Monday, July 22, 2013

Non-Infringing Alternative Not Considered in Assessing Damages

Merck & Co Inc v Apotex Inc / lovastatin damages 2013 FC 751 Snider J
            1,161,380 MEVACOR

Lovastatin damages raises fundamental issues as to the nature of causation in patent damages; it is the damages equivalent of Monsanto v Schmeiser 2004 SCC 34. The specific question is whether the availability of a non-infringing alternative should be considered in assessing damages for patent infringement. Snider J's answer is a resounding “No.” I consulted for Apotex in this case,* and consequently my discussion of the issues will be primarily descriptive rather than analytic.

Facts
Lovastatin damages is the damages phase of a bifurcated action. In the first phase, Lovastatin liability 2010 FC 1265, Snider J held that the ‘380 patent was valid and infringed by Apotex. (See this post for more background on the liability decision.)

The ‘380 patent is a process and product-by-process patent to lovastatin when made with the micro-organism A. terreus [see generally liability 28-39]. In anticipation of obtaining a compulsory licence, Apotex, through its subsidiary Apotex Fermentation Inc (AFI) developed an infringing process for the production of lovastatin, AFI-1, that used A. terreus. Subsequently, in anticipation of the compulsory licencing regime being replaced by the PM(NOC) Regulations, AFI developed a non-infringing process, AFI-4, which used a different organism, C. fuckelii. Some lovastatin was produced by AFI in Canada using both processes. The infringing Canadian-made lovastatin was used primarily for regulatory and experimental purposes, and so was exempt from liability [liability 625ff]. Apotex then decided to shift production to China, where the lovastatin was made by Blue Treasure, a joint venture with Chinese partners. Apotex transferred know-how related to both the AFI-1 and AFI-4 technologies to Blue Treasure. Once it became clear that Apotex would proceed under the NOC Regulations rather than by compulsory licence, Apotex insisted that Blue Treasure use the non-infringing AFI-4 technology for shipments to Canada. (The lovastatin made by the AFI-1 process was to be sold in China or other foreign markets [liability 297]). However, this was more expensive than the infringing AFI-1 process, and Snider J ultimately found that Blue Treasure had been boosting its profits by using the cheaper infringing process to make the lovastatin that it delivered to Apotex. Ultimately, most of the product sold by Apotex (71% by volume) was infringing [9]. More specifically, the AFI-4 production took place in three phases. In Phase 1 lovastatin was produced by AFI in Winnipeg. The first batch of AFI-4 lovastatin shipped by AFI to Apotex – “batch CR0157" – was contaminated with AFI-1 product, and was therefore infringing, but the remaining Phase 1 production was non-infringing. In Phase 2, from mid-1997 to January 1998, Blue Treasure produced 70 batches of lovastatin, which were entirely non-infringing. In Phase 3, from March 1998 to March 2000, Blue Treasure shipped infringing lovastatin [8]. Thus there was a relatively small initial infringing shipment, then a substantial period of non-infringing supply, followed by the majority of the infringing supply. Most of the infringing supply was sold prior to the expiry of the patent, but some was sold post-expiry.

Merck’s Supply Arrangements
The plaintiff’s supply arrangements are relevant to some of the issues. The plaintiff Merck Canada Inc (Merck Canada) was a licensee under the patent and it supplied the Canadian market. (Note that Merck Canada was known as Merck Frosst Canada Ltd at the time of the liability litigation, and it is referred to as Merck Frosst in the liability decision.) The plaintiff Merck & Co Inc (Merck US) was the owner of the patent, but Merck US had granted an exclusive licence to Merck and Company, Incorporated (MACI), and Merck Canada paid MACI an 8.5% royalty. MACI was not a party to the litigation. While Merck Canada paid a royalty to MACI, the supply chain agreement required Merck Canada to purchase its lovastatin from Merck US, so Merck US also profited from Merck Canada’s sales.

Heads of Damages
Merck Canada claimed lost profit damages on tablets that it would have sold to replace the infringing Apo-lovastatin tablets (“Pre-Expiry Replacement Sales”).With respect to post-expiry sales, Merck argued that Apotex would have faced a ramp-up process, and so would not have sold as many tablets post-expiry if it had not infringed. Merck Canada claimed lost profits on the sales it would have captured in this ramp-up period (“Post-Expiry Ramp-up Sales”). A reasonable royalty was claimed in the alternative. Merck US claimed for its lost profits on its supply of lovastatin API to Merck Canada in respect of the same tables, both pre- and post-expiry [11].

Merck also claimed a reasonable royalty on sales it conceded it would not have made, namely infringing Apo-lovastatin tablets sold into the export market pre- and post-expiry (Export Tablets); and infringing Apo-lovastatin tablets sold domestically after the '380 Patent expired, outside the ramp-up period (the Post-Expiry Replacement Tablets) [12].

Merck Canada also requested that its lost profits award include an amount to reflect the 8.5% royalty payable to MACI [13]. Presumably this is why MACI was not a party; on Merck’s view, Merck Canada was required to pay the royalty on the damages collected by Merck Canada in the event of success in litigation, so that MACI would have suffered no loss [127].

Pre-Expiry Replacement Sales – Non-Infringing Alternative
The main issue with respect to the pre-expiry sales, and indeed the main issue in the case in respect of both the space devoted to it by Snider J, and the quantum at stake, was whether Apotex was able to raise the defence that it had a non-infringing alternative available to it, namely the capacity to use the AFI-4 process to supply the market [30-120]. Apotex argued that but for the infringement, it would have produced the same amount of non-infringing material using the AFI-4 process, which it would have sold for the same price, and so Merck would have lost exactly the same market share had Apotex not infringed [33]. Merck’s lost profits were therefore not caused by the infringement. (The exception was with respect to the initial batch CR0157; Apotex conceded that it would not have been able to use its AFI-4 process to make that batch, and Merck was therefore entitled to its lost profits [145].) (Note that the quantum of Merck’s profits, had it made the pre-expiry replacement sales, was agreed.)

This was resolved as a pure question of law. In addition to the legal question of whether the non-infringing alternative (NIA) defence is available as a matter of law, the point turns on the factual issue of whether Apotex could have made and sold non-infringing tablets in place of the infringing tablets. Merck also argued that the fact that Apotex had breached its undertaking in the NOA that it would not infringe the patent, should have consequences in the assessment of damages in the infringement action [34]. SniderJ resolved these issues in Apotex’s favour [37-39]. That is, Snider J held that as a matter of fact, but for the infringement, Apotex would have made the same sales it in fact made, but using the non-infringing process. "The availability of the NIA defence at law is therefore the determinative question” [40].

The leading UK case is United Horse Shoe & Nail Co v Stewart & Co, (1888), 5 RPC 260 (HL), which holds that the availability of a non-infringing alternative is irrelevant to the calculation of damages. As Snider J notes, subsequent UK law affirms this position: [63]-[69]. US law, on the other hand, is equally clearly to the contrary: an available non-infringing alternative must be considered [92]. Canadian case law on point consists only of Domco Industries (1983), 76 CPR (2d) 70 rev’d on other grounds, (1986), 10 CPR (3d) 53, accepting United Horse Shoe, and Snider J’s own obiter comments in and Jay-Lor 2007 FC 358 approving the relevant passage from Domco [71], [73]. As Snider J noted, this “may not constitute the highest authority” [74].

Given the state of Canadian authority, a key question was the impact of the SCC decision in Schmeiser 2004 SCC 34, in which the SCC stated that in calculating an accounting of profits, “[a] comparison is to be made between the defendant's profit attributable to the invention and his profit had he used the best non-infringing option” [102] (emphasis added). Does this principle apply also to damages? In my article, “A Remedial Benefit-Based Approach to the Innocent-User Problem in the Patenting of Higher Life Forms” (2004), 20 CIPR 79, esp at 91-95, which was cited by the SCC on this point in Schmeiser, I argued that there is one general principle of causation which applies across all areas of law. Snider J disagreed. In her view, the applicable principles in respect of patent damages are different from those in an accounting [90]. Snider J acknowledged that the Schmeiser principle was also implicitly applied by the SCC in Cadbury Schweppes [1999] 1 SCR 142 [55], and by Snider J herself in [107] in Teva Ramipril, 2012 FC 552 in assessing damages under s 8 of the NOC Regulations, but she held that the principles of patent damages are different from these as well [55], [108]. The question is why patent damages should be different from these other monetary remedies. Snider J’s answer is that it is necessary to ignore the non-infringing alternative in order to provide adequate deterrence: [188]-[119].

My view, expressed in article “A Remedial Benefit-Based Approach,” is that United Horse Shoe ignores the generally applicable causation requirement, and it “must therefore be considered to be clearly in error” (p95). Similarly, in my co-authored article, “Damages Calculations in Intellectual Property Cases in Canada”, (2008) 24 CIPR 153, we noted that “United Horse-Shoe seems to contradict the approach to causation taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in the context of accounting of profits and equitable compensation remedies for intellectual property.” Snider J discussed these articles at some length [98]-[106], but concluded that on this point I am “‘the lone voice in the wilderness’ supporting the adoption of the [non-infringing alternative] defence” [106]. This is a very complementary criticism, as the reference is to John the Baptist saying "I am the voice of one calling in the wilderness, 'Make straight the way for the Lord.'" While I would like to be thought of as the lone voice preaching the true gospel, that is only true if the wilderness is confined to the backyard of Canadian patent damages. Outside of patent law, I am in the excellent company of the Supreme Court of Canada in Schmeiser and Cabdury Schweppes, and in the patent field, but outside of Canada, I am in the company of Chief Judges Rader (Grain Processing 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed Cir 1999) and Easterbrook (Grain Processing VIII 979 F.Supp. 1233 (ND Ind1997)), and the leading US academic on patent remedies, Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Patent Remedies: A Legal and Economic Analysis (2013) at 187ff.

*I consulted only on the damages portion of this case, not the liability action. I wrote my post on the Relevance of Non-Infringing Alternatives to Damages before being approached by Apotex.

Wednesday, July 10, 2013

First Application by PAB of New Guidelines On Patentable Subject Matter

Re Application 2,306,540, CD 1334, Pitney Bowes / Postal Tax Information System
Re Application 2,344,781, CD 1336, Progressive Directrac / Insurance Monitoring System

These two decisions from the PAB and Commissioner of Patents are the first to address patentable subject matter since the FCA Amazon.com decision, 2011 FCA 328, and since the revised Guidelines on Examination Practice Respecting Computer-Implemented Inventions PN2013-03, released in March. As discussed in my previous post, the Guidelines repudiated the earlier contribution approach, which asked whether inventive contribution was itself patentable subject matter, in favour of an approach which asks whether the invention as claimed is patentable subject matter. The effect of this change is to allow a broader range of valid claims. So, on the contribution approach, a computer implemented invention in which the inventive contribution lay in an ingenious algorithm would not be patentable unless there were some ingenuity in its implementation, whereas under the more recent approach, it will be patentable if the invention is implemented in a machine or other system which is statutory subject matter, regardless of where the inventive ingenuity is found.

These decisions illustrate the approach set out in the Guidelines. In CD 1336 the inventive concept appears to be the idea of basing insurance rate on driver risk factors derived from real-time monitoring, rather than on risk categories, and providing insurance premium information back to the driver. (I say this appears to be the inventive concept, because, as is often true in judicial decisions as well, the inventive concept as stated by the PAB is basically a paraphrase of the claims, rather than an identification of the point of inventiveness which sets the invention apart from the prior art.) As I understand it, the system would in effect say to a driver “Your GPS system shows you have been speeding a lot this month. Unless you start driving at the speed limit, your premiums will go up by $X.” This idea might be characterized as a business method, but that characterization was irrelevant to the PAB’s analysis:

82. The monitoring of operating characteristics limitation being essential, the claimed subject matter not being merely abstract, and the subject matter not being otherwise excluded from patentability, the panel finds that method claims 1-9 and system claims 10-17 are directed to statutory subject matter.

That is, regardless of whether the inventive concept is a business idea, the claim is to a system, which is patentable subject matter, and not merely to the idea in the abstract. The decision in CD 1334 is very much to the same effect. (The claims at issue in CD 1336 were nonetheless refused on the basis of obviousness, while those in CD 1334 were allowed, subject to clarifying amendment.)

In my post on the FCA Amazon.com decision I argued that the crucial paragraph 63 contained two different and contradictory ideas. Consequently:

If the Patent Office wishes to refuse a patent in which the inventive step lies in a business idea, it will focus on the first aspect of [63], and say that "the only inventive aspect of the claimed invention is the [business idea]" which is to be assimilated to a mathematical formula, and is therefore unpatentable. On the other hand, if the Patent Office wishes to grant the patent, it will focus on the second aspect of [63] and says that on a purposive construction the business idea is "only one of a number of essential elements in a novel combination," just as software patents were granted on the basis that the invention pertains "to a useful system" and "more than calculations are involved."

In CD 1336, the PAB focused on the second aspect of [63], saying “The feature 'determining the cost of insuring', although a mathematical calculation "is not the whole invention but only one of a number of essential elements in a novel combination,'" with the result that the claimed invention was patentable subject matter. It appears from the Guidelines and these two decisions, that CIPO has settled on this interpretation of Amazon.com. As I argued in my post on the Guidelines, this is the correct approach, as it is consistent with the SCC Shell Oil decision.

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

How Abstract is Your Idea?

Ultramercial, Inc v Hulu, LLC 2010-1544 (Fed Cir 2013) on remand from 132 S.Ct. 2431 for further consideration in light of Mayo v Prometheus 132 S.Ct. 1289.

Ultramercial v Hulu (No 2) is the latest engagement in the long-running battle between the US CAFC and the USSC over the subject-matter exclusion of “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” The outcome of this round is that business methods remain patentable in the US, and the key to the validity of such patents will be the level of generality at which the basic idea underpinning the invention is described.

As I have explained in various articles and posts (here and here), starting with the 1948 Funk Brothers decision, the USSC has understood the rule against patenting abstract ideas and laws of nature as an exclusion of claims for inventions in which the inventive contribution lies in the discovery of a law of nature. So, as Breyer J put it Prometheus,

the claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.

That is, the inventive concept must be found in the application of the law of nature, and not in the discovery of the law of nature. This is contrary to the Anglo-Canadian orthodoxy, which holds that the inventive contribution may lie in either the idea or the application, so long as the claim itself is to the application. So, in Hickton's Patent (1909), 26 RPC 339, 348 (CA) Fletcher Moulton LJ said that

invention may lie in the idea, and it may lie in the way in which it is carried out, and it may lie in the combination of the two; but if there is invention in the idea plus the way of carrying it out, then it is good subject-matter for Letters Patent.

Affirming this as part of Canadian law, the SCC in Shell Oil, [1982] 2 SCR 536 554, stated

A disembodied idea is not per se patentable. But it will be patentable if it has a method of practical application.

The US Federal Circuit has long held the same view as the Anglo-Canadian courts, and the story of the US law of patentable subject matter is that of the efforts of the Federal Circuit to bend the USSC jurisprudence into a more acceptable shape. The USSC position is incoherent, as “[t]he "laws of nature" are an essential part of the working of many and probably most patented inventions,” (Harvard Mouse 2002 SCC 76, [87], Binnie J), and consequently there has always been some ambiguity in the USSC case law to be exploited. Moreover, while Funk Bros, Benson and Flook represent the purest expression of the USSC’s reasoning, Diehr more closely approaching the orthodox position, and has always been the Federal Circuit’s favourite USSC decision.

Ultramercial, v Hulu (No 2), is our first look at how the Fed Cir will deal with Prometheus. The Court’s opinion, written by Rader J, is very much in the traditional Federal Circuit mold. In a passage that had me wondering if he had been reading Shell Oil, Rader CJ explained at slip op 14 that

a claim is not patent eligible only if, instead of claiming an application of an abstract idea, the claim is instead to the abstract idea itself. . . . The inquiry here is to determine on which side of the line the claim falls: does the claim cover only an abstract idea, or instead does the claim cover an application of an abstract idea?

Rader CJ rejected the notion that a claim will be unpatentable if there is an abstract idea at its core (slip op 16):

a claim may be premised on an abstract idea and, indeed, the abstract idea may be of central importance to the invention—the question for patent eligibility is whether the claim contains limitations that meaningfully tie that abstract idea to an actual application of that idea through meaningful limitations.

But how to deal with the USSC decisions? Diehr was duly relied upon, but Prometheus had to be addressed. Here Rader CJ engaged with the preemption theory that has emerged as the main rationale advanced by the USSC for its view that laws of nature cannot form the basis for a valid claim. As originally explained in Benson:

It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself expalin

This is misguided and contrary to Anglo-Canadian law. As the SCC explained in Burton Parsons [1976] 1 SCR 555 in which “[t]he objections raised against the claims really are that, except those pertaining to some specific embodiments of the invention, the others are so framed as to cover every practical embodiment,”

If the patent is to have a practical value, it must cover all [formulations of the new type of cream] which can yield the desirable result . . . [I]f, in order to guard against possible invalidity, some area is left open between what is the invention as disclosed and what is covered by the claims, the patent may be just as worthless as if it was invalid. Everybody will be free to use the invention in the unfenced area.

Nonetheless, Rader CJ was forced to accept the preemption argument, no doubt against his better judgment. He correctly recognized that “[t]he concern . . .which has become clearer through the Supreme Court’s more recent precedents, is to deny patentability to an idea itself, rather than an application of that idea.”

[T]he Supreme Court has stated that a claim is not meaningfully limited if it merely describes an abstract idea or simply adds “apply it.” . . . We also know that, if a claim covers all practical applications of an abstract idea, it is not meaningfully limited.

The question, then, is defining the level of generality of the abstract idea that underpins the patent. The patent at issue in this case, U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545, claims in very broad terms “A method for distribution of products over the Internet,” by requiring a consumer to view an advertisement before accessing copyrighted content. The problem, as described in the patent, is that

Recently, the widespread use of the Internet has made it possible to distribute and share intellectual property in its digital form, worldwide, beyond the control of the intellectual property rights holders. . . [S]everal factors encourage the growing violation of intellectual property using the Internet. . . . Young people are becoming accustomed to getting music for free and have shown little guilt about the fact that they are breaking the law.

At the same time, advertisers today are facing very unpleasant realities in conventional advertising space. More specifically: 1) the proliferation of cable channels and attendant "channel surfing" during commercials breaks; 2) consumer habits of taping shows and then fast-forwarding through commercials during playback; 3) new hard-disk TV recorders that can scan out commercials. Further, Internet banner ads have hit new lows in responses.

On this description, the idea behind the invention is specific to the problem of the Internet, and the basic idea is that “upon logging on to an Internet web site where intellectual property products, such as musical composition or written articles, are for sale via download, a consumer may choose to obtain the right to download selected intellectual property products ('IP products') by viewing or participating in an advertiser's message or commercial, rather than by paying for the intellectual property products with cash or credit card.” If that idea is described at that level, then it appears to be preempted.

But according to the Federal Circuit, “The abstract idea at the heart of the ’545 patent, which the district court properly identified, is ‘us[ing] advertising as an exchange or currency.’” Described at this higher level of generality, the idea is clearly not preempted, because, as Rader CJ emphasized, the claim is tied in many ways to an Internet implementation.

Whether the USSC will view an Internet implementation as “meaningful” post-solution activity remains to be seen. But for the time being at least, it seems that the key to getting business method patents in the US will be to describe the basic idea at a high level of generality, so that the application in the patent is a specific instance of that idea.

Monday, July 1, 2013

First Interpretation of Rule 3.1 re Grace Period for Failed Attempt to Pay Fees

Karolinska Institutet Innovations AB v Attorney General of Canada, 2013 FC 715, Hughes J

This decision of Hughes J is the first interpretation of the grace period provided for by Rule s 3.1(1) when a “clear but unsuccessful” attempt is made to pay a fee. Hughes J’s decision was a fairly straightforward application of s 12 of the Interpretation Act, which requires that an enactment be given an interpretation “as best ensures the attainment of its objects.”

On September 4 and 15, 2008, the Applicants filed patent applications under the PCT in Sweden and the US. The crucial dates for late entry into the Canadian national phase under Rule s 58(3) (42 months, rather than 30 months), were therefore 4 and 15 March 2012. The letter requesting national phase entry was filed electronically 29 Feb 2012. However, due to a clerical error in office of the Canadian agent, the total fee was sufficient to cover only the basic fee (10(a)) and the second year maintenance fee (30(a)(i)), and not the late payment fee (11); the total tendered was $250, when it should have been $450. CIPO consequently refused entry into the national phase, on the basis that s 58(3) requires payment of fees prior to the expiry of 42 months from the priority date.

The decision concerned the application of Rule s 3.1(1) which provides for a grace period

if, before the expiry of a time limit for paying a fee set out in Schedule II, the Commissioner receives a communication in accordance with which a clear but unsuccessful attempt is made to pay the fee.

In such a case, the Commissioner is required to (“shall”) send a notice requesting payment of the deficiency: s 3.1(2). The Commissioner did not do so.

CIPO argued that it was not “clear” that the Applicant intended to pay the late payment fee. Hughes J’s description of CIPO’s argument was very brief: “Counsel relies on the words ‘the fee’ in Rule 3.1” [36].

Treating the interpretation of s 3.1(1) as a matter of first instance [29], Hughes J appealed to s 12 of the Interpretation Act [37], and held, in effect, that “the fee” should be interpreted to mean the fee that was payable for the thing that the applicant was clearly trying to do [38]. Thus Rule 3.1 was applicable, and the Commissioner’s decision not to apply the grace period was unreasonable.

It seems to me that Hughes J’s decision was straightforwardly correct. I find it very difficult to think of an interpretation that would support CIPO’s position. Perhaps CIPO was of the view that there must be a clear attempt to pay the full fee, and the provision is only operable if the attempt is unsuccessful for technical reasons? I don’t see any reason why the requirement of a subjective intent to pay the full fee should be read into this Rule. In any event, I am just speculating as to what CIPO’s position might have been. I wonder if what happened is that someone at CIPO simply forgot about Rule 3.1(2), and so sent out a refusal instead of a request for payment, and this litigation was an attempt to justify that error post hoc?

Thanks to Alan Macek's IPPractice for making this decision available before it has been posted on the Federal Court website.

Sunday, June 30, 2013

No New Cases for the Week of 23 June

No new patent / NOC / data protection cases were posted on the Federal Courts' websites for the week of 23 June 2013.

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Patents to Oil Field Fluid Containment Products Invalid on the Facts

Zero Spill Systems (Int'l) Inc v 614248 Alberta Ltd 2013 FC 616 Barnes J
            2,258,064, 2,136,375, 2,166,265 Design 86793

Zero Spill Systems is a straightforward case turning on the facts. The patents and industrial design at issue related to oil field fluid containment products. The pipes used on oil rigs are full of fluid. When the pipes are disassembled it is desirable to catch that fluid, both to prevent environmental damage and to prevent the rig workers from getting “hosed.” Various fluid containment systems had been used almost since the beginning of the drilling industry [52].

Many of these systems consist of a tray adapted to fit around the flow nipple (the pipe that houses the drill pipe or string [6]), so that fluid spilled from pipes being disassembled above the nipple is directed back in to the flow nipple. The ‘375 patent was to an improved tray of this type. The uncontested evidence was that “a core inventive concept of the 375 Patent concerns the capacity of the upper tray to move telescopically relative to a fixed annular seal” [76], specifically by using a seal in the form of a flexible gasket between the tray and the flow nipple [88]. This was clearly an essential element, as it was only this feature which distinguished the invention of the ‘375 patent from the prior art [77]. On the evidence, Barnes J held that this feature was neither anticipated nor obvious [83], but neither was it infringed by either of the defendants’ containment systems. In one of those systems the seal fit snugly around the flow nipple, so as to be effectively mated and immovable [89], and in the other the tray functioned as a funnel sitting inside the flow nipple, and so was again effectively immovable [91].

The ‘064 patent concerned a containment tray adapted to fit around a “christmas tree.” There was some dispute as to how to interpret that term, but in the classic sense it means the collection of valves installed to control production on a service well. There was a dispute as to whether it could also be construed to include a blow out preventer used on a drill rig. Barnes J held that it included only a classic Christmas tree, but this point of construction does not seem to have been central to the holding of invalidity.

Barnes J held that the ‘064 patent was anticipated by the prior art Schuyler and Gayaut Patents [117], as well as by custom built solutions that had been used in the field. His reasoning on this issue was very brief; he did not identify the essential elements, and some passages suggest that his finding may have been based on obviousness. For example, he says “The 064 Patent was also anticipated by the prior use of lower trays as described by the industry witnesses. . . .Even if no exact replica of the 064 Patent apparatus was in prior use, I am satisfied that there is nothing about the design or fit up of the 064 Patent lower tray that would not have been obvious to a person of skill long before July 7, 2000" [118]. My impression is that this is a case that falls on the line between obviousness and anticipation. So, the Schuyler patent, US 5,377,748, describes a tray adapted to fit around “a variety of types of tubular members such as oil well casing, oil well pipe, and equipment attached to the casing having annular portions such as the wellhead of the oil well, well spools, blow-out preventers and the like.” The ‘064 patent claims a tray adapted to be positioned around “a christmas tree.” Does specifying a Christmas tree in particular, as opposed to a general tubular member, give rise to a potentially distinguishing selection patent, which must be assessed for obviousness, or is it a case of anticipation? The question calls to mind the statement of Lord Abinger in Losh v Hague (1838), 1 WPC 202 at 208,

it would be a very extraordinary thing to say, that because all mankind have been accustomed to eat soup with a spoon, that a man could take out a patent because he says you might eat peas with a spoon.

Whether it is invalid as anticipated or invalid as obvious, the result is the same.

Validity was the only issue in respect of the ‘265 patent, as the plaintiff no longer asserted infringement, but one of the defendants sought a declaration of invalidity [12]. Barnes J held this patent invalid for obviousness, essentially because there was no plausible evidence that the differences between the ‘265 patent and the prior art were anything but routine [139].

With respect to the ‘793 industrial design, Barnes J’s holding turned on the clear law set out in s 5.1 of the Industrial Design Act that industrial design protection does not extend to “features applied to a useful article that are dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article” [127]. On the facts, there was no evidence that there were any common features between the design and the defendant’s products that were anything other than functional [132].

Finally, while it was unnecessary to deal with damages in light of the conclusions regarding validity and infringement, Barnes J pointed out that in order to claim lost profits damages, the patentee must show not only that the defendant sold an infringing product, but also that but for the infringement, the patentee's product would have captured that sale. In this case, there was no adequate evidence of lost profits [148]. Partly this was because the patentee rented their product, while the defendants sold theirs, so there was some difficulty in making a comparison, but more generally there were methodological flaws in the patentee’s analysis which rendered it unreliable. Barnes J concluded that “Without [reliable] evidence it is impossible to assess damages in this case on the basis of the Plaintiffs’ loss of profits” [148].

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

USSC in FTC v Actavis Holds Reverse Payment Settlements Subject to “Rule of Reason”

FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 2013 USSC

In FTC v Actavis, the USSC has held, by a 5-3 majority, that so-called reverse payment settlements are not presumptively unlawful as a matter of competition law, as the FTC had asked (M20), nor are they immune from antitrust scrutiny, as the 11th Cir held, and the dissent would have affirmed. Instead, they are subject to competition law scrutiny on the basis of the “rule-of-reason” under which the agreements will be assessed for anti-competitive effects on a case-by-case basis. On the whole, the majority’s position strikes me as one which is reasonable as a matter of principle, but the specter of repeated, complex, and expensive litigation raised by the dissent is very real. In some ways either extreme position might have been preferable to the principled, but uncertain, position adopted by the majority.

In reverse payment settlements a patentee, normally a pharmaceutical patentee, makes a payment to an alleged infringer, normally a generic, in return for an agreement by the challenger to drop its challenge to the patent and stay out of the market until (closer to) the end of the patent term. The basic point made by Breyer J, for the majority, is that if the patent is in fact invalid, then, as compared with the scenario in which the patent is litigated to invalidity, this settlement will have the effect of keeping prices higher until the end of term. The patentee and challenger split the monopoly profit, and the consumer is the loser (M15). This is illegitimate and anti-competitive. Consequently, reverse payment settlements should be subject to antitrust scrutiny. On the other hand, a reverse payment settlement is a settlement, and it may have the same virtues as any other settlement, such as avoiding litigation expenses. The payment may also be compensation for ancillary services that the challenger agrees to provide under the agreement. Therefore, reverse payment settlements should not be presumptively unlawful. Instead, each settlement should be individually scrutinized to discern the true motivation (M19):

Although the parties may have reasons to prefer settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is: What are those reasons? If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.

Roberts CJ wrote for the dissent, and would have held that “If [the patentee’s] actions are within the scope of the patent, they are not subject to antitrust scrutiny” (D3). He acknowledged that there may be uncertainty as to the validity of the patent, but said that this does not justify subjecting the settlement to antitrust scrutiny:

The difficulty with such an approach is that a patent holder acting within the scope of its patent has an obvious defense to any antitrust suit: that its patent allows it to engage in conduct that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws. . . Its behavior would be unlawful only if its patent were invalid or not infringed. And the scope of the patent – i.e., what rights are conferred by the patent – should be determined by reference to patent law. (D4, D5, original emphasis)

I must admit that I am not sure whether I follow the point Roberts CJ is making. His argument seems to implicitly concede that the payments are unlawful if the patent is in fact invalid, and the point of the majority ‘s reasoning is that we will never make that determination as a matter of patent law if the reverse payments settlements are not subject to antitrust scrutiny. If Roberts CJ’s point is that it is somehow unprincipled to subject these settlements to antitrust scrutiny, then I am not persuaded.

But I think the point he is really making is that it is wrong to conduct a patent trial as part of an antitrust action. Settlements may make it more difficult to challenge invalid patents “but such a result – true of all patent settlements – is no reason to adjudicate questions of patent law under antitrust principles” (D11). The argument here appears to be pragmatic. If the patentee can raise validity of the patent as a defence in the antitrust action, then in those cases in which the settlement was a legitimate effort to avoid the costs of litigation, the whole point of the settlement will be defeated when the patentee is be forced to litigate validity as a defence (D11). The majority responds to this by saying that

it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question . . . An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival. (M18)

But if this means that the patentee cannot raise the validity of the patent in the antitrust action, then the patentee may be found to violate antitrust law even though it has done nothing wrong (D12-13). There is also the practical problem that an inquiry into the patentee’s motivation will itself be uncertain (D13). Unless the majority is of the view that only settlements that are less than anticipated litigation costs are acceptable, which it nowhere states, then the majority implicitly accepts that uncertainty over validity may be a legitimate motivating factor; so, a settlement motivated by a 5% chance of invalidity of a valuable patent might pass antitrust scrutiny. And the majority clearly accepts that ancillary services “such as distributing the patented item or helping to develop a market for that item,” may form the basis for a legitimate settlement. This means that discerning the true motivation will be very difficult, the more so because ancillary services will no doubt start to feature prominently in such settlements.

Neither the majority nor the dissent addresses what seems to me to be the central issue in deciding whether a per se analysis is appropriate. If, as the FTC believes, reverse payment settlements are normally anticompetitive, then the dissent’s objections largely melt away. There will be no need to assess patent validity in the antitrust action, and while the result will be that patentees will sometimes be prevented from entering into legitimate settlements, this will be rare, and those rare errors are the price paid for the certainty and simplicity of a per se regime; it is better than the expensive errors of a rule of reason regime. By rejecting the per se rule, the majority implicitly acknowledges that legitimate settlements are reasonably common, and if that is so, then there is considerable force to the dissent’s complaint that the rule of reason scrutiny adds considerable complexity for little benefit. Overall then, my initial reaction is that the USSC should have directly addressed the central issue: are the reverse payments normally anti-competitive? If so, they should be per se unlawful, and if not, they should be immune from antitrust scrutiny. The rule of reason analysis may be sound in principle, but the litigation costs of that inquiry will defeat the point of legitimate settlements.

What does Actavis imply for Canadian law? The majority reasoning turned on, or at least adverted to, some features of the US system, such as the 180 day exclusivity for the first generic (M16), that make anti-competitive settlements attractive. As this paper by Ron Dimock & Geoff Mowatt explains, differences between the US and Canadian systems means that “there is a much greater incentive in the U.S. for the brand to bargain with the first generic.” This suggests that the argument for per se immunity is stronger in Canada than in the US. This implies that if Canadian law is influenced by Actavis, reverse payment settlements should not be considered presumptively illegal, and the argument for the dissenting position that they should be per se immune, is stronger here than in the US. Whether Canadian courts and policy makers will, or should, be influenced by Actavis is, of course, a different question.

Tuesday, June 18, 2013

Section 2.1 of the Act Gives the Federal Court Personal Jurisdiction over Provincial Crown Defendants

Safe Gaming Systems Inc v Atlantic Lottery Corporation 2013 FC 217 Proth Aronovitch

In Dableh v Ontario Hydro (1990) 33 C.P.R. (3d) 544, Dubé J held that the Federal Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Hydro-Québec and the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, on the basis that as a statutory court, express legislation is required for Federal Court jurisdiction, and neither the Patent Act nor the provincial legislation of those provinces conferred such jurisdiction. The actions against those Crown Corporations was accordingly dismissed. The action was maintained against Ontario Hydro on the basis of the wording of the Ontario Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

In 1993 the Patent Act was amended to add s 2.1: “This Act is binding on Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province” (my emphasis).

In Safe Gaming Systems, Proth Aronovitch held that s 2.1 means what it says. Safe Gaming is the owner of patent 2,331,238 which it believes is infringed by Nova Scotia Gaming Corporation (NS Gaming), the Atlantic Lottery Corporation (Atlantic Lottery). Relying on Dableh, those defendants moved to strike the action against them on the basis that they are provincial Crown defendants and the Federal Court therefore lacks personal jurisdiction. Proth Aronovitch denied the motion to strike, primarily on the basis that s 2.1 of the Act has effectively reversed Dableh on this point.

Monday, June 17, 2013

Myriad Genetics

I've given my initial thoughts on the USSC Myriad Genetics decision in a guest post on IPKat.

Thursday, June 13, 2013

Practice Notice on Dosage Regimes Difficult to Reconcile with Hughes J’s Finasteride Decision

The Practice Notice on Medical Uses released by CIPO on Monday is directed at “medical use claims, including dosage regimens and dosage ranges.” Unfortunately, it seems difficult to reconcile with the relatively recent decision of Hughes J in Merck v Pharmascience / finasteride (NOC), 2010 FC 510, 85 CPR(4th) 179 on exactly that point.

The notice begins by stating that “it is well established that methods of medical treatment and surgery are not statutory subject matter and are excluded from the definition of invention.” This is fair summary of the law. In my view the SCC decision in Tennessee Eastman v Commissioner of Patents, [1974] SCR 111, which is usually cited on this point, really turned on s 41, which is now repealed, but the Federal Courts have consistently read it more broadly, and the point is now established in the Federal Court jurisprudence, independently of the authority of Tennessee Eastman.

The Notice then states that “Medical use claims, however, are generally permitted as long as they do not equate to medical or surgical methods . . . The Federal Court has concluded, however, that inventions preventing physicians from exercising their skill and judgment in using a known compound for an established purpose effectively cover a method of medical treatment.” This is also a fair summary of the case law.

However, the Notice then goes on to say:

[If] it is determined after a purposive construction that a dosage regimen or dosage range is an essential element of a claim encompassing the use of a known compound in an established treatment, then the claim covers a method of medical treatment, and thus, is not compliant with section 2 of the Patent Act.

Where an essential element only serves to instruct a medical professional “how” to treat a patient, rather than “what” to use to treat the patient, this will lead to the conclusion that the claimed use encompasses a method of medical treatment.

The apparently blanket rejection of dosage regime claims is not consistent with the case law.

In Merck v Apotex / alendronate 2005 FC 755, 41 CPR(4th) 35, concerning 2,294,595, the inventive concept was the discovery that a single large weekly dose had fewer side effects than an equal amount taken on a daily basis [27], and the patentee claimed the composition in the specified dosage and dosing interval, as well the composition “for use” in the specified dosage and dosing interval [28]. Mosley J held that these claims were not an unpatentable method of medical treatment, though his reasoning was very cursory as he had held the patent invalid for obviousness [133]-[138]. In contrast, in Axcan v Pharmascience / URSODIOL 2006 FC 527, 50 CPR(4th) 321 concerning 1,318,590, Harrington J. in the Federal Court held that a claim to a dosage form of a pharmaceutical composition for treatment of cirrhosis was an unpatentable on the sole basis that it was a method of medical treatment. Harrington J described the holding of Mosley J in alendronate, but he did not attempt to distinguish it.

In finasteride Hughes J reviewed these cases and reconciled them by saying that "In Axcan, Harrington J. found the claim to be invalid because it was directed to a dosage range in which it was left to the physician to make on appropriate selection" [112]. At the same time Hughes J approved Mosley J's alendronate decision [112]. This is significant, because, as noted, subject matter was only a secondary consideration in Mosley J's decision, so it is relatively weak authority on its own. Consequently, Hughes J concluded that [114]:

a distinction must be made between claims that rely upon the skill and judgment of a medial practitioner and those that deal with a vendible product, be it a scalpel, X-ray machine or 1 mg tablet that are to be used or prescribed for use by such practitioner.

Thus in Hughes J’s view, it is not any dosage regime which is unpatentable, but only a dosage regime which requires skill and judgment.

This is reinforced by his holding on the facts that the claim in question was not unpatentable as being a method of medical treatment. In finasteride only Claim 5 of Patent 2,173,457 was at issue. After incorporation of prior references [5], Claim 5 reads:

5. The use of [finasteride] for the preparation of a medicament adapted for oral administration useful for the treatment of male pattern baldness in a person and wherein the dosage amount is about 1.0 mg.

Hughes J expressly construed this claim such that “having a dosage at about 1.0 mg” was an essential element [101]. Nonetheless, he held it was patentable subject matter: "In the present case, we have a 1.0 mg tablet taken as a daily dose. No skill or judgment is brought to bear. It is a vendible product and not a method of medical treatment" [114]. 

The Practice Notice cited Hughes J’s finasteride decision, but only in an introductory sentence saying that the Notice was intended to reflect judicial decisions. Despite that intent, I do not see how the statement that a claim is an unpatentable method of medical treatment if “a dosage regimen or dosage range is an essential element of a claim,” can be reconciled with finasteride. And apart from fine points of doctrine, there are now two cases holding dosage regime claims are patentable subject matter, and one to the contrary.

Friday, June 7, 2013

Golden Bonus Doctrine in Germany

A few weeks ago I posted about the "golden bonus" doctrine as it was applied in the US COMBIGAN decision. This doctrine says that if an invention is obvious for one reason, it does not become non-obvious merely because it has some non-obvious benefits (the "golden bonus"). This recent post on the Kluwer Patent Blog discussing the Bundesgerichtshof descision in Kosmetisches Sonnenschutzmittel III (X ZR 72/08), indicates that the same doctrine applies in Germany, though couched in European problem-and-solution terms. According to the blog post (unfortunately, I don't read German), the decision held that even if the invention is an inventive solution to the problem the inventors sought to address, it will be obvious if it is an obvious solution to a different problem which a skilled person would also be motivated to address. The post goes on to suggest that the more recent BGH decision in Trenn-Erderschalter (X ZR 160/11) casts some doubt on that holding, but so far as I can tell (again from the Kluwer blog post), the Trenn-Erderschalter decision simply said that the alternative problem itself was not obvious, and so even if its solution was obvious, it would not render the invention obvious.

Thursday, June 6, 2013

Teva / Sildenafil Amended

Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc, 2012 SCC 60, as amended, rev’g 2010 FCA 242 rev’g 2009 FC 638
            2,163,446 VIAGRA   Pfizer / sildenafil (NOC)

In its Teva / sildenafil decision the SCC held that the ‘446 patent is “void” [91], even though this was an NOC proceeding which normally has no in rem effect. In response, Pfizer moved under the SCC rules for rehearing or amendment. The SCC responded by amending its decision to make it clear the its holding does not have in rem effect. The new concluding paragraph [91] is “Therefore, I would allow the appeal with costs and hold that Teva established its allegation that Patent 2,163,446 is not valid, and dismiss Pfizer's application for an order of prohibition under s. 6(1) of the Regulations.” The full amending decision is available from Alan Macek's IPPractice site. This amendment is welcome, though not entirely surprising, as it would have been very unusual for the Court to overturn established law without argument, without mentioning that it was doing so, and without even being asked.

However, the is not the end of Pfizer’s troubles with this proceeding. In Apotex v Pfizer / sildenafil 2012 FC 1339 Zinn J granted summary judgment to Apotex in an impeachment action, holding the ‘446 patent to be of no force or effect, in part on the basis that the SCC had declared the ‘446 void. (In my previous comment on Zinn J’s decision, I focused on the question of whether the SCC had actually declared the patent void.) That point has now been clarified, but that was not the sole basis, or even the primary basis, for Zinn J’s decision. He held that

the determination by the Supreme Court in its Reasons that the ‘446 Patent fails to meet the requirement of sufficient disclosure pursuant to subsection 27(3) of the Patent Act is a legal determination binding on this Court and is dispositive of Apotex’s claim in this action that the ‘446 Patent is invalid due to insufficiency of disclosure, even if the Supreme Court grants Pfizer’s motion and deletes its declaration of invalidity from its Judgment [30] (my emphasis).

With respect, Zinn J must be wrong on this point. This holding a contrary to a very well established law at both the SCC and FCA level that NOC proceedings are not determinative of patent validity (see cases cited below). By holding that the SCC determination is dispositive, Zinn J’s determination effectively does an end-run around this line of cases. It implies that while the result in the NOC case does not directly invalidate the patent, that will be the practical effect because it determines the outcome of the subsequent infringement / impeachment action.

Zinn J did not directly address this line of cases, but instead referred to the rule that claim construction is a matter of law, and that the result turned on “three questions of law: (1) the determination of the invention or inventive concept of the patent, (2) the construction of the ‘446 Patent, and (3) whether the ‘446 Patent, properly construed, permitted the person of skill in the art ‘to make the same successful use of the invention as the inventor could at the time of his application.’”

There are two problems with this analysis. First, it seems to me that the first and third of these points must be questions of mixed fact and law. The inventive concept is the inventive technical contribution made by patentee over the state of the art. The state of the art is a question of fact, and the question of whether the contribution is inventive is mixed fact and law. What the “skilled person” could have taken from the invention requires evidence about the skilled person. I have argued that even the construction of the patent is really a question of mixed fact and law, since it requires factual evidence as to what terms would have meant to a skilled person. The reason the courts refer to it as a question of law is to reserve the ultimate question of claim construction to the court, rather than having to choose betweeen constructions provided by experts. This is entirely reasonable, but it does not mean that there is no factual underpinning to claim construction.

Moreover, I’m not sure I agree with Zinn J’s analysis of the Sildenafil decision. The decision is not easy to understand (I am just about finished a case comment), but my view is that it turned on the SCC's understanding that the other claims in the patent were invalid because the allegation of invalidity was not contested by Pfizer (because it was an NOC proceeding), or on the view that the patentee was trying to “game the system.” Both of these turn on factual issues that were not fully contested in the NOC proceeding.

And even if the determinations were in some sense a question of law, this misses the point of the case law holding that NOC proceedings are not determinative. The principle is based on institutional considerations, not whether a question of law is at issue. As the SCC said in Eli Lilly & Co v Novopharm Ltd [1998] 2 SCR 129, quoting Strayer J.A. in Pharmacia [1995] 1 F.C. 588, 600 (SCC emphasis):

If the Governor in Council had intended by these Regulations to provide for a final determination of the issues of validity or infringement, a determination which would be binding on all private parties and preclude future litigation of the same issues, it surely would have said so. This Court is not prepared to accept that patentees and generic companies alike have been forced to make their sole assertion of their private rights through the summary procedure of a judicial review application.

Similarly, in Lilly v Novopharm 2007 FCA 359 the FCA stated (my emphasis):

[41] NOC proceedings were never intended to be substitutes for an infringement action. Similarly, it is inappropriate to rely on NOC proceedings to set binding precedent on controversial and uncertain questions in patent law. NOC proceedings are supposed to be summary in nature and do not lend themselves to such determinations.

Thursday, May 30, 2013

A Product-by-Process Claim Is Not a Product Claim

Bayer Inc v Cobalt Pharmaceuticals Co / drospirenone (NOC) 2013 FC 573 O'Reilly J
            YASMIN® / drospirenone / 2,261,137

In this application Bayer sought an order of prohibition preventing Cobalt from launching a generic version of YASMIN® until the expiry of the ‘137 patent. O’Reilly J refused to grant the order on the basis on non-infringement, and he did not reach Cobalt’s invalidity arguments. The infringement issue turned entirely on claim construction. Bayer’s claim construction argument were far-fetched, and were dismissed by O’Reilly J without difficulty.

Drospirenone is a old compound. The first 12 claims of the ‘137 patent are claims to a process for the production of drospirenone. The description (p 6) states that “a key reaction” in the process is ruthenium-catalyzed oxidation of certain compounds, and all the process claims incorporate that step. Claim 13, the only claim in issue, was to “A product according to the process of claim 12,” wherein the product comprises drospirenone of specified purity. Cobalt alleged that its product would not infringe because its process for the production of drospirenone would not use a ruthenium salt as an oxidizing agent.

Bayer argued that the use of a ruthenium salt as an oxidizing agent was not an essential element of the claims [30]. O’Reilly J rejected this argument [31]-[36]. While identification of the essential elements can sometimes be difficult, in this case O’Reilly J’s analysis is very straightforward and compelling. All the claims included ruthenium and the description identified its use as “key.” There were no alternatives mentioned apart from chromium, which was mentioned only to be avoided; part of the stated purpose of the invention (p 9) was to avoid the use of chromium, for environmental reasons.

Bayer also argued that the SCC decision in Hoffmann-La Roche [1955] SCR 414 stands for the proposition that product-by-process claims should be read as claims to the product alone [13], so that it does not matter how Cobalt’s product was produced, so long as it was of the required purity. As OReilly J pointed out, what Hoffmann-La Roche really says is that you cannot obtain a new patent for an old compound, even though a new process for making it has been invented [20].

Finally, Bayer argued that a skilled person would read Claim 13 as a claim for the purer form of drospirenone, regardless of how it was made [24]. It is not surprising that O’Reilly J rejected this submission, given that the first words of Claim 13 are “A product according to the process of claim 12.”

Friday, May 24, 2013

Triple Re-Litigation of Factual Issues

Apotex Inc vPfizer Canada Inc / azithromycin (NOC) 2013 FC 493 O'Reilly J
             ZITHROMAX / azithromycin / 1,314,876

O’Reilly J’s decision, which I will call Azithromycin AD (No 2), relates to a claim by Apotex for damages under s 8 of the PM(NOC) Regulations, consequent on Snider J’s dismissal of Pfizer’s application for an order of prohibition in the s 6 proceeding, Pfizer Canada Inc v Apotex Inc, 2003 FC 1428 (Azithromycin AD (No 1)). The key issue is whether a prior factual finding of non-infringement in the s 6 proceeding can be re-litigated in the s 8 proceeding. The answer is yes (although on the facts O’Reilly J arrived at the same conclusion as had Snider J, namely that the patent was not infringed). This means that the same factual issues may be litigated three times: once in the s 6 application, again in the s 8 action, and again in the infringement action. "Seemingly redundant litigation" is already said to be a problem with our version of the patent linkage regime: 2012 FC 767 [69]-[70]. This decision, if it stands, will add to the problem.

Tuesday, May 21, 2013

New Blog on Comparative Patent Remedies

For those of you interested in remedies (and who isn't, at the end of the day?), here is a new blog about Comparative Patent Remedies, by Professor Tom Cotter, the author of an excellent recent book of the same name. In both his book and his blog, Professor Cotter's style combines sophisticated economic analysis with a detailed practical grasp of the legislation and case law. I find his work to be very insightful and interesting from an academic perspective, but it is also just the thing if you are looking for some foreign law to bolster (or undermine) a novel argument.

Thursday, May 16, 2013

Patentable Subject Matter: We Have Company in the Chaos

I have criticized the FCA for its inconclusive decision in Amazon.com, which failed entirely to resolve the central question of whether business methods are patentable. But at least we are in good company. As I discuss in my guest post on IPKat, the US Federal Circuit en banc decision in CLS Bank v Alice Corp (Fed Cir 2013) is equally inconclusive. In the UK, the statute itself is confused, but the UK courts are starting to develop a coherent approach, as I discuss in a second IPKat guest post on HTC Europe Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2013] EWCA Civ 451.

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

Golden Bonus Doctrine in US COMBIGAN Decision

Allergan, Inc v Sandoz Inc / COMBIGAN (Fed Cir 2013) rev’g 818 F.Supp.2d 974

The recent Fed Cir decision in Allergan v Sandoz / COMBIGAN provides an interesting perspective on the parallel Canadian litigation. The invention at issue is a combination of brimonidine and timolol, used for the treatment of glaucoma. Both active ingredients had previously been used for that purpose, and the primary issue in both the US and Canadian litigation was whether the combination was obvious.

In the litigation over the Canadian patent 2,440,764, Allergan v Sandoz / COMBIGAN(NOC) 2011 FC 1316 (blogged here), Crampton J held it non-obvious, largely on the basis that the improved safety profile and absence of an afternoon trough in efficacy as compared to the individual drugs were part of the inventive concept [58], and these were not obvious. Subsequently, in Allergen Inc v Apotex Inc / COMBIGAN (NOC) 2012 FC 767 (blogged here), Hughes J held that the absence of an afternoon trough in efficacy was not part of the inventive concept [147]. His view was that the inventive concept was that the specified combination would achieve the promised results [145]. Consequently, Hughes J would have held the claims obvious [189], but for a concern regarding comity with Crampton J’s prior decision. The disagreement between Crampton J and Hughes J over the nature of the inventive concept turned on a disagreement as to whether the specification as a whole should be considered in construing the inventive concept. On appeal of Hughes J’s decision, the FCA was resolved that debate in favour of considering the entire specification, as Crampton J had done: Apotex Inc v Allergan Inc / COMBIGAN (NOC) 2012 FCA 308 (blogged here). Consequently, the FCA concluded that the improved safety profile was part of the inventive concept [74], and that improved safety profile was not obvious [93]. An order of prohibition was therefore granted.

In the US litigation the district court held that the increased efficacy (absence of an afternoon trough) and reduction in side-effects (improved safety profile) were unexpected results that weighed in favour of non-obviousness (Fed Cir slip op 12, Dist Ct 998-99). In respect of the majority of claims at issue (Claim 1 of 7,323,463 was exemplary) the Fed Cir held that this did not establish non-obviousness:

While the unexpected benefits of twice a day dosing of the combination formula are relevant to Sandoz’s attack on the validity of the method claims, we do not find it similarly meaningful to our evidence in the prior art showing the concomitant administration of brimonidine and timolol multiple times per day, that the combination had benefits over the administration of either alone, and that there was a motivation to combine the two to achieve better patient compliance. KSR, 550 U.S. at 426. Whether or not that combination also solved problems associated with the afternoon trough, we find the motivation to make the combination was real. [My emphasis] Accordingly, we conclude that the claims of the ’463 patent are invalid as obvious.

In other words, if the invention was obvious for other reasons, a patent cannot be supported by the discovery of a non-obvious advantage. This is the classic “golden bonus” principle as described in Hallen v Brabantia [1991] RPC 195 at 216 (CA). This principle is perhaps not as well recognized in Canadian law as it is in English law (compare 2007 FC 455 [309-10] with 2007 FCA 217 [26]), but it is certainly a point which deserves more attention that it received in the Canadian litigation. I am still of the view that the main holding of the FCA in COMBIGAN, that it is necessary to have reference to the entire specification in order to construe the inventive concept, is correct, but the golden bonus argument may provide a different route leading to a different conclusion on the obviousness question.

The Federal Circuit decision was also interesting for a split on Claim 4 of the 7,030,149 patent. (There was no equivalent claim in the Canadian ‘764 patent.)

4. A method of reducing the number of daily topical ophthalmic doses of brimondine administered topically to an eye of a person in need thereof for the treatment of glaucoma or ocular hypertension from 3 to 2 times a day without loss of efficacy [by treatment with COMBIGAN]

In effect, the unexpected advantages were made part of the claim itself. Judge Dyk, dissenting on this point, held that this claim was also invalid, on the basis that a golden bonus cannot render an invention patentable, whether or not that bonus is made part of the claim:

Avoiding a ‘loss of efficacy’ is not a separate step, but rather a result of the claimed method. We should recognize in this case, as we did in Bristol-Myers Squibb, that ‘[n]ewly discovered results of known processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable.’

The majority held that it was not clear from the record whether the increased efficacy was an inherent property of the composition (fn 1). This disagreement raises an interesting point: is it possible to avoid the golden bonus doctrine (if that doctrine exists in Canada), by making the unexpected advantage part of the claim?

Monday, May 13, 2013

No New Cases for the Week of 5 May

No new patent / NOC / data protection cases were posted on the Federal Courts' websites for the week of 5 May 2013.

Friday, May 3, 2013

PMPRB “subverting the will of Parliament”

Teva v Canada (AG) 2013 FC 448 Zinn J (Copaxone II) quashing In re Copaxone PMPRB-2010-D3-Copaxone additional reasons at 2013 FC 500

            PMPRB / Copaxone Syringe

This is the second trip by Teva to the FC appealing a decision of the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board that Teva has sold its Copaxone Syringe at an “excessive” price. In the first decision, 2009 FC 1155 (Copaxone I), Hughes J quashed the decision of the Board for having failed to consider the statutorily mandated factors. Hughes J returned the question to the Board for redetermination. A differently constituted panel of the Board heard the matter, and once again determined that the price was excessive. Zinn J has now held that the decision of the second Board was defective, in exactly the same way as the decision of the first Board, and once again sent the matter back for reconsideration.

Section 85(1) of the Patent Act provides that “the Board shall take into consideration the following factors, to the extent that information on the factors is available to the Board:”

(a) the prices at which the medicine has been sold in the relevant market;
(b) the prices at which other medicines in the same therapeutic class have been sold in the relevant market;
(c) the prices at which the medicine and other medicines in the same therapeutic class have been sold in countries other than Canada;
(d) changes in the Consumer Price Index; and
(e) such other factors as may be specified in any regulations made for the purposes of this subsection.

Copaxone Syringe was introduced by Teva in 2003 at $36 per daily dose. Teva subsequently increased its price to $43.20, a 20% increase, which was in excess of the CPI for the relevant period.* However, during the entire period, Copaxone Syringe was the lowest priced drug in its class domestically, and it was also consistently sold at a lower price in Canada than in any of the other comparator nations specified by regulation [8]. In Copaxone I, Hughes J found that in finding the price increase excessive, “the Board focused only on the [Consumer Price Index] essentially to the exclusion of the other factors set out in section 85(1). Lip service only was given to these other factors” [49]. He therefore quashed the decision and sent it back for redetermination, “preferably by a different panel” [76].

A different panel was duly constituted, and the Board again concluded that Copaxone Syringe was excessively priced. On appeal, Zinn J, like Hughes J, held that “the Board’s decision must be set aside because it again paid no more than lip service to the factors favouring the conclusion that the medicine was not excessively priced, namely paragraphs 85(1)(b) and (c), and again treated paragraph 85(1)(d), CPI, as a conclusive factor” [38]. The second panel’s attempts to explain why the low domestic and international price should not be given any weight were not persuasive enough to constitute a reasoned decision. For example, with respect to the international comparison, the Board argued that “the comparator drugs’ prices are not from Canada and as such might be affected by exogenous factors such as a different regulatory regime, different income levels, and different health and other socio-economic factors.” But as Zinn J pointed out, “Having enacted this provision, Parliament is presumed to be aware of the difficulties in comparing the price of medicines across borders; despite this, it saw fit to include ‘the prices at which the medicine and other medicines in the same therapeutic class have been sold in countries other than Canada’ as a factor to be considered when determining whether a drug is being sold at an ‘excessive’ price in Canada. What the Board appears to be saying is that this factor is inherently unreliable and should be given little if not no weight. The Board appears therefore to be subverting the will of Parliament, which clearly saw this as a relevant factor to be accorded weight” [41].

Its difficulties with the Board are no doubt frustrating for Teva, but the bigger question is why the Board appears to be not just “subverting the will of Parliament,” but doing so systematically. The problem is not just that the Board decided unreasonably; one erroneous decision, or even an unreasonable decision, is readily explained as an aberration. But we now have two different Federal Court judges independently concluding that two differently constituted panels have ignored their statutory obligation. This points to a deeper problem.

* Copaxone I at [7], [33], [34], [35], based on the first Board decision, states that the price increase took place all at once on July 1, 2004, while Copaxone II at [7], [15], [18], [21], based on the decision of the second panel, states that the price increase took place over a period of several years, with substantial increases in 2004 and 2005, no increase in 2006-07, and smaller increases in 2008-08. I have no explanation for the discrepancy, but it is not crucial to the reasons of either panel, or to those of the Federal Court.