Monday, June 8, 2020

"Foreign Prosecution History Is Inadmissible"

Gemak v Jempak 2020 FC 644 Lafrenière J

            2,276,428 / 2,337,069


After a decade in which it was almost unheard of for the Federal Court to grant a contested motion for summary trial or summary judgment in a patent case, it seems they are now raining down upon us, with Lafrenière J’s summary judgment decision in Gemak v Jempak following Manson J’s decisions in Viiv v Gilead 2020 FC 486 (here) and Canmar 2019 FC 1233 (here). Lafrenière J’s decision in this case is a good example of summary judgment being used to dispose expeditiously of a far-fetched claim construction argument. It is also notable for holding expressly that foreign prosecution history is not admissible under s 53.1. This is in tension with Manson J’s holding in Canmar that foreign prosecution history should be admissible, albeit only in “extraordinary circumstances” [73], [74], [77].


Gemak’s 428 patent at issue was to a dishwasher detergent pod. These pods commonly use percarbonate as a bleaching agent which is activated on exposure to water. Percarbonate is susceptible to degradation by contact with other detergent ingredients or by moisture. For that reason, the percarbonate must be coated to protect it prior to actual use of the pod. Claim 1 is representative [13]:

 

A detergent composition comprising a granulated percarbonate and a blend which encapsulates the percarbonate, the blend comprising . . . carboxymethyl cellulose [CMC]


Jempak’s detergent pods included percarbonate encapsulated in a protective coating. It was not really disputed that the use of CMC was an essential element of the claim [119]. It was also established that the protective coating used by Jempak did not comprise CMC. Gemak’s main argument was that CMC was present in the other detergent ingredients in Jempak’s pods, and that once the pod was assembled, the CMC in the other ingredients could adhere to the percarbonate coating, and that the resulting coating with CMC adhering to it would constitute “a blend” comprising CMC which encapsulates the percarbonate [121]. Lafrenière J rejected this on the view that “encapsulation refers to a protective coating (a blend) that is applied to the percarbonate during its manufacture to maintain the stability of the percarbonate and to prevent it from decomposing prematurely before use” [123]. Gemak’s position was not helped by its “evasive and defiant” expert witness [104].


It strikes me that this is an excellent example of the kind of argument that should not be allowed to proceed to a full trial. The patent system is rife with the potential for abuse, in large part due to the cost and complexity of patent litigation. The cost-effective disposition of weak claims is essential to ensuring that the patent system encourages innovation, rather than impeding it.


The other notable point is that Jampak sought to adduce evidence of the US prosecution history. Lafrenière J refused to allow this evidence, in part because it was introduced too late [77] and in part because it would not assist the court [78]. But he also held expressly that “foreign prosecution history is inadmissible” under the new s 53.1 of the Act: [86], and generally [82]-[86]. This holding was primarily based on a straightforward textual argument:

 

[83] Subsection 53.1(1) provides that the prosecution history may be admitted into evidence in an action to rebut any representation made by the patentee regarding claim construction, but only when specific conditions are met. In particular, subparagraph 53.1(1)(b)(ii) provides that the communication must be between the applicant and “the Commissioner, an officer or employee of the Patent Office or a member of a re-examination board.”

 

[84] The definition of “Commissioner” is set out in section 2 of the Patent Act as meaning the Commissioner of Patents, who is appointed by the Governor in Council and exercises the powers and performs the duties conferred and imposed on that officer by or pursuant to the Patent Act. The Patent Office described in section 3 as an office attached to the Department of Industry, or to such other department of the Government of Canada as may be determined by the Governor in Council.


Further,

 

[86] There is a further presumption against the legislature impliedly changing established law, particularly the common law. If Parliament had intended that communications prepared in respect of the prosecution of the application for a foreign patent could be admitted, clearer language would be required to effect that result. In the circumstances, I conclude that section 53.1 did not change the existing rule, as enunciated in Free World Trust, that foreign prosecution history is inadmissible.


I made some similar points in my blog post on Manson J’s decision in Canmar 2019 FC 1233 [77], which held that in “extraordinary” circumstances foreign prosecution history should be admissible to aid in construction of the Canadian claims.

 

On the other hand, “[t]he language of section 53.1 is limited to communications between the patentee and the Canadian Patent Office” [70]. In particular, per s 53.1(b)(ii), the communication must be between the applicant and “the Commissioner, an officer or employee of the Patent Office or a member of a re-examination board.”

 

Further, prior to the enactment of s 53.1, it was clear law that “statements made during prosecution of Canadian patent applications or corresponding foreign patent applications were neither relevant nor admissible with respect to construing terms used in issued Canadian patents” [58]; and Free World 2000 SCC 66 [66]. As a matter of statutory interpretation, “[i]t is presumed that the legislature does not intend to make any change in the existing law beyond that which is expressly stated in, or follows by necessary implication from, the language of the statute in question”: R v T (V) [1992] 1 SCR 749, quoting with approval Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes; and see also Parry Sound v OPSEU [2003] 2 SCR 157 [39]. This implies that s 53.1, in providing for admissibility of communications to the Canadian examiner, did not change the existing rule that foreign prosecution history is inadmissible.


I’d say that someone owes me a beer.


In any event, there is evidently some tension with Manson J’s holding in Canmar that foreign prosecution history should be admissible, albeit only in “extraordinary circumstances” [73], [74], [77]. Lafrenière J did not directly discuss Manson J’s holding on this point.

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