2,664,173 / Shaker and Degasser Combination
In Western Oilfield Eqpt v M-I, O'Reilly J found most of the claims of M-I’s 173 patent to be valid and several to have been infringed by Western. The decision largely turned on the facts, but there are a few legal points of interest. This post will summarize the case and discuss inducing infringement, utility and obviousness, where the decision illustrates the application of established law. A subsequent post will deal with the best mode requirement, and another post will deal with added matter and the period for assessing reasonable compensation, where the decision raises more interesting legal issues.
The Invention
The invention relates to a machine called a “shale shaker,” used in the oil and gas industry to remove solids, aka “cuttings,” from the slurry that emerges from an active well, in order to separate the drilling fluid for reuse [6]. A shale shaker shakes the slurry over a screen to allow the fluid to fall through while the rock cuttings are carried away. Shaking alone does not remove all of the fluid, and the cuttings remain wet after passing through a standard shaker [33]. The invention consisted of a method and system for applying a vacuum (“pressure differential generator”) to the cuttings to recover more of the drilling fluid [35].
Claim Construction and Infringement
There were a number of contentious issues on claim construction, but these turned on the evidence and ultimately O'Reilly J construed the claims in favour of the patentee. The finding that Western infringed and induced infringement followed directly from the construction of the patent: [91]-[92]. This result is not very surprising, as it appears that the infringed claims were added during prosecution after the patentee became aware of the defendant’s system: [14], [89].
Western directly infringed the system claims [116], but did not directly infringe the method claims, which required the step of introducing slurry to the shaker [117]. M-I argued that Western induced infringement of the system claims by the drilling companies, who were the end users of the system. The established test for inducement was set out in Weatherford 2011 FCA 228 [162]. The first branch requires an act of direct infringement, and it was not disputed that the drilling companies were direct infringers [129]. The second prong requires the patentee to establish that the defendant’s influence caused the direct infringement. This is often the main hurdle, but in this case the instructions and assistance given by Western to its clients were so extensive that it was clear that this aspect of the test was satisfied [130]-[132].
The third prong of the test from Weatherford requires that “the influence must knowingly be exercised by the inducer, that is, the inducer knows that this influence will result in the completion of the act of infringement” [162]. O'Reilly J held that this branch had also been made out, noting that:
[133] Western (and its experts) has misunderstood the third branch of the test for
inducement. It does not require the alleged inducer to know that the actions of the third
party amount to infringement. That would require a legal analysis of the patent’s claims.
What is required is knowledge on the inducer’s part that the influence it wields will cause
the third party to carry out the acts that amount to infringement. In other words, the
alleged inducer simply has to know what the third party is likely to do in response to its
influence.
O'Reilly J’s holding on this point is consistent with the formal statement of the test in Weatherford, but there are surprisingly few cases that turn on this point. While O'Reilly J did not review the case law, his holding on this point is consistent with the view expressed by Gauthier J in her more extensive discussion of the issue in Bauer v Easton 2010 FC 361 [195]-[203]. It’s interesting to note that in US law it is now established that knowledge of the patent is needed, both for contributory infringement and for inducement: see Aro II 377 US 476, 488 (1964) regarding contributory infringement and Global–Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB SA 563 US 754, 766 (2011) regarding inducement. However, the US Supreme Court has not provided any clear rationale for its approach.
Utility
O'Reilly J rejected Western’s utility challenge. His decision raises no new points of law, but his brief discussion at [139] provides a useful summary:
● First, the focus must be on the claims, not on embodiments that are [described in the
specification but] not claimed;
● Second, a claim will not be found to lack utility for failure to mention a component that
a skilled person would recognize as necessary; [see also Metalliflex [1961] SCR 117];
● Third, the fact that [the inventor] did not initially arrive at a prototype that could
immediately be commercialized does not mean that his testing did not reveal a useful
invention.
Obviousness
The second step of the Windsurfing/Pozzoli framework, endorsed by the SCC in Sanofi 2008 SCC 61 [67], is to “[i]dentify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be done, construe it.” In many cases identifying the inventive concept can lead to an unproductive satellite debate, and in Ciba v SNF 2017 FCA 225 the FCA (see here) stated that:
[77] There may be cases in which the inventive concept can be grasped without difficulty
but it appears to me that because “inventive concept” remains undefined, the search for it
has brought considerable confusion into the law of obviousness. That uncertainty can be
reduced by simply avoiding the inventive concept altogether and pursuing the alternate
course of construing the claim.
As noted by the FCA in BMS v Teva 2017 FCA 76 (see here), in Pozzoli itself, [2007] EWCA Civ 588 [19], the EWCA struck a “cautionary note” in respect to the use of the inventive concept:
In some cases the parties cannot agree on what the concept is. If one is not careful such a
disagreement can develop into an unnecessary satellite debate. In the end what matters
is/are the difference(s) between what is claimed and the prior art. It is those differences
which form the "step" to be considered at stage (4). So if a disagreement about the
inventive concept of a claim starts getting too involved, the sensible way to proceed is to
forget it and simply to work on the features of the claim.
The analysis of obviousness in Western Oilfield v M-I proceeded entirely in terms of the inventive concept, which allowed the claims at issue to be addressed in three categories, which reflected different inventive concepts [212]-[226]. This illustrates that there are indeed some cases in which “the inventive concept can be grasped without difficulty,” and in such cases, focusing on inventive concept can streamline the obviousness analysis.
Novelty
The anticipation attack largely failed on the facts, with O'Reilly J generally preferring the evidence of the patentee’s expert witness. However, the patentee’s own expert concluded that one item of prior art anticipated four claims, which were accordingly held to be invalid [148].
An overbreadth attack failed on the facts: [227]-[234].
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