suggest that provoking a referral in order to take advantage of the safe harbour is conduct that should be sanctioned; that would put applicants in an even more impossible position. The point is that a rule requiring a Final Action or URB referral in order to take advantage of the safe harbour incentivizes conduct that is harmful to the patent system as a whole by increasing cost and delay.

Thus, the Final Action / URB approach would dramatically restrict the availability of the safe harbour. It would be tantamount to abolishing the safe harbour, or dramatically increasing the cost of the patent system. That in itself does not imply the Final Action approach is wrong. We need to ask whether it would be desirable to dramatically restrict the safe habour. This would be harsh for the applicant, but that might be justified if there is an offsetting benefit to the public.

There is a straightforward argument in favour of restricting or abolishing the safe habour. The safe harbour may protect what is in fact a second patent for the same invention, which should properly have been included in the parent application. Indeed, that is the whole point — if the divisional is patentably distinct, a safe harbour is not needed. It is unfair to the applicant to penalize them for double patenting that was not their fault, but regardless of whose fault it might be, the public will suffer the consequent harm of double patenting. We might therefore want to restrict the availability of the safe harbour, accepting the unfairness to the applicant, in order to protect the public from the harms of double patenting. Requiring the applicant to pursue more onerous steps before taking advantage of the safe harbour effectively restricts the availability of the safe harbour and therefore provides more protection to the public against the harms of double patenting.

How difficult should it be for the applicant to take advantage of the safe harbour? How hard should the applicant have to fight in resisting the Patent Offices improper unity objection? That depends on how much the public is harmed by double patenting. We should require the applicant to fight hard—all the way to a URB referral or a Final Action, if the harm to the public is large; in other words, we are willing to tolerate significant unfairness to the patentee if the harm to the public is substantial. On the other hand, if the harm to the public from double patenting is minimal, then we should not tolerate as much unfairness to the patentee. It follows that to decide where to draw the line for the safe harbour, we need to assess the harm to the public from double patenting in the context of divisionals.

How bad is the double patenting problem? The double patenting doctrine “is aimed at the problem of evergreening; extending the monopoly that was granted on the first patent by filing a new patent that does not offer a new invention to the public”: Mylan v Lilly 2016 FCA 119 [26]. When Consolboard was decided, the evergreening problem was substantial. The term ran from grant and applications were not published until grant, so if the inventor could file two patents for the same invention, it could get early protection by vigorously prosecuting the first application and potentially many years of extended protection by delaying prosecution of the second. The problem is now substantially mitigated because applications are now laid open after 18 months, so the inventor can get at most an extra 18 months, after which the first application will be prior art against the second. I will discuss this in a subsequent post.

More importantly for the present purposes, the evergreening problem does not arise at all in respect of divisionals. A divisional will necessarily have the same expiry date as the parent. This is because the divisional necessarily has the same filing date as the parent (78.2(b)). That is the point of a divisional. Otherwise, in response to a unity objection, the applicant would have to withdraw some claims and file an entirely new patent application with a new priority date, with the attendant risk that invalidating prior art would have arisen in the interim. That would be unfair to the applicant, which did after all actually file a sufficient specification fully disclosing the second invention on the original filing date, so there is no reason to deny the applicant the benefit of the original filing date. The solution to the problem is to allow a divisional, which has the same priority date as the parent (per 78.2(b)), thereby avoiding the problem of intervening prior art. In all other respects the divisional is like an entirely separate application: s 36(4). Since the divisional necessarily has the same filing date as the parent, it necessarily has the same expirty date, under the current rule that the term runs from filing. The mischief of term extension through double patenting simply cannot arise in respect of a divisional under current law, as McVeigh J recognized in AbbVie v JAMP Pharma 2023 FC 1520 [609]–[610]: see also MIPS v Bauer Hockey 2018 FC 485 [302] and GlaxoSmithKline v Apotex 2003 FCT 687 [89].

The same objection can be made to McVeigh J’s argument that “[a]n applicant should not be penalized for electing for a divisional, but such an election should not be a mere attempt to secure the claims and take advantage of the earlier priority date of the parent patent” [245]. This implies that the safe harbour should be denied when the applicant is trying to game the system by using a divisional to take advantage of the earlier priority date of the parent patent. The problem with that reasoning is that the applicant can never “take advantage of the earlier priority date of the parent,” because the parent never has an earlier priority date; the priority date of the parent and the divisional are always the same: s 78.2(b).

Another type of harm was noted by Kelen J in GlaxoSmithKline v Apotex 2003 FCT 687 [89]–[90]. He acknowledged that the original rationale for the rule against double patenting did not apply in respect of divisionals under the new Act [89], but he went on to make the following observation:

[90] I cannot agree with GSK that "the sin of double patenting" has evaporated. GSK has overlooked the impact that a second patent can have under the Regulations. Under paragraph 7(1)(e) of the Regulations, the Minister is prohibited from issuing the requested NOC for 24 months once the owner of a patent has applied for an order under subsection 6(1). The effect of this provision is to put in place a mandatory injunction that remains in force until either the case is disposed of or the 24-month period expires. The existence of additional patents allows the patent-holder to bring additional applications, thereby obtaining multiple injunctive periods. There is no need to look further than the case at bar for an excellent example of this practice. Even though Apotex successfully invalidated the '637 patent in 2001, the filing of this application by GSK has prohibited Apotex from bringing its product to market for the past two years.

I’ll call this the “NOC problem”. It arose in that case because GSK filed an application claiming dry formulation paroxetine and carved out a divisional claiming dry formulation paroxetine without microcrystalline cellulose. The patent based on the parent issued and was added to the patent register. Apotex promptly filed an NOA and the NOC litigation over the parent ensured. Then the divisional claiming dry formulation paroxetine without microcrystalline cellulose issued and was added to the patent register, and the litigation started all over again. If the two are not patentably distinct, the patentee would surely lose in the second litigation if it lost in the first. But as Kelen J pointed out, it can nonetheless get the benefit of the statutory stay (though there is a second order disincentive because of the prospect of s 8 damages). So, the NOC problem was real.

I say it “was” real, because the NOC problem that arose in GlaxoSmithKline v Apotex no longer exists, as McVeigh J recognized in AbbVie v JAMP Pharma 2023 FC 1520 [613]. As a result of 2006 amendments, SOR/2006-242, the patent list is now ‘frozen.’ The generic is now only required to respond to patents that were listed at the time it filed its NOA: NOC Regs 5(4). Consequently, the statutory stay cannot be triggered by a divisional patent added to the list after the generic files its NOA. The generic can be sued in an ordinary infringement action on the basis of a subsequent divisional — whether or not that divisional was patentably distinct from the patent — but that doesn’t cause substantial harm because there is no equivalent of the statutory stay. Under current FCA jurisprudence, the patentee will never get an interlocutory injunction. (Even if the law were relaxed, it is unlikely that a patentee would get an interlocutory injunction in a case in which its action was based on a patent that was prima facie the same as the patent at issue in litigation which it had already lost.) Without the statutory stay, there is no benefit to bringing an action based on a patent which is not patentably distinct from the earlier patent; if it lost on the first, it will almost certainly lose on the second.

So, the evergreening problem no longer exists in respect of divisionals, and the NOC problem no longer exists either.

McVeigh J raised another objection:

[1239] First, following the approach in Abbott FC [ie requisition only], this assertion potentially opens a door to misuse the patent prosecution process. Every inventor could file as many patents as they desire in a single application, and then when the Patent Office suggests division, the inventor has protection from double patenting attacks because the divisionals were “forced.”

[1240] The underlying policy rationale of double patenting must be kept in mind. Allowing inventors to expand their domain via decisions that are made by the patentees themselves is counterintuitive to the rationale underpinning double patenting. Accepting NCS’s approach means inventors can benefit from accidental misuse of the system, or worse, knowingly expand their domain in the knowledge that forced divisional applications are immune from double patenting attacks.

I’ve quoted this argument in full because I don’t understand it. When McVeigh J says “Every inventor could file as many patents as they desire in a single application,” I take it she means that an inventor could file a single application claiming many different inventions. In that case, yes, under the ‘requisition only’ approach the inventor would indeed have protection from double patenting attacks because the divisionals were ‘forced.’ But the inventor would have protection from double patenting attacks even without the safe harbour because the inventions are patentably distinct. Moreover, I fail to see how the patentee can be said to have expanded their domain. If the patentee discloses multiple inventions in the application, the patentee is entitled to protection for those multiple inventions. The patentee’s domain is defined by the claims, the patentee is entitled to claim all the inventions that it disclosed, and so far as the scope of the domain is concerned, it makes no difference whether those claims are found in single patent or multiple patents. The only thing the applicant gains by filing a single application with multiple inventions is filing fees. That is why the examiner can object based on lack of unity; the unity objection is really an administrative mechanism for ensuring that the fees charged for examination are commensurate with the work involved. That is why the s 36(1) provides that a patent is not invalid simply because the examiner fails to raise a proper unity objection.

McVeigh J raised yet another argument in AbbVie v JAMP Pharma 2023 FC 1520:

[614] However, I am not convinced that this amendment [freezing the patent register] completely removes the potential for unfair advantage from double patenting under the Regulations. As JAMP points out, a first person with more patents under a given drug on the Register will make more work for a second person seeking a NOC for a biosimilar. This is ordinarily not a problem where several patents correspond to the same drug on the Register, but it may constitute an unfair advantage for a first person where more work is created than a single invention warrants, i.e. where a generic manufacturer has to do a disproportionate amount of work due to a double patent.

If I understand this argument correctly, the idea is that it is more work for a second person to address two patents for the same invention rather than one. This is not correct in the context of divisionals. First suppose that the divisional was prompted by a unity objection made by the examiner. If the claimed subject-matter of the divisional is patentably distinct from the parent, then there is no grounds for complaint. The problem can only arise if the unity objection was improper. If the improper objection had not been made, then the claims of the divisional would have issued as claims in the parent. Since the disclosure of the patent and divisional are the same, it is no more work for the second person to address those claims in two patents (with the same disclosure), rather than one.

The objection is no stronger even as applied to an entirely unprompted divisional, for exactly the same reason. The double patenting objection only bites when the subject-matter claimed by the divisional is not patentably distinct from the parent. In that case, the patentee might have included the claims of the divisional along with the parent, but chose not to; but because it is a divisional, the disclosure is the same. Again, it is no more difficult for the second person to address claims in two patents with the same disclosure than if those same claims had been found in a single patent with that same disclosure. That is true because the disclosure is the same either way; whether the divisional was forced or voluntary doesn’t matter. Further, even if we suppose that the claims of the divisional somehow would not have been filed at all, so that there were some inconvenience of having to address new claims, it cannot possibly be very much inconvenience to address claims that are not patentably distinct, based on the same disclosure; certainly not enough to justify making the applicant fight through to the URB or a Final Action.

Finally, there is the argument that even if there is no harm to the public, it is just wrong to allow two patents for the same invention: see GlaxoSmithKline v Apotex [91]. Maybe so, but it is so wrong that we want to deny the applicant the protection of the safe harbour which the SCC endorsed in Consolboard, even in the absence of any harm to the public? To my mind, that would be contrary to a purposive interpretation of the Act. The Patent Act is intended to benefit the public. Throwing sand in the gears of the system without any corresponding benefit will simply harm the public. Kelen J adverted to 36(2) of the Act in support of his position. I fail to see how that provision supports his view that granting two patents for the same invention is a grievous sin.

To summarize, the question is how hard we should require the applicant to fight in opposing a unity objection before permitting it to take advantage of the Consolboard safe harbour. The safe harbour can result in the divisional being valid even though it is not patentably distinct from the parent. If this causes substantial harm to the public, we should require the patentee to fight hard; if there is not much harm to the public, then we should be more lax in allowing the applicant the benefit of the safe harbour.

As it turns out, this is not a difficult question to answer. There is no harm to the public at all in the context of a divisional.

There was substantial harm when Hoechst and Consolboard were decided, because the divisional might have a later expiry date (and still the SCC was willing to allow a safe harbour). That harm is now gone. There was still some harm, albeit less, under the old PM(NOC) Regs. That harm is also now gone. So now we are left with the argument that there is some inconvenience to the second person in an PM(NOC) action, although surely there is very little — I have argued that there is none at all. And then there is the argument that it is just wrong to allow two patents for the same invention. We seem to be clutching at straws to preserve double patenting as a ground of invalidity.

We can now return to the question of how difficult it should be for the applicant to take advantage of the safe harbour. If the public is seriously harmed by double patenting, a more stringent approach might be desirable, requiring the applicant to fight all the way to a URB referral or a Final Action. If the harm to the public from double patenting is minimal, then we should not tolerate as much unfairness to the patentee.

It turns out that this question is very easy to answer. As we have seen, there is simply no double patenting problem at all in respect of divisional patents. This clearly implies that a relaxed approach to the safe harbour is best. Nothing in the SCC authority requires otherwise.

Indeed, given that there is no harm at all from double patenting in the context of divisionals, it would be preferable to abolish the doctrine entirely, so that a divisional patent would never be subject to a double patenting attack based on the parent, regardless of whether it is forced or voluntary. We should recall that double patenting doctrine is entirely the creation of the courts. It has no basis whatsoever in the Act. Suppose that double patenting doctrine did not exist and it was now argued for the first time that a divisional patent is invalid if it is not patentably distinct from the parent. Would the courts today be willing to read language into the Act to invalidate the divisional? Surely not. While the the courts will sometimes read language into legislation as a matter of statutory interpretation, a strong justification is required to depart from the text, such as absurd consequences, or a result that is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. Neither of remaining arguments for the double patenting doctrine in the context of divisionals — inconvenience to the second party, if any, and ‘it’s just wrong’ — is remotely strong enough to justify reading language into the Act.

The courts created the double patenting doctrine. Now that the problems it was intended to address have been eliminated in the context of the divisionals, the double patenting doctrine should also be eliminated in that context. It might be said that now it is established law, and we are stuck with it, for better or for worse. I don’t find that persuasive. The courts created double patenting doctrine of their own initiative to address a specific problem. If the courts have the authority to create the doctrine, how can it be said that they do not have the authority to abolish it, now that the rationale for the doctrine has vanished? (What could the legislature even do to abolish a doctrine that isn’t found in the Act in the first place?) I don’t see any impediment to this in the SCC juriprudence. Hoechst, Consolboard, and Whirlpool were all decided under the old Act. Sanofi held that a selection patent is not invalid for obviousness type double patenting over a genus patent because a species is not obvious over the genus [113]. The double patenting doctrine was not applied, it was not challenged, and divisionals were never mentioned. This can’t be taken to affirm the continued vitality of double patenting doctrine in the divisionals context.

I would note that in Consolboard 537 the SCC cited JR Short Milling [1941] Ex CR 69 and Fox 4th at 270, as authority for the proposition that patents granted on divisional applications directed by the Patent Office should not be open to attack by reason of the grant of the original patent. Fox in turn cited Lovell Mfg v Beatty Bros (1962) 41 CPR 18 (Ex Ct) 68, in which Thorson P held as follows:

Finally, the basic objection to double patenting is that it would extend the life of the monopoly if a patent were granted for a device and a patent for the same device were granted subsequently. This did not happen in the present case for the two patents referred to, indeed, the plaintiff's three patents, were issued on the same day. This puts an end to the matter.

This seems to me to be both common sense and good authority for the proposition that a double patenting objection cannot be raised in respect of patents which expire on the same day. At the time, it would have been a matter more or less of coincidence that the patents expired on the same day, because they were issued on the same day. (The complete file history for the patents at issue in Lovell is not available online, but so far as I can tell, the patents were for related but distinct inventions, with different specifications, that had been filed at the same time by the same applicant. Presumably they were examined together and issued on the same date for that reason.) With divisionals under current law, it is matter of necessity, since the parent and the divisional will always have the same filing date. But in either case, the principle is the same: if the second patent cannot extend the life of the monopoly “that puts an end to the matter,” and the double patenting objection is not available.

In summary, there is simply no double patenting problem at all in respect of divisional patents. Double patenting has nonetheless grown into a complex area of law that is especially problematic in patent prosecution. There is no reason to ever hold a divisional is invalid for double patenting over its parent, so the best approach would be to simply hold that double patenting doctrine does not apply at all to divisionals, on the authority of Lovell Mfg. But at the very least, the FCA should clearly affirm the ‘requisition only’ approach to the Consolboard safe harbour. Nothing in Consolboard or any other SCC or FCA authority requires otherwise. We do not need strict rules around the safe harbour in order to protect the public from a double-patenting harm that does not exist. There are some issues in patent law that are truly difficult, such as how to deal with indirect infringement in the pharma context. The safe harbour for divisionals is not one of those issues.

Thursday, July 8, 2021

Double Patenting over Published Prior Patent

Hoffmann-La Roche Limited v Sandoz Canada Inc 2021 FC 384 Manson J

2,667,654 / 2,709,997 / pirfenidone / ESBRIET / NOC

As I mentioned in my first post on this decision, Roche’s 997 patent was found to be invalid for obviousness-type double patenting over Roche’s 654 patent [148]–[153], even though the publication date of the 654 patent, June 26, 2008, was before the claim date of the 997 patent, November 10, 2008 [9], [11], [153], so the 654 patent was prior art over the 997 patent. In my first post, I didn’t make much of this point. I just said that I was “a bit puzzled” as to why the argument was run on a double patenting basis, given that the 654 patent was prior art over the 997 and so, under Hospira 2020 FCA 30, would have been part of the state of the art against the 997 patent. I suggested that “Perhaps Sandoz felt it was safer to use double patenting rather than to rely on the Hospira doctrine—presumably the 654 patent was not part of the common general knowledge and would not have been discoverable in a reasonably diligent search.”

On further reflection, it seems to me problematic to use double patenting in this situation. Now, it may not matter, if indeed under Hospira the 654 patent is part of the state of the art against the 997 patent. But what if there is a difference? Suppose the 654 patent could not be used in an obviousness attack against the 997 patent, but it could be used in a double patenting attack. In that case, allowing a double patenting attack would mean that the patentee is in a worse position than an unrelated third party. That is, suppose that the 654 patent can be raised against the 997 patent in a double patenting attack, but not in an obviousness attack, and suppose that the 997 patent is obvious over the 654 patent, but not otherwise. That means that the 997 patent would be considered a valid inventive improvement if granted to a third party, but would be invalid if granted to Roche. This seems to me to be contrary to the general principle that validity is objective. It also strikes me as unfair that Roche should be at a disadvantage in patenting improvements to a base technology that it invented and disclosed. 

There is also a problem of consistency with the Act. In Sanofi 2008 SCC 61 [12], the Supreme Court remarked that the law of patents is “wholly statutory.” That is a considerable overstatement: the double patenting doctrine itself, which was approved by the SCC in Whirlpool 2000 SCC 67, is a judicially created doctrine which, in the classic application, prevents an inventor from obtaining a second patent for an invention which is an obvious variant of an invention disclosed in its own unpublished prior application. The doctrine was thought to be necessary precisely because that prior application is not part of the state of the art as statutorily defined in s 28.3. There are many other instances where the courts have supplemented the sparse or ambiguous language of the statute: the non-obviousness requirement, fundamental as it is, was not codified until 1993. But there are limits. As the SCC also pointed out in Sanofi 2008 SCC 61 [12], “the general concepts which are the common currency of patent lawyers are founded on a statutory text, and cannot have any other firm foundation.” If the prior application has already been published, there is no loophole to close.

Now, as noted, none of this matters if, under Hospira the 654 patent could also be raised in an obviousness attack against the 997 patent even if granted to a third party. But that isn’t an adequate reason for holding that the double patenting doctrine applies even if the prior application is published. Hospira postdates the double patenting doctrine, and the two developed independently. If the double patenting doctrine applies now, it would also have applied prior to Hospira, when it did undoubtedly make a difference. Further, Hospira is recent and there is perhaps still some uncertainty as to its scope. Applying the double patenting doctrine in this scenario means that the 997 patent was held to be invalid without ever addressing whether the 654 patent was part of the state of the art against it.

Another problem with using double patenting in this case is that the obviousness-type double patenting was assessed as of the claim date of the 997 patent [153]. That is clearly the appropriate date for an obviousness attack, but it is not clear that it is the correct date for a double patenting attack, as it is currently unsettled whether the appropriate date is the claim date of the first (654) or second (997) patent: see here and here. Now, Manson J has previously held that the appropriate date is the second claim date, and perhaps that is why he used it, but the point is not settled at the FCA level, and it would have been preferable to have this issue discussed expressly.

Since Manson J did not have any discussion at all of whether it was appropriate to use double patenting in this situation, I would presume that Roche simply didn’t object to the use of the double patenting attack and instead chose to focus its efforts on the substantive question of obviousness. Consequently, I would suggest that this decision is not strong authority for the proposition that it is permissible to use obviousness-type double patenting when the first patent is already published.

Tuesday, April 11, 2017

Another Piece of the Double Patenting Puzzle

Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada v Apotex Inc 2017 FC 296 Manson J
            2,366,932 / 2,519,898 / dasatinib / SPRYCEL / NOC

Patent law has a reputation of being an arcane and technical area of law. To me, it doesn’t generally seem that much worse than, say, corporate law, or even administrative law (where as soon as everyone figures out what the law is, the SCC changes it). But double patenting definitely lives up to the billing of being both arcane and technical. Manson J’s Dasatinib decision is significant in holding that the appropriate date for assessing obviousness-type double-patenting is the claim date of the second patent, in a case in which it actually mattered on the facts. However, the holding was not strictly necessary to the result, as the claims in question were invalid under a standard obviousness analysis, and Manson J’s reasons for selecting that date were brief. On the whole, the question of whether the claim date of the first or second patent is appropriate, remains open.

Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine which prevents an inventor from obtaining a second patent for an invention which is an obvious variant of an invention disclosed in its own unpublished prior application, even though that prior application is not part of the state of the art defined in s 28.3. The problem arises when the first patent is published after the claim date of the second patent (because otherwise it will typically be prior art in any event). The problem has normally been framed as involving a choice between three possible dates (from earliest to latest) (see Mylan FCA 2016 FCA 119, [45]):

(1) the claim date of the first patent (First Claim date);
(2) the claim date of the second patent (Second Claim date);
(3) the publication date of the second patent (Second Publication date):

The question is important only when the state of the art has changed in the interim. Keep in mind that when we are considering the correct date for assessing double patenting, it must already have been established that the double patenting doctrine applies, and so it is established that the first patent is considered to be part of the state of the art against the second, regardless of what date is used.

Recently, the law has been developed primarily in the context of NOC litigation dealing with two patents related to tadalafil, the earlier 377 patent, and the later 784 patent. In Mylan FC 2015 FC 17, discussed here, de Montigny J held that the appropriate date was (1), the First Claim date. Then, in Apotex Tadalafil FC, dealing with the same two patents, Gleason J expressed a preference for (2), the Second Claim date, but on the facts it was not necessary for her to decide between the First and Second claim dates: see here. The next decision, chronologically, was Mylan FCA, the appeal from Mylan FC. As discussed here, the Rennie JA, speaking for the FCA, definitively ruled out (3), the Second Publication date, but held that it was an open question as to whether the First or Second Claim date was correct. This effectively over-ruled de Montigny J’s holding that (1), the First Claim date, was appropriate, though he was affirmed in the result, because on the facts the result was the same whether the First or Second Claim date was used. Then, in Apotex Tadalafil FCA, Apotex argued that Whirlpool 2000 SCC 67 had held that (3), Second Publication date, was correct. The FCA rejected that argument and encouraged some out-of-the-box thinking: see here. Thus, coming in to this case, we have a clear holding from the FCA eliminating (3), the Second Publication date, but otherwise an entirely open question as between (1) and (2), the First or Second Claim date.

In this case, Manson J held that (2), the Second Claim date, is the correct date. This mattered on the facts, because Manson J held the claim at issue to be obvious as a consequence, but if the First Claim date was used, the claim at issue would not have been obvious [207]. With that said, he had already held that claim to be obvious on a traditional obviousness analysis [202].

I must say that I find Manson J’s reasoning on this issue more difficult to follow that the rest of his decision. He said that in Apotex Tadalafil FCA the FCA had

declined to affirm Justice Rennie’s exclusion of the Second Publication date (Apotex Tadalafil FCA at para 41). Therefore, the law as it currently exists on the appropriate date for the obviousness-type double patenting analysis is inconclusive. [212]

I find this passage confusing. It might be read as suggesting that Apotex Tadalafil FCA had doubted Rennie JA’s holding and re-opened the Second Publication date as a possibility, but I can’t read the decision that way. Apotex’s argument in Apotex Tadalafil FCA was Mylan FCA was wrongly decided because it was inconsistent with Whirlpool. This FCA rejected the inconsistency argument, and that is why Pelletier JA said “there is no reason for us to depart from Mylan FCA” [41]; he was not suggesting that Mylan FCA was doubtful authority and might be reconsidered.

Manson J then went on to say that he found the policy arguments made by Apotex for using Second Publication date to be persuasive in principle [209], [213]. However, those arguments were only briefly described, as being to the effect that the evil of double patenting “is to force the public to endure a prolonged monopoly on an invention,” and the publication date of the second patent “is the first date at which the patentee can enforce the second patent and the public is threatened by the risk of liability for infringement” [209]. I must say that I don’t see the force in this at all. An inventor is entitled to an invention which is not obvious as of the claim date, so the monopoly is “prolonged” only if the patent was obvious as of the claim date. Many valid patents are granted for inventions which would be obvious as of their publication date. And while the point about enforcement and liability is more or less true (though strictly, the patentee can’t enforce the patent until it is granted), I don’t really see the relevance. Manson J made the point only briefly, and no doubt it was clearer from the submissions.

No doubt Manson J’s discussion of the policy arguments was so cursory because he then went on to say, albeit in a roundabout way, that he was in any event bound by Mylan FCA to reject the Second Publication date [213]. Then, quoting a passage from Apotex Tadalafil FC [132] in which Gleason J said that “a sound argument” could be made for using (2), the Second Claim date, Manson J held that the Second Claim date, or more specifically, the Second Priority date, was indeed the correct date [216]. As discussed here, while Gleason J made a number of good points in her careful analysis, she did not definitively come down in favour of the Second Claim date. (I note that Manson J referred to the “Second Priority date,” while I have been referring to the “Second Claim date.” As discussed here, I think it is implicit in the decisions that it is really the choice between the earlier or later claim date that is at issue, even though in most of the cases this has been the priority date.)

In summary, Manson J’s Dasatinib decision is significant in holding that the appropriate date for assessing obviousness-type double-patenting is the Second Claim date, in a case in which it actually mattered on the facts. However, the holding was not strictly necessary to the result, as the claims in question were invalid under a standard obviousness analysis. Moreover, Manson J’s decision was thinly reasoned on this point. Given that Gleason J in Apotex Tadalafil FC did not feel bound to follow the much more thoroughly reasoned decision of de Montigny J in Mylan FC, I would say that it remains an open question as to whether the First or Second Claim date is appropriate.

Friday, November 11, 2016

What Did Whirlpool Decide?

Apotex Inc v Eli Lilly Canada Inc 2016 FCA 267 Pelletier JA: Boivin, Rennie JJA aff’g 2015 FC 875 Gleason J
            2,226,784 / tadalafil / CIALIS / NOC

This brief decision of FCA dealing with obviousness-type double patenting is important for its discussion of the FCA's view of precedent, both at the SCC level and its own. The decision first addresses the question of when the SCC should be taken to have settled a question of law. This topic is important not just for the issue at hand, but more broadly as the Federal Courts interprets and applies new Supreme Court precedent. The FCA also suggested that counsel might want to be more creative in thinking about how to approach obviousness-type double patenting. On both points, the FCA’s attitude bodes well for the future development of the law.

The 784 patent was attacked as being invalid for double patenting over patent 2,181,377 in two separate NOC proceedings, one involving Mylan and the other involving Apotex. The key issue in all the proceedings was the appropriate date for assessing obviousness-type double patenting: is it the claim date of the earlier patent, the claim date of the later patent, or the publication date of the later patent?

Mylan FC 2015 FC 17 was decided in Lilly’s favour in January 2015 (see here). The decision under appeal in this case, Apotex FC 2015 FC 875 was decided, also in Lilly’s favour, in July 2015 (see here). Mylan FC was affirmed by Mylan FCA 2016 FCA 119, which was issued in April of 2016. As discussed here, in Mylan FCA, the FCA rejected the latest date, namely the publication date of the later patent, and held that it did not need to decide between the two other possible dates, because the FC had held that on the facts, the 784 patent was not obvious over the 377 patent on either of the claim dates. Only a few days after Mylan FCA was issued, the appeal from Apotex FC was heard [8]. Pelletier JA remarked that “In the normal course, given that the double patenting issue is identical in both cases, this Court would have simply followed Mylan FCA and rejected Apotex’s double patenting argument on the basis that it had already decided this issue” [8]. But Apotex argued that Mylan FCA should not be followed because it was inconsistent with the SCC decision in Whirlpool 2000 SCC 67. The question therefore, was “What did Whirlpool Decide?” [28ff].

I won’t rehash the details of the Whirlpool decision, which was summarized by the FCA at [28]-[33]. Suffice it to say that Apotex made a plausible argument that the SCC in Whirlpool would have assessed double patenting as of the publication date of the later patent, if the issue had been before it [36-[37]. However, Whirlpool didn’t explicitly decide, or even address, the question of the appropriate date. The issue is whether the appropriate date should be considered settled by implication through exegesis of the SCC’s statements, or whether the question should be considered to have been left open.

Despite the appeal of Apotex’s argument, Pelletier JA rejected it (my emphasis):

[37] It is, in my view, improbable that Binnie J. would settle a significant point in the law of double patenting by implication and without addressing it directly. The care taken to justify the publication date of a patent as the date at which it is to be construed suggests that if Binnie J. intended to decide the issue of the comparison date of the claims of the patents in an obviousness double patenting suit, he would do so explicitly.

[38] Furthermore, the issue of the comparison date in double patenting cases had not arisen previously in the Supreme Court jurisprudence, nor in the works of the text book writers. It would be surprising, to say the least, if Binnie J. purported to deal with a novel question by implication. This is all the more so when one considers that the issue was there to be addressed if the Court chose to do so.

He therefore held that the question of the appropriate date remained open after Whirlpool [39].

In my view, Pelletier JA’s reasoning is both sound as a matter of policy and strongly supported by the SCC’s discussion in R v Henry 2005 SCC 76 [57]. In Henry the SCC reconsidered a number of its prior decisions, overruling some of them. The issue of the binding effect of SCC statements arose because R v Noël, 2002 SCC 67 was affirmed on its facts (Henry [49]) and the Attorney General of Ontario worried that some of the obiter would be seen as binding on trial courts. Binnie J, for the Court, that “ I do not think this ‘concern’ is plausible. The comment was neither part of the legal analysis nor a direction to trial courts. It was simply an observation by an experienced judge” [52]. Binnie J reviewed the law relating to the binding effect of its decisions, and summarized as follows (my emphasis):

[57] The issue in each case, to return to the Halsbury question, is what did the case decide? Beyond the ratio decidendi which, as the Earl of Halsbury L.C. pointed out, is generally rooted in the facts, the legal point decided by this Court may be as narrow as the jury instruction at issue in Sellars or as broad as the Oakes test. All obiter do not have, and are not intended to have, the same weight. The weight decreases as one moves from the dispositive ratio decidendi to a wider circle of analysis which is obviously intended for guidance and which should be accepted as authoritative. Beyond that, there will be commentary, examples or exposition that are intended to be helpful and may be found to be persuasive, but are certainly not “binding” in the sense the Sellars principle in its most exaggerated form would have it. The objective of the exercise is to promote certainty in the law, not to stifle its growth and creativity. The notion that each phrase in a judgment of this Court should be treated as if enacted in a statute is not supported by the cases and is inconsistent with the basic fundamental principle that the common law develops by experience.

This statement emphasizes that even direct statements by the SCC expressing a view on a point of law are not necessarily binding; it follows that inferences as to what the Court might have been thinking can never be binding. 

In his discussion, Binnie J acknowledged that in the 1970s the Court’s mandate shifted from error correction to development of the jurisprudence, and consequently, the Court’s work became more oriented to “the development of a general analytical framework which necessarily went beyond what was essential for the disposition of the particular case” [53]. While Binnie J noted that this is particularly true in the Charter context, there is no doubt that we have seen a similar shift in patent law as well. Binnie J acknowledged that this shift meant that some statements that are strictly dicta should nonetheless be considered to be effectively binding: “It would be a foolhardy advocate who dismissed Dickson C.J.’s classic formulation of proportionality in Oakes as mere obiter” [53]. Nonetheless, it is still true that “the common law develops by experience,” and much of that experience is gained at the trial and appellate levels. Binnie J cautioned that the lower courts should not be too ready to overly broaden what the SCC had decided, because:

the effect would be to deprive the legal system of much creative thought on the part of counsel and judges in other courts in continuing to examine the operation of legal principles in different and perhaps novel contexts, and to inhibit or skew the growth of the common law. This would be a consequence totally unforeseen and unintended by the Court that decided Sellars.[56]

The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court in our system, and we like to think that it has some of the best judges, but very able judges are found at every level of court, and the Supreme Court justices are not omniscient oracles. A judge in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal, will have more insight into the proper disposition of a legal question that is immediately raised on the facts before her and fully argued by counsel, than can be found in the inferred intent of a Supreme Court judge. Binnie J’s assertion that it is not “plausible” that obiter statements by the SCC could be seen as effectively binding on lower courts, is, with due respect, clearly wrong, as we know well in patent law, but the remainder of his discussion is entirely compelling.

In summary, not only was the FCA in this case right to hold that the remarks in Whirlpool were not binding authority on the issue of the correct date for assessing obviousness-type double patenting, to have held otherwise would have been inconsistent with the SCC’s own guidance in R v Henry on the binding effect of SCC decisions.

Finally, on a point of considerable practical importance, Pelletier JA concluded with the following observation:

[40] I might add that the analysis in the Earlier Cases, in Mylan FCA, and in this case was driven by the fact that the parties chose to frame the issue in terms of the date for comparison of the claims of the patents in issue. Having conducted the analysis on the basis chosen by the parties, we should not be taken as having decided that this framework for analysis is the correct one. The fact that this issue has not arisen in this form in the past may be an indication that there may be other ways to approach it. Perhaps, the Court, having construed the claims of each of the patents with the assistance of the persons skilled in the art, simply compares the claims and decides whether the later claims are patentably distinct from the earlier claims on the basis of the insights which it has gained in the course of the construction of the patents. This appears to be what was done in [Comm’r of Patents v Hoechst [1964] SCR 49], and more recently in [Sanofi 2008 SCC 61]. This is not to argue that this approach is any more correct than the comparison date approach but rather that, going forward, parties should not feel that they are locked into the framework chosen by the parties in these cases.

This observation is of a piece with Pelletier JA’s discussion of Whirlpool. Adherence to precedent is important to the predictability which allows parties to plan in reliance on the law, but sound precedent cannot grow in a straightjacket imposed by the idiosyncracies of how particular cases were argued: to repeat Binnie J’s words, “The objective of the exercise is to promote certainty in the law, not to stifle its growth and creativity."

Tuesday, April 26, 2016

Publication Date of Second Patent is Not the Date for Assessing Double Patenting

Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC v Eli Lilly Canada Inc (NOC) 2016 FCA 119, Rennie JA, Trudel, Dawson JJA aff’g 2015 FC 17 de Montigny J
            2,226,784 / tadalafil / CIALIS

The main question addressed in this appeal was the date for assessing obviousness type double-patenting. Double patenting is a judicially created doctrine which prevents an inventor from obtaining a second patent for an invention which is an obvious variant of an invention disclosed in its own prior unpublished prior application, even though that prior application is not part of the state of the art defined in s 28.3. So, in Com'r of Patents v. Farbwerke Hoechst [1964] SCR 49, the SCC held that Hoechst’s application for a patent for a medicine consisting of sulphonyl urea diluted by a carrier should be rejected as not inventively distinct over Hoechst’s prior application for a patent for sulphonyl urea, given that there was no inventive step in mixing sulphonyl urea with a carrier.

If the state of the art does not change, then the date at which double patenting is assessed does not matter; in Hoechst it had always been common general knowledge that a medicine could be mixed with a carrier. But when the common general knowledge changes, the date is important. That is what happened in this case.

The question was whether Lilly’s ‘784 patent was invalid for obviousness-type double patenting over Lilly’s 2,181,377 patent. The ‘377 patent claimed tadalafil, which is a PDE V inhibitor. It had a priority date of 21 Jan 1994. The ‘784 patent claimed tadalafil for the treatment of erectile dysfunction (ED). It had a priority date of 14 July 1995. The publication date of the ‘784 patent was 6 Feb 1997. Between the first date and the last there were two new pieces of information available to the public. On 22 Dec 1994, Pfizer’s ‘902 US patent application was published, disclosing that sildenafil, another PDE V inhibitor, was useful for treating ED [6]. In June 1996 the Boolell study was published, which provided good evidence that a PDE V inhibitor could be administered orally for safe, effective treatment of ED [7]. The timeline was conveniently summarized by Rennie JA in this chart:


If the relevant date for assessing double patenting was the publication date of the‘784 patent, then it was uncontroversial that it would be obvious, because the ‘377 patent disclosed that tadalafil is a PDE V inhibitor and the Boolell paper disclosed that any PDE V inhibitor would be effective to treat ED [46].

The FCA rejected that date. Mylan had argued that Whirlpool 2000 SCC 67 mandated the use of the publication date of the later patent [15], presumably on the basis that Whirlpool [55] had held that the claims had to be construed as of the date of publication [55, 56]. Rennie JA held that Whirlpool was not controlling authority on this point, essentially on the basis that the question of the correct date was not at issue [48]. The refusal to decide the issue by exegesis of Whirlpool strikes me as sound both in law and as a matter of policy. In R v Henry, 2005 SCC 76 [57] the SCC pointed out that its dicta is to be treated as binding only when obviously “intended for guidance,” and “[t]he notion that each phrase in a judgment of this Court should be treated as if enacted in a statute is not supported by the cases and is inconsistent with the basic fundamental principle that the common law develops by experience.” It is better to rely on the considered reasoning of the FCA on the merits of the issue, rather than an attempt to discern what the SCC might have intended on an issue which it never addressed.

Turning to the merits, Rennie JA held that it would be inappropriate to use any date later than the claim date of the second patent because that would permit consideration of information arising after the patent’s claim date, contrary to s 28.3 [50]. For example, pretend the the ‘377 patent didn’t exist and suppose the Boolell paper was published in August of 1996, so that no one knew that PDE V inhibitors could be used to treat ED until then. If double patenting was assessed as of February 1997, the ‘784 patent would be held invalid for obviousness, even though on the claim date of the ‘784 patent it was not obvious to anyone that tadalafil could be used to treat ED – not even to someone with full knowledge that tadalafil was a PDE V inhibitor, as disclosed by the ‘377 patent. That cannot be right, as Lilly would have made two distinct contributions to knowledge, namely that tadalafil was a PDE V inhibitor, and that tadalafil could be used to treat ED.

The next question is whether the claim date of the ‘377 patent should be used, or the claim date of the ‘784 patent. Rennie JA held it was not necessary to decide [52], because de Montigny J had held [147] that notwithstanding the disclosure of Pfizer’s ‘377 patent, on the claim date of the ‘784 patent it was still not thought that oral administration of a PDE V inhibitor would be effective in treating ED. That is, the ‘377 patent did not change the common general knowledge and therefore the use of tadalafil to treat ED would not have been obvious over the ‘377 patent and the common general knowledge even at the priority date of the ‘784 patent. This was a finding of fact which was entitled to deference [53]. It might be said that the FCA should have decided the point anyway to provide clarity, particularly since it was fully argued, but on the whole I think the point is difficult enough that the FCA was right to leave it to a case in which it is determinative. I haven’t had any fresh thoughts of my own on which of those dates is preferable since I wrote my post on the decision of de Montigny J (here) and the more fully considered comments on Gleason J’s decision (here).