Does Canada Really Follow the “English Rule” for Costs?

ABB Technology AG v Hyundai Heavy Industries Co, Ltd 2013 FC 1050 Barnes J

Cost-shifting has been big news lately in the US as a way of discouraging patent trolls, and in conversation I have heard it suggested that trolls are not a major problem in Canada because we follow the “English rule,” that costs follow the cause. There is a real debate as to whether the English rule actually deters trolls – my intuition is that it might deter trolls who are asserting weak patents for nuisance value settlement, but it is unlikely to deter trolls who are asserting strong and important patents that impact major markets. (And see this IPKat report of the debate being joined in Europe.)

But a more basic question from a Canadian perspective is raised by this costs award in ABB Tech v Hyundai: do we really follow the English rule? In ABB Tech v Hyundai 2013 FC 947 (blogged here), the defendant Hyundai was entirely successful: the plaintiff’s action was dismissed and both patents in issue were declared invalid. The defendant’s actual legal costs exclusive of disbursements, were $2,809,161 [2]. Costs calculated at the middle of Column III would have been $75,337 – less than 3% of actual costs [3]. Costs at the top of Column IV, which seems to be the norm in hard-fought patent cases, would have been $289,495, or just over 10% of actual costs. In the end, Barnes J felt that a premium even above Column IV was warranted [4], and he awarded $350,000 [8] – which is 12.5% of actual costs.

Readers in practice will know whether these numbers are representative of costs awards generally, but they are at least generally consistent with what I have seen in other costs decisions in which actual costs were disclosed. Barnes J confirmed this in his remark that “This case exemplifies the growing disparity between the Federal Court tariff and the actual costs of patent litigation” [4]. Barnes J continued to say, “but that [disparity] alone is not a basis for departing wholly from the tariff in assessing costs. If it were otherwise the tariff would rarely, if ever, be used in cases of this type.” I think this is right. Rule 400(1) does state that “The Court shall have full discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs and the determination of by whom they are to be paid,” and the Court has already exercised that discretion in systematically departing from the prima facie rule of Col III that is set out in Rule 407, in favour of the top end of Column IV. But in order to maintain consistency and predictability, a complete departure from the tariff is a policy matter that should be implemented deliberately, rather than by the exercise of the discretion of individual judges.

Perhaps it is time for a deliberate reconsideration of the costs rules. It seems to me that now we don’t really follow the English rule in a functional sense. We have a hybrid in which costs awards are big enough to fight over (thus increasing costs), but not big enough to make any difference to litigation strategy. That may be the worst of both worlds.