Tuesday, January 2, 2024

Double Patenting and Divisionals

NCS Multistage Inc v Kobold Corporation 2023 FC 1486 McVeigh J

2,693,676 / 2,820,652 / 2,738,907 / 2,766,026 / 2,820,704 (NCS) / 3,027,571 (Kobold)

My first post on this case provided an overview of this decision and addressed some miscellaneous issues, while my second post addressed the overbreadth argument. This post addresses the issue of double patenting and the Consolboard [1981] 1 SCR 504, 536–37 safe harbour for so-called ‘forced’ divisionals. Specifically, the question is whether the safe habour for forced divisionals is triggered by an examiner requisition raising a unity of invention objection, or only by a Final Action, or by something in between.

This is the most important legal aspect of the decision. It is unfortunate that NCS’s ‘throw mud at the wall’ litigation strategy meant it was crammed in with dozens of other issues. The entire discussion of divisionals was 40 paragraphs in a 1684 paragraph decision dealing with myriad other matters. As a result, McVeigh J’s analysis left several loose ends unresolved. This post, which is twice as long as McVeigh J’s discussion, tracks down these loose ends in some detail. It might seem unreasonable of me to do so, given that there is now clearly a split in the case law. No doubt future cases will provide more guidance, so it might be said that we need only let the law unfold.

But that is a litigation perspective and this is a patent prosecution problem. There are many legal issues that make no difference in prosecution. A question as to the threshold for obviousness might make it more or less likely that the patent will ultimately be found invalid for obviousness in litigation, but there is nothing a patent agent can do to affect whether the invention is obvious; that means that any change in the rule will not affect how patent agents prosecute current applications. It is not unreasonable to allow the law to unfold slowly on such issues. But the law relating to divisionals affects hundreds of applications every week. Patent agents need to know what steps to take today, to protect the patents they are prosecuting now from double patenting attacks ten years from now, when the issued patents are finally tested in litigation. The patent agent has a more difficult job than the litigator in that respect; the litigator needs to know what the law is today, the agent needs to know what it will be ten years from now.

An inventor cannot have two patents for the same invention: Comm'r of Patents v Hoechst [1964] SCR 49. The rule applies when the claims are “identical or conterminous,” referred to as “same invention” double patenting, and also when the claims of the second patent are not “patentably distinct” from those of the earlier patent, called “obviousness” double patenting: Whirlpool 2000 SCC 67 [63]–[67]; Sanofi 2008 SCC 61 [108]–[115].

The rule applies also to divisional patents, with the caveat that in Consolboard [1981] 1 SCR 504, 536–37, the SCC carved out an exception for what is sometimes call a ‘forced’ divisional, as a opposed to a voluntary divisional:

As I noted earlier, the appellant originally filed a single patent application for letters patent, but was required by the Commissioner of Patents to divide his application into two parts. It may be open to question whether the Commissioner of Patents should have split off the wafers and treated them as the subject of a separate patent but in my view a patentee is not to be prejudiced by enforced divisional applications. If patents are granted on divisional applications directed by the Patent Office, none of them should be deemed invalid, or open to attack, by reason only of the grant of the original patent.

A question then arises as to what constitutes an “enforced” or ‘forced’ divisional, which permits the patentee to take advantage of this safe harbour [226]–[245], as opposed to a so-called ‘voluntary’ divisional, which is not.

The SCC’s Consolboard statement does not provide any guidance on this issue. The SCC was speaking loosely, because a divisional is never “enforced” or “directed” by the Patent Office. If an examiner raises a unity objection, refusing to grant the patent with the full set of filed claims, and the applicant deletes some of the claims in response, the patentee may choose to file a divisional in respect of those claims, but the Patent Office will never require the applicant to file the divisional. In that sense, all divisionals are voluntary. In another sense, all divisionals are forced, because the applicant obviously wanted a patent with the full set of original claims, or it would have filed two entirely different applications in the first place. The SCC must have meant that a divisional is to be considered forced if the Patent Office would have refused to grant the parent application with the full set of claims, so that the only way to get a patent with the claims found in the divisional would have been to file the divisional. The forced / voluntary terminology seems established, so I will continue to use it, but the real question is what it means for the Patent Office to refuse the parent application.

With that terminology in mind, the substantive question is which divisionals can take advantage of the Consolboard safe harbour (‘forced’) and which cannot (‘voluntary’). Is a divisional considered forced if it is a response to a unity of invention objection by the examiner, or it is considered forced only if it is a response to a Final Action? The question arose on the facts on the issue of whether the 652 and 2,749,636 patents were voluntary divisionals of the 676 patent. (The 636 patent was not asserted but McVeigh J found it necessary to address it nonetheless [1229].)

In her review of the limited caselaw, McVeigh J [234], noted that in Abbott FC 2009 FC 648 [193], Heneghan J indicated that it was enough that the division was a response to an examiner’s unity of invention objection, saying:

[193] I am satisfied that the [2,358,395] Patent should not be found invalid for double patenting over the [2,285,266] Patent. The Applicants provided evidence to show that claims respecting the improved taste profile were divided out of the ‘266 Patent at the request of the Commissioner of Patents. That was an administrative action lying within the mandate of the Commissioner of Patents. In my opinion, it would be unfair and inequitable to find that the ‘395 Patent should be invalidated, only because the Applicants had followed the directions of the Commissioner.

In Abbott FC [27], Heneghan J noted that “during the prosecution of the ‘266 Patent, the Commissioner of Patents required Abbott to divide out any claim relating to improved taste profile into a separate application,” which led to the 395 patent. This evidently refers to the examiner’s requisition of 28 March 2000 (02285266-2000-03-28-PRO). This was the extent of the objection; in particular, there was no Final Action in the file. This means that for Heneghan J, for the applicant to be able to take advantage of the safe harbour it is enough that the divisional was filed after a requisition by the examiner making a unity objection. For convenience, I’ll call this a ‘requisition only’ approach to the safe harbour. (Note that it is the examiner, not the Commissioner, who issues a requisition, but I take it that Heneghan J is using “the Commissioner” is a synecdoche for the Patent Office as a whole.)

On the other hand, McVeigh J [236] noted that in Biogen FC 2020 FC 621 [106], [197], relating to the 2,562,277 patent, Manson J suggested that a divisional is not considered forced if it is merely a response to a requisition:

[106] Throughout the trial, Biogen characterized the divisional application as “forced.” This is an overstatement, as the August 26, 2011 Office Action was an objection, rather than a rejection by way of a “final action.” At this point in the prosecution process, Acorda’s election to proceed with the use claims and file a divisional for the method claims was voluntary. If Acorda felt that the unity of invention objection was not merited, it could have advocated that the responder method was indeed part of the claimed use invention.

The thrust of Manson J’s remark was that a divisional filed as a response to an examiner’s unity objection is not considered voluntary. The examiner requisitions at issue in Abbott FC and Biogen FC were in substantially similar terms, so it is clear that the two decisions are indeed at odds on this point. Manson J’s statement also suggests that a divisional should be considered forced only if it is in response to a Final Action. I’ll call this a ‘Final Action’ approach.

I should note that strictly a unity objection is never resolved by a Final Action. In response to a unity objection, and prior to a Final Action, the Examiner may refer the application to the Commissioner of Patents for review by a Unity Review Board: see MOPOP 21.07 and 21.07.06. (This is an administrative procedure not specifically contemplated in the Rules.) If the applicant is unsuccessful before the URB, the matter is referred to the Commissioner who may issue a Notice of Direction to the applicant under authority of 36(2.1): “the applicant shall, on the direction of the Commissioner, limit the claims to one invention only.” While 36(2.1) uses mandatory “shall” language, what is mandatory is limiting the claims in the application to a single invention. There is no positive obligation to then pursue a divisional: 36(2.1) provides that any other invention disclosed “may” be made the subject of a divisional application. In any event, notwithstanding the mandatory language, even after a Notice of Direction has been sent to the applicant, this does not in itself terminate prosecution. The applicant can then respond to the Notice of Direction, presumably normally by deleting the objectionable claims. But if the applicant chooses instead to continue the fight, the application will be forwarded to the Patent Appeal Board in a process that “resembles the review of a Final Action”: MOPOP 21.07.06. After the referral to the PAB, an unsuccessful applicant has the option of pursuing the matter through the courts. So, under the current procedure a unity objection is never resolved by a Final Action as such. With that said, this entire scenario was not before Manson J, and presumably his reference to a “final action” can be taken to mean the functionally equivalent referral to the PAB under the unity procedure. With that said, Manson J made no reference to the URB, and it is likely that he did not have the procedural context in mind, given that the divisional at issue was a response to a requisition. It is therefore entirely possible that he would consider a divisional responding to a Notice of Direction to also be forced, even though it precedes the equivalent of a Final Action. It also seems clear enough that he would not require the applicant to go so far as to appeal to the PAB.

With all that out of the way, back to the case at hand. After reviewing Abbott FC and Biogen FC, McVeigh J was of the view that:

[245] The preferred approach is an informed middle ground. Where an inventor can trace the origin of the divisional back to a direction of the Commissioner, it will be immune from double patenting attacks.

It’s not clear from this passage alone what kind of “middle ground” McVeigh J is endorsing. McVeigh J’s language referring to “a direction of the Commissioner” echoes Heneghan J’s reference to “the directions of the Commissioner.” This suggests McVeigh J contemplated a variation on Heneghan J’s approach.

Seemingly confirming this, on the facts McVeigh J did review the prosecution history to see if the 636 divisional was forced or voluntary, even though there was no referral to the URB or PAB [1228]–[1236]. This in itself implies that she would not require a referral to the URB or PAB as a prerequisite to considering a divisional to be forced. NCS relied on two Examiner Requisitions in the 676 file dated October 19, 2010 (02693676-2010-10-19-PRO) and June 16, 2011 (02693676-2011-06-16-PRO) [1234], both of which were requisitions which contained unity objections in fairly standard terms. McVeigh J found these requisitions insufficient to establish that the divisional was forced. This means that, contrary to the ‘requisition only’ approach, for McVeigh J a unity objection by an examiner is not in itself enough to establish that division was forced.

Specifically, McVeigh J noted that while the examiner had made two requisitions, “[a] review of the file history leaves it unclear whether NCS divided the 676 Patent [to form the 636 Patent] due to these objections from the Patent Office” [1235]. So, for McVeigh J, while a referral to the URB is not required, a requisition based on a unity objection alone is not enough either. It appears that she would require some evidence connecting the divisional to the objection. This might be called a ‘requisition plus’ approach. It is not enough that a unity objection was made; there must be something more that establishes a causal connection between that objection and the filing of the divisional.

What kind of evidence could establish the necessary connection? Here is the text of the June 16, 2011 requisition that NCS relied on. (The first was in similar terms.)

The application does not comply with subsection 36(1) of the Patent Act. The claims are directed to a plurality of alleged inventions as follows:

[. . . ]

According to subsection 36(2) of the Patent Act, after limiting the claims of the present application to one invention only, the applicant may make any other invention disclosed the subject of a divisional application.

This in itself was not enough to persuade McVeigh J of the necessary connection. So, it would seem that for McVeigh J, a divisional that is simply a response to this language in a requisition does not constitute a forced divisional, and so cannot take advantage of the safe harbour. This is fairly standard language for a unity objection. The language in the 28 March 2000 requisition (02285266-2000-03-28-PRO ) in Abbott FC was in very similar terms:

The claims are directed to a plurality of alleged inventions as follows:

[. . . ]

The claims must be limited to one invention only as set out in Section 36 of the Patent Act.

From this we see that McVeigh J sets a higher bar than Heneghan J in that she came to a different conclusion on essentially the same facts. I don’t think that anything can be made of the difference of the wording between these requisitions, or whether a divisional is forced or not would turn on vagaries of the examiner’s drafting style. But her “middle ground” remark implies she would not go so far as to require a Final Action.

The foregoing tells us what evidence McVeigh J considers is not adequate to establish the necessary connection between the requisition and the divisional, but it does not tell us what kind of evidence is adequate.

The next paragraph offers a hint. In coming to the conclusion that “there is nothing in the record to indicate the 636 Patent is a forced divisional” [1236], McVeigh J stated:

I acknowledge that there are two Examiner Requisitions on October 19, 2010 and June 16, 2011. However, there is no indication as there was above, in the case of the 652 Patent that NCS created a new patent application based on these objections or even in response to these objections.

The reference to the “above” case of the 652 patent is evidently a reference to [1233], where McVeigh J screenshotted the following from the 652 file history correspondence (02820652-2013-07-11-PRO):

 

 

 

 

 

 

So, it appears that McVeigh J took this to be an indication that the 652 Patent was created as a response to the examiner objections. I must say that it is not clear to me what it is about this document that warrants that inference. I am given to understand that a “voluntary amendment” (VA) of this type is not unusual, but neither is it entirely standard. A divisional is typically filed with the intended claims. In some cases, however, perhaps if the applicant has not decided which claims to pursue in the divisional, the applicant may file the divisional with placeholder claims, perhaps the original claims from the parent or claims to the unelected subject matter that was cancelled after the unity objection in the parent. The applicant may then amend the claims after filing by a VA. The VA is usually filed after the initial filing of the divisional, though in this case it was filed at the same time as the divisional application itself was filed. It not clear why that was done; filing a VA adds some expense and an additional step that could have been avoided by simply filing the intended claims as part of the application itself. In any event, the VA is an amendment to the claims that were filed as part of the divisional application, which is considered an entirely separate application (s 36(4)). I can’t see how an amendment to the claims of the divisional establishes a connection to the examiner’s requisition relating to the parent.

In any event, this at least implies that something in the correspondence with the Patent Office during the prosecution of the divisional indicating that the divisional is being filed in response to the objection is the extra step that McVeigh J would require to show that the divisional was filed as a result of that objection. Second, it implies that the above language is sufficient to establish that inference, even though it is not entirely clear why that language is sufficient.

There is a problem, however. As quoted above, McVeigh J held that in contrast to the 652 patent, the file history of the 636 patent left it unclear as to whether the 636 application was also was a response to the examiner requisition. However, the 636 file history (02749636-2011-11-30-PRO) has a very similar VA:


 I don’t see any substantive distinction between these. There is a difference in that the 652 VA was filed at the same time as the divisional itself was filed, whereas the 636 VA was filed about ten weeks after the divisional application was itself filed (as is more usual). I don’t know why this would make any difference in McVeigh J’s analysis, but I also don’t see any other difference that might be relevant.

The bottom line from the analysis so far is that that McVeigh J would require something more than a unity objection to establish that the divisional was forced; there must be something in the file history of the divisional to indicate it was filed in response to the requisition. However, it is not clear what it is about the VA that allowed McVeigh J to draw that inference. The confusion about the role of the VA is compounded by the apparent inconsistency between the treatment of the 652 and 636 divisionals. Consequently, it is not clear what evidence is needed to establish the connection that McVeigh J would require.

The foregoing relates to McVeigh J’s discussion of whether the 636 divisional was forced. She then turned to the question of whether the 652 divisional was forced [1236]. In that context, her analysis turned on what appears to be an entirely separate point:

[1244] As can be seen, Parliament created two avenues for the Patent Office when objecting to a multiplicity of invention. Subsection 36(2) allows the inventor to voluntarily divide, whereas subsection 36(2.1) enforces a division.

[1245] NCS adopts the position that both voluntary and forced divisional applications are possible under subsections 36(2) and 36(2.1) of the Patent Act.

[1246] However, I am of the view that subsection 36(2.1) is comparable to the Supreme Court’s wording of “enforced divisional application” in Consolboard at paras 536-537. This further supports adopting the approach in Biogen FC.

This seems to be saying that only a divisional issued pursuant to 36(2.1) would be considered forced. As noted above, 36(2.1) is used by the Commissioner after a review by the URB. This means that only a divisional that went to the URB is to be considered forced. As McVeigh J notes [1246], this is similar to the Biogen FC approach of requiring a Final Action, with the caveat that a referral to the URB is not strictly a Final Action, though it follows a similar procedure. While neither McVeigh J nor Manson J mentioned the URB, I expect they would both consider it sufficient if the divisional were filed as a consequence of a Notice of Direction pursuant to 36(2.1) without requiring the applicant to continue resisting so as to provoke a true Final Action.

It is not clear to me how to reconcile McVeigh J’s analysis of the 636 and 652 divisionals. The “middle ground” language [245], and the discussion at of the 636 patent at [1233]–[1236], implies a ‘requisition plus’ approach, while the discussion of the 652 patent at [1244]–[1246] implies a ‘final action’ approach. These seem to be two entirely different tests. McVeigh J held the 636 patent to be a ‘voluntary’ divisional on the basis of the first test [1236], and she held the 636 patent to be a ‘voluntary’ divisional on the basis of the second test [1247], thus confirming that these two lines of reasoning are indeed distinct grounds for holding that the division is voluntary. One way to reconcile the tests would be to say that both tests must be satisfied to take advantage of the safe harbour, but this seems strained — if McVeigh J had intended a two-pronged test, one would have expected her to say so explicitly.

To this point I have been trying to unpack McVeigh J’s decision. Now we can turn to policy considerations. There are a few points at which the divisional might be considered forced: (1) if made as a response to an examiner’s requisition; (2) after a referral to the URB and a subsequent Notice of Direction by the Commissioner pursuant to 36(2.1); (3) after the subsequent Final Action by the examiner; (4) after an adverse PAB decision; (5) after an adverse court decision. All of these might additionally be combined with McVeigh J’s suggestion that there must be something extra in the divisional file to establish a connection between the requisition and the divisional.

Regardless of the point where we draw the line in the prosecution of the parent, it is difficult to see any policy justification for requiring something extra in the file to establish a causal connection with the divisional. First, I must say that I have difficulty understanding why the standard sequence of events is not sufficient to establish a causal connection. Typically, a unity objection is made to the parent patent, identifying two groups of claims, and instructing the applicant to elect Group A or Group B; the applicant does indeed delete Group B; the applicant subsequently files a divisional claiming Group B (or substantively similar claims); the divisional application explicitly indicates that it is a divisional of the parent, as is required to claim divisional status and the benefit of the same filing date. What else is really needed to establish that the division was caused by the requisition?

Further, if a ‘requisition plus’ rule is established, patent agents will simply add the necessary wording, once they find out what it is. That will be pure formalism, and it is difficult to see what is gained. If the special words are already standard boilerplate, then it won’t make any difference. If new words need to be used – for example, if it is necessary to file placeholder claims and a VA simultaneously — there will be a period of potentially prolonged uncertainty before we find out what the special words are. And there is also the question of existing divisional patents. If agents need to add new words that are not now normally included, this would effectively mean that all past divisionals are deemed to be voluntary. This is effectively a retroactive change in the law with the injustice that entails, for no apparent benefit. The broader point here is that specific words in the divisional file will never be a reliable indication of a causal connection (assuming some evidence is necessary beyond the requisition), because the patent agent will use whatever words are necessary to invoke the safe harbour. For simplicity, in the remainder of this policy discussion I will assume there is no such requirement, though we cannot rule it out as a legal requirement.

Now we can return to the question of where to draw the line. We can rule out options (4) and (5). No one so far has suggested going so far as to requiring the applicant to go to the PAB or beyond. The outcome of a PAB decision may be an outright rejection of the application: see MOPOP 26.08. It unreasonable to require the applicant to risk rejection of the application as a prerequisite to taking advantage of the safe harbour. Moreover, requiring a PAB decision would appear to be contrary to Consolboard, as there was no mention of a PAB decision requiring the division, though it is conceivable that there was one and it was not mentioned. I included options (4) and (5) nonetheless for completeness, and to point out that there is no reason in principle to draw the line at a Final Action rather than a PAB rejection; whether the applicant decides to withdraw claims from the parent and file a divisional after any of these steps, the reason is always that the cost and inconvenience of filing a divisional is outweighed by the cost of fighting the objection.

The real question, then, is whether the safe harbour should be triggered by a requisition only, or whether the applicant needs a URB referral or a Final Action. Since a URB referral and a Final Action are closely linked, we can treat them together. These are very onerous requirements. Final Actions, or a trips to the URB, are rare. This is because a Final Action is intended as a last resort when a true impasse is reached. Indeed, an applicant is required to respond “in good faith” to a requisition: Rule 86(3). A refusal to divide in response to a unity objection solely to provoke a referral to the URB so as to protect the safe harbour, would arguably not be made in good faith. Moreover, I am given to understand that in practice unity objections tend to be raised early in proceedings and the examination does not take place until any perceived lack of unity issue is resolved. That means that a trip to the URB and possibly a Final Action would be provoked at the very outset of examination, before any of the substantive objection have been raised. That is clearly not the function of a Final Action. Further, while unity objections are routinely made very early in prosecution on the basis of the application submitted by the applicant, it also happens that a unity objection is made later in prosecution, based on new prior art discovered by the examiner or submitted by a third party pursuant to 34.1(1). In such a case, the applicant may agree with the examiner that the unity objection is appropriate. It seems wrong to require the applicant to disagree with the examiner in order to provoke a Final Action so as to take advantage of the safe harbour. It might be said that if the examiner and the applicant agree the parent claims two patentably distinct inventions, then there is no need for the safe harbour. But it is one thing for the examiner and the applicant to agree, and it is another for the applicant to be confident that a court ten years from now will agree. And just because the applicant agrees that division is appropriate, it does not necessarily mean that the applicant believes that the parent contains two distinct inventions. It is enough that the applicant is of the view that there are arguably grounds for believing the application contains two inventions; that is enough to warrant examining the two putative inventions separately. This is not to suggest that provoking a referral in order to take advantage of the safe harbour is conduct that should be sanctioned; that would put applicants in an even more impossible position. The point is that a rule requiring a Final Action or URB referral in order to take advantage of the safe harbour incentivizes conduct that is harmful to the patent system as a whole by increasing cost and delay.

Thus, the Final Action / URB approach would dramatically restrict the availability of the safe harbour. It would be tantamount to abolishing the safe harbour, or dramatically increasing the cost of the patent system. That in itself does not imply the Final Action approach is wrong. We need to ask whether it would be desirable to dramatically restrict the safe habour. This would be harsh for the applicant, but that might be justified if there is an offsetting benefit to the public.

There is a straightforward argument in favour of restricting or abolishing the safe habour. The safe harbour may protect what is in fact a second patent for the same invention, which should properly have been included in the parent application. Indeed, that is the whole point — if the divisional is patentably distinct, a safe harbour is not needed. It is unfair to the applicant to penalize them for double patenting that was not their fault, but regardless of whose fault it might be, the public will suffer the consequent harm of double patenting. We might therefore want to restrict the availability of the safe harbour, accepting the unfairness to the applicant, in order to protect the public from the harms of double patenting. Requiring the applicant to pursue more onerous steps before taking advantage of the safe harbour effectively restricts the availability of the safe harbour and therefore provides more protection to the public against the harms of double patenting.

How difficult should it be for the applicant to take advantage of the safe harbour? How hard should the applicant have to fight in resisting the Patent Offices improper unity objection? That depends on how much the public is harmed by double patenting. We should require the applicant to fight hard—all the way to a URB referral or a Final Action, if the harm to the public is large; in other words, we are willing to tolerate significant unfairness to the patentee if the harm to the public is substantial. On the other hand, if the harm to the public from double patenting is minimal, then we should not tolerate as much unfairness to the patentee. It follows that to decide where to draw the line for the safe harbour, we need to assess the harm to the public from double patenting in the context of divisionals.

How bad is the double patenting problem? The double patenting doctrine “is aimed at the problem of evergreening; extending the monopoly that was granted on the first patent by filing a new patent that does not offer a new invention to the public”: Mylan v Lilly 2016 FCA 119 [26]. When Consolboard was decided, the evergreening problem was substantial. The term ran from grant and applications were not published until grant, so if the inventor could file two patents for the same invention, it could get early protection by vigorously prosecuting the first application and potentially many years of extended protection by delaying prosecution of the second. The problem is now substantially mitigated because applications are now laid open after 18 months, so the inventor can get at most an extra 18 months, after which the first application will be prior art against the second. I will discuss this in a subsequent post.

More importantly for the present purposes, the evergreening problem does not arise at all in respect of divisionals. A divisional will necessarily have the same expiry date as the parent. This is because the divisional necessarily has the same filing date as the parent (78.2(b)). That is the point of a divisional. Otherwise, in response to a unity objection, the applicant would have to withdraw some claims and file an entirely new patent application with a new priority date, with the attendant risk that invalidating prior art would have arisen in the interim. That would be unfair to the applicant, which did after all actually file a sufficient specification fully disclosing the second invention on the original filing date, so there is no reason to deny the applicant the benefit of the original filing date. The solution to the problem is to allow a divisional, which has the same priority date as the parent (per 78.2(b)), thereby avoiding the problem of intervening prior art. In all other respects the divisional is like an entirely separate application: s 36(4). Since the divisional necessarily has the same filing date as the parent, it necessarily has the same expirty date, under the current rule that the term runs from filing. The mischief of term extension through double patenting simply cannot arise in respect of a divisional under current law, as McVeigh J recognized in AbbVie v JAMP Pharma 2023 FC 1520 [609]–[610]: see also MIPS v Bauer Hockey 2018 FC 485 [302] and GlaxoSmithKline v Apotex 2003 FCT 687 [89].

The same objection can be made to McVeigh J’s argument that “[a]n applicant should not be penalized for electing for a divisional, but such an election should not be a mere attempt to secure the claims and take advantage of the earlier priority date of the parent patent” [245]. This implies that the safe harbour should be denied when the applicant is trying to game the system by using a divisional to take advantage of the earlier priority date of the parent patent. The problem with that reasoning is that the applicant can never “take advantage of the earlier priority date of the parent,” because the parent never has an earlier priority date; the priority date of the parent and the divisional are always the same: s 78.2(b).

Another type of harm was noted by Kelen J in GlaxoSmithKline v Apotex 2003 FCT 687 [89]–[90]. He acknowledged that the original rationale for the rule against double patenting did not apply in respect of divisionals under the new Act [89], but he went on to make the following observation:

[90] I cannot agree with GSK that "the sin of double patenting" has evaporated. GSK has overlooked the impact that a second patent can have under the Regulations. Under paragraph 7(1)(e) of the Regulations, the Minister is prohibited from issuing the requested NOC for 24 months once the owner of a patent has applied for an order under subsection 6(1). The effect of this provision is to put in place a mandatory injunction that remains in force until either the case is disposed of or the 24-month period expires. The existence of additional patents allows the patent-holder to bring additional applications, thereby obtaining multiple injunctive periods. There is no need to look further than the case at bar for an excellent example of this practice. Even though Apotex successfully invalidated the '637 patent in 2001, the filing of this application by GSK has prohibited Apotex from bringing its product to market for the past two years.

I’ll call this the “NOC problem”. It arose in that case because GSK filed an application claiming dry formulation paroxetine and carved out a divisional claiming dry formulation paroxetine without microcrystalline cellulose. The patent based on the parent issued and was added to the patent register. Apotex promptly filed an NOA and the NOC litigation over the parent ensured. Then the divisional claiming dry formulation paroxetine without microcrystalline cellulose issued and was added to the patent register, and the litigation started all over again. If the two are not patentably distinct, the patentee would surely lose in the second litigation if it lost in the first. But as Kelen J pointed out, it can nonetheless get the benefit of the statutory stay (though there is a second order disincentive because of the prospect of s 8 damages). So, the NOC problem was real.

I say it “was” real, because the NOC problem that arose in GlaxoSmithKline v Apotex no longer exists, as McVeigh J recognized in AbbVie v JAMP Pharma 2023 FC 1520 [613]. As a result of 2006 amendments, SOR/2006-242, the patent list is now ‘frozen.’ The generic is now only required to respond to patents that were listed at the time it filed its NOA: NOC Regs 5(4). Consequently, the statutory stay cannot be triggered by a divisional patent added to the list after the generic files its NOA. The generic can be sued in an ordinary infringement action on the basis of a subsequent divisional — whether or not that divisional was patentably distinct from the patent — but that doesn’t cause substantial harm because there is no equivalent of the statutory stay. Under current FCA jurisprudence, the patentee will never get an interlocutory injunction. (Even if the law were relaxed, it is unlikely that a patentee would get an interlocutory injunction in a case in which its action was based on a patent that was prima facie the same as the patent at issue in litigation which it had already lost.) Without the statutory stay, there is no benefit to bringing an action based on a patent which is not patentably distinct from the earlier patent; if it lost on the first, it will almost certainly lose on the second.

So, the evergreening problem no longer exists in respect of divisionals, and the NOC problem no longer exists either.

McVeigh J raised another objection:

[1239] First, following the approach in Abbott FC [ie requisition only], this assertion potentially opens a door to misuse the patent prosecution process. Every inventor could file as many patents as they desire in a single application, and then when the Patent Office suggests division, the inventor has protection from double patenting attacks because the divisionals were “forced.”

[1240] The underlying policy rationale of double patenting must be kept in mind. Allowing inventors to expand their domain via decisions that are made by the patentees themselves is counterintuitive to the rationale underpinning double patenting. Accepting NCS’s approach means inventors can benefit from accidental misuse of the system, or worse, knowingly expand their domain in the knowledge that forced divisional applications are immune from double patenting attacks.

I’ve quoted this argument in full because I don’t understand it. When McVeigh J says “Every inventor could file as many patents as they desire in a single application,” I take it she means that an inventor could file a single application claiming many different inventions. In that case, yes, under the ‘requisition only’ approach the inventor would indeed have protection from double patenting attacks because the divisionals were ‘forced.’ But the inventor would have protection from double patenting attacks even without the safe harbour because the inventions are patentably distinct. Moreover, I fail to see how the patentee can be said to have expanded their domain. If the patentee discloses multiple inventions in the application, the patentee is entitled to protection for those multiple inventions. The patentee’s domain is defined by the claims, the patentee is entitled to claim all the inventions that it disclosed, and so far as the scope of the domain is concerned, it makes no difference whether those claims are found in single patent or multiple patents. The only thing the applicant gains by filing a single application with multiple inventions is filing fees. That is why the examiner can object based on lack of unity; the unity objection is really an administrative mechanism for ensuring that the fees charged for examination are commensurate with the work involved. That is why the s 36(1) provides that a patent is not invalid simply because the examiner fails to raise a proper unity objection.

McVeigh J raised yet another argument in AbbVie v JAMP Pharma 2023 FC 1520:

[614] However, I am not convinced that this amendment [freezing the patent register] completely removes the potential for unfair advantage from double patenting under the Regulations. As JAMP points out, a first person with more patents under a given drug on the Register will make more work for a second person seeking a NOC for a biosimilar. This is ordinarily not a problem where several patents correspond to the same drug on the Register, but it may constitute an unfair advantage for a first person where more work is created than a single invention warrants, i.e. where a generic manufacturer has to do a disproportionate amount of work due to a double patent.

If I understand this argument correctly, the idea is that it is more work for a second person to address two patents for the same invention rather than one. This is not correct in the context of divisionals. First suppose that the divisional was prompted by a unity objection made by the examiner. If the claimed subject-matter of the divisional is patentably distinct from the parent, then there is no grounds for complaint. The problem can only arise if the unity objection was improper. If the improper objection had not been made, then the claims of the divisional would have issued as claims in the parent. Since the disclosure of the patent and divisional are the same, it is no more work for the second person to address those claims in two patents (with the same disclosure), rather than one.

The objection is no stronger even as applied to an entirely unprompted divisional, for exactly the same reason. The double patenting objection only bites when the subject-matter claimed by the divisional is not patentably distinct from the parent. In that case, the patentee might have included the claims of the divisional along with the parent, but chose not to; but because it is a divisional, the disclosure is the same. Again, it is no more difficult for the second person to address claims in two patents with the same disclosure than if those same claims had been found in a single patent with that same disclosure. That is true because the disclosure is the same either way; whether the divisional was forced or voluntary doesn’t matter. Further, even if we suppose that the claims of the divisional somehow would not have been filed at all, so that there were some inconvenience of having to address new claims, it cannot possibly be very much inconvenience to address claims that are not patentably distinct, based on the same disclosure; certainly not enough to justify making the applicant fight through to the URB or a Final Action.

Finally, there is the argument that even if there is no harm to the public, it is just wrong to allow two patents for the same invention: see GlaxoSmithKline v Apotex [91]. Maybe so, but it is so wrong that we want to deny the applicant the protection of the safe harbour which the SCC endorsed in Consolboard, even in the absence of any harm to the public? To my mind, that would be contrary to a purposive interpretation of the Act. The Patent Act is intended to benefit the public. Throwing sand in the gears of the system without any corresponding benefit will simply harm the public. Kelen J adverted to 36(2) of the Act in support of his position. I fail to see how that provision supports his view that granting two patents for the same invention is a grievous sin.

To summarize, the question is how hard we should require the applicant to fight in opposing a unity objection before permitting it to take advantage of the Consolboard safe harbour. The safe harbour can result in the divisional being valid even though it is not patentably distinct from the parent. If this causes substantial harm to the public, we should require the patentee to fight hard; if there is not much harm to the public, then we should be more lax in allowing the applicant the benefit of the safe harbour.

As it turns out, this is not a difficult question to answer. There is no harm to the public at all in the context of a divisional.

There was substantial harm when Hoechst and Consolboard were decided, because the divisional might have a later expiry date (and still the SCC was willing to allow a safe harbour). That harm is now gone. There was still some harm, albeit less, under the old PM(NOC) Regs. That harm is also now gone. So now we are left with the argument that there is some inconvenience to the second person in an PM(NOC) action, although surely there is very little — I have argued that there is none at all. And then there is the argument that it is just wrong to allow two patents for the same invention. We seem to be clutching at straws to preserve double patenting as a ground of invalidity.

We can now return to the question of how difficult it should be for the applicant to take advantage of the safe harbour. If the public is seriously harmed by double patenting, a more stringent approach might be desirable, requiring the applicant to fight all the way to a URB referral or a Final Action. If the harm to the public from double patenting is minimal, then we should not tolerate as much unfairness to the patentee.

It turns out that this question is very easy to answer. As we have seen, there is simply no double patenting problem at all in respect of divisional patents. This clearly implies that a relaxed approach to the safe harbour is best. Nothing in the SCC authority requires otherwise.

Indeed, given that there is no harm at all from double patenting in the context of divisionals, it would be preferable to abolish the doctrine entirely, so that a divisional patent would never be subject to a double patenting attack based on the parent, regardless of whether it is forced or voluntary. We should recall that double patenting doctrine is entirely the creation of the courts. It has no basis whatsoever in the Act. Suppose that double patenting doctrine did not exist and it was now argued for the first time that a divisional patent is invalid if it is not patentably distinct from the parent. Would the courts today be willing to read language into the Act to invalidate the divisional? Surely not. While the the courts will sometimes read language into legislation as a matter of statutory interpretation, a strong justification is required to depart from the text, such as absurd consequences, or a result that is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. Neither of remaining arguments for the double patenting doctrine in the context of divisionals — inconvenience to the second party, if any, and ‘it’s just wrong’ — is remotely strong enough to justify reading language into the Act.

The courts created the double patenting doctrine. Now that the problems it was intended to address have been eliminated in the context of the divisionals, the double patenting doctrine should also be eliminated in that context. It might be said that now it is established law, and we are stuck with it, for better or for worse. I don’t find that persuasive. The courts created double patenting doctrine of their own initiative to address a specific problem. If the courts have the authority to create the doctrine, how can it be said that they do not have the authority to abolish it, now that the rationale for the doctrine has vanished? (What could the legislature even do to abolish a doctrine that isn’t found in the Act in the first place?) I don’t see any impediment to this in the SCC juriprudence. Hoechst, Consolboard, and Whirlpool were all decided under the old Act. Sanofi held that a selection patent is not invalid for obviousness type double patenting over a genus patent because a species is not obvious over the genus [113]. The double patenting doctrine was not applied, it was not challenged, and divisionals were never mentioned. This can’t be taken to affirm the continued vitality of double patenting doctrine in the divisionals context.

I would note that in Consolboard 537 the SCC cited JR Short Milling [1941] Ex CR 69 and Fox 4th at 270, as authority for the proposition that patents granted on divisional applications directed by the Patent Office should not be open to attack by reason of the grant of the original patent. Fox in turn cited Lovell Mfg v Beatty Bros (1962) 41 CPR 18 (Ex Ct) 68, in which Thorson P held as follows:

Finally, the basic objection to double patenting is that it would extend the life of the monopoly if a patent were granted for a device and a patent for the same device were granted subsequently. This did not happen in the present case for the two patents referred to, indeed, the plaintiff's three patents, were issued on the same day. This puts an end to the matter.

This seems to me to be both common sense and good authority for the proposition that a double patenting objection cannot be raised in respect of patents which expire on the same day. At the time, it would have been a matter more or less of coincidence that the patents expired on the same day, because they were issued on the same day. (The complete file history for the patents at issue in Lovell is not available online, but so far as I can tell, the patents were for related but distinct inventions, with different specifications, that had been filed at the same time by the same applicant. Presumably they were examined together and issued on the same date for that reason.) With divisionals under current law, it is matter of necessity, since the parent and the divisional will always have the same filing date. But in either case, the principle is the same: if the second patent cannot extend the life of the monopoly “that puts an end to the matter,” and the double patenting objection is not available.

In summary, there is simply no double patenting problem at all in respect of divisional patents. Double patenting has nonetheless grown into a complex area of law that is especially problematic in patent prosecution. There is no reason to ever hold a divisional is invalid for double patenting over its parent, so the best approach would be to simply hold that double patenting doctrine does not apply at all to divisionals, on the authority of Lovell Mfg. But at the very least, the FCA should clearly affirm the ‘requisition only’ approach to the Consolboard safe harbour. Nothing in Consolboard or any other SCC or FCA authority requires otherwise. We do not need strict rules around the safe harbour in order to protect the public from a double-patenting harm that does not exist. There are some issues in patent law that are truly difficult, such as how to deal with indirect infringement in the pharma context. The safe harbour for divisionals is not one of those issues.

Monday, December 18, 2023

Blogging Break

I'll be taking a break until early in the new year, when I'll be back with a long post on the double patenting issues raised by NCS Multistage v Kobold 2023 FC 1486 and AbbVie v JAMP Pharma 2023 FC 1520. Enjoy the holidays!

Friday, December 15, 2023

Nova v Dow: Doctrinal Implications

Nova Chemicals Corp v Dow Chemical Co 2022 SCC 43 Rowe J: Wagner CJ, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Martin, Kasirer and Jamal JJ concurring; Côté J dissenting affg Nova Chemicals Corporation v Dow Chemical Company 2020 FCA 141 Stratas JA: Near, Woods JJA affg Dow Chemical Co v Nova Chemicals Corp 2017 FC 350, 2017 FC 637 Fothergill J

2,160,705 / film-grade polymers / ELITE SURPASS

The Intuition / The Legal Background / Causation as a Matter of Fact / The Concession / What Role for “But For” Causation in Identifying the NIO? / Summary of the Summary / Causation Concept in the Absence of an NIO / What is the NIO? / The Value of the Invention / Rivett on the Facts / Three Policy Arguments / The Source of the Chilling Effect / Miscellaneous Policy Issues

In Nova v Dow, Rowe J, writing for an 8-1 majority, addressed the proper method of calculating an accounting of profits in the patent context. I have a two-part article on the decision forthcoming in the IPJ. Part I of that article analyzes Nova v Dow at a doctrinal level. What did Rowe J mean by “cause”? What did he mean by “the non-infringing option”? What did he mean by “the value of the invention”? I summarized Part I in a series of blog posts, listed above. Part II addresses the policy implications of Nova v Dow. In the first post summarizing Part II, I argued that the policy arguments advanced by Rowe J in support of his approach are either entirely misguided, or support a “but for” approach to an accounting. Further, while Rowe J asserted that his approach would not chill legitimate non-infringing competition because his approach is not intended to be punitive, the chilling effect does not depend on the label we attach to a remedy. In the next post I discussed the source of the chilling effect and showed that Rowe J’s departure from “but for” causation does indeed risk a chilling effect. That post left aside the question of the extent of that chilling effect and the appropriate policy implication, which will be discussed in the post following this one. In this, the fourth post on Part II, I will summarize my thoughts on the likely doctrinal implications of Nova v Dow. A subsequent post will consider the policy implications and the appropriate response to the decision. (The third post on Part II dismisses two minor policy arguments made by Rowe J.)

The accounting context

The most basic question is how Nova v Dow will impact the accounting of profits remedy in the patent context. This question is remarkably difficult to answer given that it was the focus of the entire decision. The problem is that Rowe J did not provide any guidance on the key issues. While he implicitly rejected “but for” causation, he did not specify any alternative. On the central issue of what constitutes an appropriate a non-infringing option, the key holding is that the NIO is “any product that helps courts isolate the profits causally attributable to the invention” [58]. In the absence of any clear causation concept, saying that the NIO is anything that is helpful is, well, unhelpful. Moreover, he held that both causation and the nature of the NIO are matters of fact. Since Rowe J did not articulate any guiding principle it is difficult to predict how the law will evolve. Ultimately, my best guess is that the courts will develop a non-exhaustive list of factors, including market substitutability, technical similarity, and “but for” causation, which are all considered and balanced in light of the facts of the case.

Many doctrines involve balancing a list of factors. This does not raise any problems in itself—so long as the factors are all relevant to some principled underlying inquiry. For example, a variety of factors may be relevant to reconstructing the hypothetical negotiation in assessing reasonable royalty damages, with more or less weight given to any particular factor on the facts of a case. That does not necessarily result in unpredictability, because the various factors all address the same principled question, namely what are the terms of the licence the parties would have entered into had they bargained ex ante. The weight to be given to each factor turns on the degree to which, on the facts, that factor is relevant to the ultimate inquiry. The difficulty in with Nova v Dow is that there is no underlying principle. This means that even if the courts develop a list of “relevant” factors, those factors will not be relevant to any underlying principle, because there is no underlying principle. This means that there will be no way to predict whether one factor rather than another will have more weight in any given case; that will likely turn on arbitrary and idiosyncratic factors such as the mannerisms and persuasiveness of the expert witnesses.

Consequently, if I suspect that Nova v Dow will result in long-term uncertainty, where there is really no way of predicting whether an NIO is appropriate other than going to trial.

In her dissent, Côté J stated that “[t]here must be some legal requirements or standards [for a non-infringing option] that guide courts and the parties to the litigation” [193]. The “must” in that sentence is aspirational rather than descriptive. There should be some legal requirements or standards to provide guidance—but, since Nova v Dow, there aren’t. No doubt the FCA would like to provide guidance, but only time will tell whether that will be possible in the face of Rowe J’s holding that it is purely a matter of fact as to whether a particular alternative is an NIO.

There will also be uncertainty as to the applicability of Rowe J’s approach to different heads of profit. Rowe J explicitly endorsed “but for” causation in the context of springboard damages, while he used a different causation concept in the context of the non-infringing option. So “but for” causation is used sometimes, but not always, when assessing the amount to be disgorged. There is an open question as to whether “but for” causation will be used in assessing products from convoyed goods (unpatented goods normally sold with the patented product), fixed costs (which were addressed in the FCA but not the SCC), and the cost of capital. The most likely scenario is that these heads of profits will be addressed on an ad hoc basis, in which “but for” causation may or may not be applied in each case. However, we can expect clarity to emerge as courts specifically address these heads of profit. 

In particular, in the Nova v Dow FCA decision Stratas JA held that "the full costs approach [to deduction of fixed costs] is principled and sound" [154]. This means that the infringer will always be able to deduct some portion of its fixed costs. This issue was not addressed by the SCC, but if the SCC had addressed some coherent causation principle, then Stratas JA's approach to fixed costs might have been subject to revision. As it is, I expect it will stand, even though it is not based either on "but for" causation or on whatever causation concept was being used by Rowe J. While we now have doctrinal clarity regarding the deductibility of fixed costs, I doubt this will lead to predictability. While Stratas J A clearly held that some proportion of fixed costs are always deductible, he did not provide any principle to determine what that proportion might be — except that whatever the principle is, it is not "but for" causation. In my view, "but for" causation is the only principled approach and consequently, Stratas JA's full costs approach is likely to also lead to long-term unpredictability and arbitrary results. I am coming around to the view that this may even more important in practice than the question of the appropriate NIO. An infringer will always be able to point to very substantial fixed costs and if any significant proportion of those costs is regularly deducted, this may significantly reduce the quantum of the accounting.

Further, in the article, I point out that there is a real puzzle in allowing for the cost of capital. It is possible that deductibility of the cost of capital will turn on whether the infringing product is funded with retained capital or external capital, even though this clearly has no bearing on whether the profits are caused by the invention.

The patent damages context

The next question is whether Rowe J’s approach to the NIO will extend to patent damages. The straightforward argument for extending it to the damages context is that prior to Nova v. Dow, patent damages and an accounting were symmetrical. As the Court of Appeal stated in Merck 2015 FCA 171 [60] in the course of holding that the Schmeiser differential profits approach extends to damages, “the significance of [Schmeiser] is that if a court may consider a defendant’s resort to a non-infringing alternative when calculating the infringer’s profit, there is no reason in principle to ignore such conduct when calculating the patentee’s lost sales.” If the Schmeiser approach applies to damages as much as an accounting, then it would seem to follow that the Nova v Dow approach does also. On the other hand, Rowe J focused throughout his decision on the accounting remedy, and there is not the slightest hint of a suggestion that the principles would extend to damages as well. Further, Stratas JA, whose judgment in the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the Supreme Court, expressly held that his approach to an accounting did not apply in the damages context: Nova v. Dow FCA 2020 FCA 141 [45], [67], [76]. Consequently, it would be entirely fair to read the SCC decision as being confined to the accounting context. I suspect that whether the Court of Appeal decides to extend Rowe J’s approach to the NIO to the damages context depends on the view it takes of the soundness of his decision. A similar question arises with respect to s 8 damages under the PM(NOC) regime. I expect that will go the same way as damages more generally.

Beyond patent law

An accounting or disgorgement of the wrongdoer’s profits is a remedy that is not limited to patent law, but I very much to doubt that Nova v Dow will have any influence beyond patent law. It is difficult to identify any principle which might be extended to other cases, and Rowe J’s focus on the profits causally attributable to “the invention” is a straightforward basis for holding that Nova v Dow does not apply more broadly.

Monday, December 11, 2023

Redundancy between Overbreadth and Utility

NCS Multistage Inc v Kobold Corporation 2023 FC 1486 McVeigh J

2,693,676 / 2,820,652 / 2,738,907 / 2,766,026 / 2,820,704 (NCS) / 3,027,571 (Kobold)

My last post provided an overview of this decision and address several miscellaneous issues. This post addresses the overbreadth argument. McVeigh J held a number of claims of the 704 patent to be invalid for overbreadth. I have argued that overbreath in Canadian law is almost always redundant with some other ground of invalidity. In this case, McVeigh J held most of the overbroad claims to also be invalid for lack of utility, and I will argue that overbreadth was indeed redundant. The details are interesting to see how the two separate tests for overbreadth and utility ended up functionally converging, and to see why some claims were overbroad but nonetheless useful.

The key question on overbreadth is whether a feature of the invention is essential, not in the sense of claim construction, but “whether that feature is so key to the invention described in the disclosure that a Claim that omits it encompasses embodiments that were not contemplated in the disclosure”: Seedlings 2021 FCA 154 [54], quoted at [167]. McVeigh J summarized this as asking whether the whether the feature in question is “at the core of the invention actually invented or disclosed” [1458]. This strikes me as a good summary of Seedlings, which puts the question in a positive form. In utility, the question is whether the invention is useful, which in this case boiled down to whether it was operable, ie whether it worked. In principle, these are two distinct questions. But what does it mean to ask whether the feature lies “at the core of the invention”?

To see how McVeigh J answered this question, we need to turn to the facts. There were five features implicated in the overbreadth and utility attacks, namely three components of the fracturing valve — the wedge, plug, and seal — as well as the the alignment mechanism and the means for holding the mandrel stationary. We can ignore the wedge, as both attacks failed.

Seals

On overbreadth, McVeigh J held as follows:

[1467] The placement of the seals and the number of seals goes to the very core of the 704 Patent invention. The 704 Patent discloses a fracturing valve and both parties agree that the lower seal is essential to allow the fracturing valve to operate as disclosed. The 704 Patent does not disclose any method by which the invention could operate without the described lower seal placement. The lower seal is an essential element that goes to the very core of the invention.

The claims that did not specify a seal were therefore invalid for overbreadth [1470]. That means that those claims were overbroad because they were inoperable. The claims without seals were also invalid for lack of utility [1514] for the same reason: “There are no operable embodiments of the 704 Patent Claims that do not include a seal” [1511]. It is not just that the claims happened to be invalid on both grounds: they were invalid on both grounds for the same reason, namely inoperability. Thus overbreadth was functionally redundant in light of the utility requirement.

(Note that Claim 15 was listed as being invalid for overbreadth [1470] but not lack of utility [1514], but in light of McVeigh J’s reasoning, I think this must have been an inadvertent omission from the utility list.)

Equalization Valve or Plug

The equalization plug “goes to the very core of the invention, such that the fracturing valve cannot operate without an equalization plug” [1475]. Again, it is “core” because it is necessary for operability. Consequently, “those claims that do not explicitly claim an equalization plug are invalid for overbreadth” [1478]. Those claims were invalid for lack of utility for the same reason: “the 704 Patent Claims that do not claim an equalization plug cannot perform the claimed fracturing function; they will not operate” [1517]. Again, overbreadth and the lack of utility are functionally the same — both turn on inoperabilty — and the overbreadth attack is redundant.

Alignment Mechanism

Similarly, McVeigh J found that the alignment mechanism goes to the core of the invention because it was necessary for the tool to work [1483], and the claims at issue lacked utility for exactly the same reason [1520]. Again, overbreadth was functionally redundant.

(In the listing of invalid claims at [1486], [1521] claims 24–27 were listed as being invalid for overbreadth but not lack of utility. In light of the reasoning, this seems to have been an oversight.)

Stationary Mandrel

McVeigh J found that a component for holding the mandrel stationary was core to the invention because “there must be some kind of component that provides frictional resistance against the wellbore that allows the mandrel to remain stationary for the invention to operate” [1494]. Claims that did not specify a means for holding the mandrel stationary were therefore invalid for overbreadth [1495].

However, lack of utility was not proven:

[1525] There was insufficient evidence on this issue to demonstrate that the 704 Patent will not work where the mandrel is not held stationary. This is likely due to the fact that Kobold raised this issue in construction and it was not argued substantively by either party in closing.

[1526] Therefore, without more evidence on this specific issue, I find that Kobold has not met its burden to demonstrate inutility on this issue.

So, in discussing overbreadth, McVeigh J found that the tool would not operate if the mandrel was not held stationary, but in discussing utility she could not arrive at that conclusion on the evidence. It is not clear to me why the evidence that McVeigh J relied on in the overbreadth context did not allow her to come to the same conclusion in respect of lack of utility. Nonetheless, it is clear that the functional question was the same under both overbreadth and utility — would the invention work if the mandrel was not held stationary — and the only difference was in respect of the evidence.

In summary, notwithstanding that McVeigh applied separate analyses with separate tests for overbreadth and utility, overbreadth is functionally redundant in light of the utility requirement. I would expect similar results in contexts where there is overlap with novelty or anticipation: eg it seems very reasonable to say that a feature that is the only point of distinction between the prior art and the claimed invention would be considered “core” to the invention.

Thursday, December 7, 2023

Throwing Mud at the Wall

NCS Multistage Inc v Kobold Corporation 2023 FC 1486 McVeigh J

2,693,676 / 2,820,652 / 2,738,907 / 2,766,026 / 2,820,704 (NCS) / 3,027,571 (Kobold)

This case concerns six patents relating to downhole tools used in fracking. NCS sued Kobold for infringement of five NCS patents. In response, Kobold sued NCS for infringement of Kobold’s 571 patent. It did not go well for NCS — all the claims in issue for all five patents were declared invalid, while Kobold was successful in its infringement counterclaim.

In broad brush terms, this strikes me as a case where a major new technology created new problems with obvious solutions. Horizontal fracking is relatively recent. It presents some new problems, such as clearing debris away from the tool. In a vertical well, this is accomplished largely by gravity — debris falls to the bottom of the well — but in horizontal wells, some other methods are necessary. The methods claimed by NCS were generally obvious or had already been tried: for example, if debris is getting stuck in a moving part, machine out a bit more clearance to allow free movement of the debris [1191]. Several ancillary arguments were raised along the way, of which the most important is the discussion of double patenting. I’ll deal with double patenting and overbreadth in subsequent posts. This post will provide an overview and briefly address a few of the other legal issues.

This is a very long decision. That is a direct result of an “everything but the kitchen sink” approach: “[a]fter closing submissions, the parties had narrowed the scope of claims at issue down from approximately 145 claims across seven patents to approximately 123 claims at issue across six patents, still with 128 separate issues.” McVeigh J was not impressed. She quoted Locke JA’s comments in Western Oilfield 2021 FCA 24 [9] as to “the lack of wisdom of raising so many issues on appeal,” with the result that “the appellants’ approach suggests that they themselves cannot identify any issues that are particularly strong” [5]. She reiterated that “putting all these issues before the Court was an unwise litigation strategy” and warned that

[9] Lest this become a trend for this Court, or for the parties before it, I feel compelled to state that, in my view, putting these countless issues before the Court for simultaneous determination was detrimental to the aims of the parties in presenting the most clear and effective arguments. It is also contrary to the general principle of this Court to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive outcome of every proceeding.

While McVeigh J directed her general comments at both parties, the fault lay primarily with NCS. Kobold successfully asserted one patent and four claims, which depended on three further claims [1623]. NCS asserted five patents and put over 120 claims in issue. NCS was comprehensively unsuccessful. All claims at issue — 128 in total — were declared invalid. Costs consequences followed: “There is a clear window here for an elevated lump sum costs award to incentivize efficiencies while sanctioning conduct with so many issues making it more complex.” Accordingly, McVeigh J awarded Kobold a lump sum of 45% of actual fees, up from the baseline of 37.5%, in significant part because “the multitude of claims and issues in this case unnecessarily enhanced the complexity of this case” [1671], [1674]. I must say that the 7.5% bump in the costs award strikes me as a modest sanction given the waste of judicial resources occasioned by NCS’s strategy. But maybe I am just inclined to be unsympathetic after having waded through 200 pages of claim construction.

While NCS’s strategy was certainly annoying, that doesn’t make it unwise. And while it failed in this case, that doesn’t necessarily mean it was a bad strategy; if you make a bet with good odds, it was a still a good bet to make, even if you lose. This is one of the most extreme versions of the kitchen sink strategy aka the “throw mud at the wall” strategy that I’ve seen, but that strategy is common enough in a more restrained form. This raises an interesting question about the ‘kitchen sink’ strategy: it makes the judges mad and risks an adverse costs award, but maybe that is worth it if it increases your chance of winning. I think it is pretty clear that the kitchen sink strategy sends a message to the court that you have a weak case. But given that you do have a weak case, is the kitchen sink strategy a good bet?

Of course, we can’t do a controlled study to see whether a more focused strategy is better, but I have to admit my eyes glazed over while reading hundreds of pages of claim construction, with each claim getting only a few paragraphs of analysis. And while I can’t see inside McVeigh J’s head, I have to suspect that it would have been easy for a few meritorious points to have been swamped by the routine of dismissing the unmeritorious arguments. This is particularly so because McVeigh J often found the evidence of NCS’s expert, Mr Lehr, to be wanting. He “took several positions which appeared at odds with expertise and historical facts” [92], and his arguments were regularly inconsistent with the documentary evidence: see eg [1286]. In some instances Mr. Lehr would read in new elements that were not in the claim at issue at all [1424]. I suspect NCS’s kitchen sink strategy had the effect of undermining the credibility of their own expert by inducing him to take unsupportable positions on weak claims that should never have been raised, rather than allowing him to take a stronger position on a smaller number of claims.

On the other hand, there were one or two places where the sheer volume of issues may have worked to NCS’s advantage. For example, Kobold did not carry its burden of showing that the 704 patent was obvious, because Kobold’s experts provided only conclusory statements and did not address inventiveness at the claim-by-claim level [1450]–[1452]. It is possible that these weaknesses in Kobold’s submissions were due to the sheer volume of arguments it had to deal with. (The claims were nonetheless invalid on other grounds.)

Some of the discussion was a bit difficult to follow because McVeigh J’s analysis sometimes plunged right into the weeds without making it clear why the issue mattered. Most of the hundreds of pages of claim construction were like that. While claim construction is antecedent to validity, without knowing “where the shoe pinches” it can be difficult to stay awake while reading about whether a “wedge” has to be wedge-shaped.

Priority and the use of file history

One argument that was particularly difficult to follow related to priority dates and the use of file history [1302]–[1337]. The Ravensberger patent (2,730,695), filed 11 Feb 2011 claimed an almost identical invention to the NCS 907 patent [1302], and claimed priority from US applications 12/842,099 (23 June 2010) and 12/971,932 (17 Dec 2010). The 907 patent was filed on 4 May 2011 and claimed priority to an 18 Oct 2010 US application (61/394,077). During prosecution of the 907 patent a protest was filed arguing that if the 907 patent could not claim priority from the US 077 application, then it was anticipated by the Ravensberger patent. (McVeigh J referred to the protest as being filed on 6 March 2012 [1305], but it appears she is referring to the protest filed on 26 March 2012.) The 907 patent nonetheless was granted, from which it might be inferred that the examiner had decided that it properly claimed priority from the 077 application. (Though I should say here that it is not clear to me why any of this mattered.) There was also a protest against the Ravensberger patent based on the 907 patent, apparently also raising a priority issue. NCS wanted to introduce the file history of the Ravensberger patent [1309]. (Again, I don’t understand what argument was being pursued and so I don’t know how the file history was supposed to be relevant.) McVeigh J reviewed this file history, and while she was of the view that the file history might in principle be used for purposes other than claim construction pursuant to s 53.1(1), she decided that she would not use the file history “essentially to re-argue the same protest in relation to the Ravensbergen when the Patent Office issued the patent with those priority dates” [1325]. That seems like a very reasonable conclusion, with the caveat that I don’t understand where the argument was going.

McVeigh J then stated that “[a]lthough Canadian jurisprudence does not appear to have directly addressed this question, priority can be asserted on a claim-by-claim basis” [1331]. I’m not aware of any caselaw on that point either, but nonetheless the point seems perfectly clear on the face of s 28.1(1): “The date of a claim . . . is. . . .” I expect that is why there is no jurisprudence on the point.

Then McVeigh J stated (my emphasis):

[1335] As such, it is possible for different claims to be subject to different priority dates relating to different, previously filed applications. However, I interpret this as taking place during the application process and not at the stage in an action where validity is being determined. This would amount to an ex post facto prosecution of the patent, and contrary to the role of this Court.

This is puzzling. On its face, the underlined sentence seems to to say that the Court cannot assess whether a claim can properly claim priority from a foreign filing. However, in the next paragraph McViegh J stated that “on this record with very limited argument and no expert assistance, I am not prepared to do a claim-by-claim review of priority dates” [1336]. That indicates that she would be prepared to assess priority, just not in the context of this particular patent and in particular given the (puzzling) reliance on the Ravensberger claim history. Further, in discussing Kobold’s 571 patent, McVeigh J did determine different claim dates for different claims [1586], saying “As stated earlier, I agree that it is possible to evaluate the claim date in the way NCS requests” [1580]. I take it the “earlier” is a reference to her discussion at [1302]–[1337] relating to the 907 patent. So, on the whole, it seems clear enough that McVeigh J is not suggesting that the claim date of different claims cannot be determined by the court. I would speculate that the underlined sentence was addressed to the specific argument being made by NCS — maybe to the effect that she was not prepared to review the priority date determinations made by the examiner in light of the prosecution history. That is a very reasonable position, which does not exclude the court reviewing the priority dates directly. I’ll just conclude by saying that it is perfectly clear from 28.2(1)(b) and 28.2(1), which governs anticipation generally, not just in the context of prosecution, that the claim date may be assessed by the court.

Grace Period

An invention must not have been obvious in light of the state of the art. Section 28.3(a) gives a one-year grace period which excludes information derived from the applicant from the state of the art. Kobold wanted to rely on a presentation referred to as “What up?” in attacking NCS’s patent. NCS objected that the presentation contained information derived from NCS and so could not be used [1258]. McVeigh J held that even if the presentation contained some information derived from NCS, 28.3(a) could not be used to exclude all information in the “What up?” presentation [1281]. That seems to be to be clearly correct. Both on the face of the Act and on a purposive analysis, it is only the information derived from the patentee that is excluded, not all information that is somehow associated with the information derived from the patentee.

Mosaicing art from different experts

NCS argued that in attacking the patent for obviousness, Kobold could only rely on references that were discussed by both of its experts, apparently on the view that where a piece of prior art is obvious, it should be obvious to both experts [1417]. McVeigh J rejected this: “I reject the proposition that references must be discussed by both (or all) experts where there is more than one expert giving their opinion for a single party. Once a piece of prior art forms part of the record, the Court is able to consider it under the obviousness analysis” [1418].

Inventive Concept

There has been a lot of controversy over the use of the inventive concept in claim construction: see here and here. My own view is that the EPO objective problem and solution approach is probably the best way: see here for my argument to that effect, and here, here and here describing the EPO approach. In this case, it seems that NCS’s expert generally wanted to characterize the inventive concept at a very abstract level, as being “active debris relief” [1097] (and see eg [1441]), but any real trouble was avoided by McVeigh J’s (clearly correct) insistence that obviousness must be addressed on a claim by claim basis: see eg [1435]–[1436]. In other instances, NCS’s expert described the inventive concept by simply paraphrasing the claims: see eg [1343]. That is a common approach, which is not necessarily a problem, but one has to ask what is gained by focusing on an ‘inventive concept’ that is just a paraphrase of the claims, as opposed to focusing on the claims themselves.

Ambiguity

It is difficult to establish ambiguity and consequently a successful attack based on ambiguity is rare, but in this case McVeigh J held two claims to be invalid as being “incapable of being meaningfully interpreted” [1530]; and see [1527]–[1532]. There is no new law here, but successful ambiguity attacks are rare enough that this one is noteworthy. (I did not review the claims myself so I do not have any independent opinion as to whether they were incapable of being meaningfully interpreted.)

Utility related to the nature of the invention

In AstraZeneca 2017 SCC 36 [53], the SCC stated that the utility of an invention must be “related to the nature of the subject-matter,” saying “a proposed invention cannot be saved by an entirely unrelated use. It is not sufficient for an inventor seeking a patent for a machine to assert it is useful as a paperweight.” We don’t see this argument used very often, but in this case NCS sought to save the 704 patent, which McVeigh J found to lack utility because it could not function without seals, by arguing that it would nonetheless be useful for cleaning the casing, presumably by pushing it through to shove debris, in the same way that a completely inoperative tool could be used. McVeigh J rejected this argument on the basis that cleaning did not relate to the nature of the invention [1512]. There is no new law, but as with ambiguity it’s noteworthy just because we don’t see this point raised very often. (NCS’s argument was a bit less absurd than the foregoing summary suggests, because an operable tool would clean the casing as part of its perforating and fracturing capabilities — but it was a desperate argument nonetheless.)

Remedy

McVeigh J allowed the successful patentee, Kobold to elect between an accounting and damages, saying “With respect to an accounting of profits, no evidence has been advanced to suggest the parties may not be entitled to this relief. With the bifurcated phase with respect to damages ahead, there is no reason to deny such relief given the Defendants came to the Court with clean hands” [1659]. The direct implication is that the successful patentee is presumptively entitled to an accounting, barring some reason for denying it, such as unclean hands. As I noted in a post on an earlier case, in a two part article forthcoming in the IPJ and summarized in a series of blog posts, I have argued that Nova v Dow 2022 SCC 43 wrought such a major change in the principles on which the quantum of an accounting is assessed that the courts should revisit the principles on which an accounting is granted.