Apotex Inc v Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc [Apotex s 8 Liability Appeal] 2014 FCA 68 Sharlow JA,
Pelletier JA concurring, Mainville JA dissenting, var’g 2012 FC 553 Snider J ( blog blog);
Teva Canada Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc [Teva s 8 Liability Appeal] 2014 FCA 67 Sharlow
JA, Dawson JA concurring, Mainville JA dissenting, var’g 2012 FC 552 Snider J (blog blog)
ramipril / ALTACE
Under the patent linkage set provided for in the PM(NOC) Regulations, a generic that would
otherwise be in a position to receive an NOC as a result of an ANDS will be placed on “patent
hold” until it has addressed all the patents listed against the drug in question by the innovator /
patentee whose drug was the reference product for the ANDS. The generic can respond with a
Notice of Allegation, alleging invalidity or non-infringement, and if the patentee responds, a
statutory stay is triggered under s 7, preventing the generic from receiving its NOC until the
patents have expired or the generic has prevailed on its allegations in NOC proceedings. If the
generic is successful, s 8(1) makes the patentee liable to the generic for losses suffered from
having been wrongly (in hindsight) held off the market by the statutory stay. The patent linkage
system is analogous to an automatic interlocutory injunction, and s 8 is analogous to the
undertaking in damages which is usually required for a plaintiff to obtain such an injunction.
The Apotex and Teva s 8 Liability Appeals raise some unusual issues regarding the start and end
dates for the section 8 liability period (which I have previously called the compensable period).
While the facts were unusual, this means that the FCA had the opportunity to clarify some
principles which are not as apparent in more routine situations.
Showing posts with label ramipril. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ramipril. Show all posts
Friday, March 28, 2014
Thursday, March 27, 2014
What is the "But For" World under S 8 of the NOC Regulations?
Apotex Inc v Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc [Apotex s 8 Liability Appeal] 2014 FCA 68 Sharlow JA,
Pelletier JA concurring, Mainville JA dissenting, var’g 2012 FC 553 Snider J ( blog blog);
Teva Canada Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc [Teva s 8 Liability Appeal] 2014 FCA 67 Sharlow JA, Dawson JA concurring, Mainville JA dissenting, var’g 2012 FC 552 Snider J (blog blog)
ramipril / ALTACE
In these companion cases, the FCA has split on a very difficult issue relating to calculation of damages under s 8 of the NOC Regulations.* Damages generally are assessed by a comparison of the actual world with a “but for” or hypothetical world in which the wrong had not occurred. Sharlow J for the majority in the FCA, Mainville J in dissent, and Snider J at trial, all accepted that this basic principle should apply to s 8. The question is how exactly to construct the hypothetical world in assessing damages under s 8. Should we assume that NOC Regulations were effective against all generics, so that everything would have unfolded exactly as it did, except that the claimant would have received its NOC, and entered the market, notwithstanding the statutory stay? Should we assume that the NOC Regulations did not exist at all in the compensable period, for either the claimant or other generics which might have entered the market? Should we assume that NOC Regulations were effective against all generics except the claimant? These were essentially the positions taken by Sharlow J, Mainville J, and Snider J respectively. In the end, there is no perfect answer to this question.
Teva Canada Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc [Teva s 8 Liability Appeal] 2014 FCA 67 Sharlow JA, Dawson JA concurring, Mainville JA dissenting, var’g 2012 FC 552 Snider J (blog blog)
ramipril / ALTACE
In these companion cases, the FCA has split on a very difficult issue relating to calculation of damages under s 8 of the NOC Regulations.* Damages generally are assessed by a comparison of the actual world with a “but for” or hypothetical world in which the wrong had not occurred. Sharlow J for the majority in the FCA, Mainville J in dissent, and Snider J at trial, all accepted that this basic principle should apply to s 8. The question is how exactly to construct the hypothetical world in assessing damages under s 8. Should we assume that NOC Regulations were effective against all generics, so that everything would have unfolded exactly as it did, except that the claimant would have received its NOC, and entered the market, notwithstanding the statutory stay? Should we assume that the NOC Regulations did not exist at all in the compensable period, for either the claimant or other generics which might have entered the market? Should we assume that NOC Regulations were effective against all generics except the claimant? These were essentially the positions taken by Sharlow J, Mainville J, and Snider J respectively. In the end, there is no perfect answer to this question.
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